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
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


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MODERN WAR: ITS THEORY AND PRACTICE.

ILLUSTRATED FROM CELEBRATED CAMPAIGNS
AND BATTLES.

With Maps and Diagrams.

BY EMERIC SZABAD,
CAPTAIN U.S.A.


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P R E F A C E.

WHEN I resolved, last year, to leave the Italian service and go to America, I had in view the two-fold object of fighting and of describing the events of the war. Having been temporarily relieved from active service by the close of the operations in Western Virginia of the army under General Fremont, to which I was attached, and the time for me to write of the war not having come, I thought that I might do service by preparing a volume embodying, in a popular form, an exposition of military operations from their most elementary principles up to their highest development, as taught and acted upon by the great masters of the Art of War.

In carrying out my design, I have, as far as possible, avoided technical expressions, which, though useful for the professional soldier, are an embarrassment to the general reader, for whom I have written. I have endeavored to illustrate the prin-

ciples laid down by examples of their direct application in the most famous campaigns and battles of modern times. My labor will not be useless if, in times like the present, I shall have succeeded in enabling the general reader to form some adequate conception of the Theory and Practice of Modern War.

E. S.

NEW YORK, December, 1862.

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MODERN WAR.

CHAPTER I.

PROGRESS OF THE ART OF WAR.

Ancient and Modern Wars.—Meaning of Modern Tactics.—Slow Progress of the Art of War.—Modern Generals and Generalship.

WAR is no novelty in human society. The first two brothers born in this world began the fight; and it has ever since, from time to time, swept the face of the earth with more or less greater masses. Some of the nations of antiquity, as the Greeks and Romans, remain to the present day famous for their martial spirit and warlike achievements. Yet there is nothing on which human energy is brought to bear that has made such slow progress as war—a singular phenomenon, indeed, and the more so if it be considered that the progress finally made consists chiefly in form! However, that great progress has been made is a fact patent to every one at all acquainted with the history of war.

War is now an Art and a Science. There is

hardly a progress made in science or mechanical arts from which war has remained isolated. Steam and electricity alike serve its purposes; and hence the vast discrepancy between the ancient and modern wars. Canrobert and Pelissier could, every second day, converse from the shores of the Euxine with the Emperor Napoleon sitting in the Tuilleries. What would Hannibal not have given could he, from before the gates of Rome, have exchanged messages with his superiors, the merchants of Carthage? On close examination, and not forgetting our fire-arms, the points of resemblance between ancient and modern campaigns must therefore appear very few, and all parallels imaginary. It would certainly be absurd to try to compare the siege of Troy with that of Sebastopol; and equally idle would it be to seek to establish a parallelism between Hannibal's and Napoleon's Italian campaigns. Hannibal passed the Alps; Napoleon passed the Alps; the one carried over thirty-seven elephants, the other as many guns; both passed the Po at Piacenza. Here is the beginning and end of the parallel. There is hardly more than a shadow of resemblance in their tactics. Even the wars of Louis XIV. offer, in more than one respect, a great discrepancy compared to the present system. At that period there was, for example, no difference between siege and field artillery, which,

to our notions of mobility, seems almost incomprehensible. Indeed, considering the tactic operations of the modern battle-field with the combined, harmonious action of the "Three Arms," the ancient battles must appear as so many multitudes of single combats.

Our instruments and means of war are infinitely more studied and more varied, and so are our tactic forms. Here, it should be remembered, form is substance. There is an immense difference of intrinsic value in the mere shape of the battle array. The more ancient nations used to form their line of battle of a mass a hundred ranks or a hundred men deep. The Greek phalanx was sixteen ranks deep. The Romans, who improved upon the Greeks, reduced the depth of the legion to ten ranks. All these formations would now prove more or less ruinous. Imagine such deep masses exposed to the rifles of French chasseurs, or the plunging discharges of a rifled battery! Whole hosts of Hectors and Ajaxes would be mowed down in a few minutes like grass.

The difficulty of modern generalship is thus evident. The present tactic forms, the variety and nature of the weapons, all render necessary expansion. Three or four regiments will now cover as wide a front as that of the whole army of Cæsar or Pompey. Those generals could survey each oth-

ers' line of battle with ease; but how different is the case now, where any army of considerable strength occupies several miles. Yet, without a close survey of the battle-ground, no prudent general will engage in battle. He can not advantageously and properly dispose of the "three arms," infantry, cavalry, artillery, without closely examining the whole battle-field and the surrounding ground. This palpable difference holds as well with regard to the general dispositions of the plan of campaign. The present state of society, political and otherwise, with its ramified system of communication, and its centres of commercial and industrial activity, renders the mere choice of a line of operation a rather difficult task. It mattered little to Hannibal, after passing the Alps, whether he marched first on Turin or Milan; but this was certainly not so with Napoleon in the campaign that led to the battle of Marengo. Napoleon had well to weigh the strategic value of these two capitals, both from a military point of view and politically.

The requirements of a military leader at the present time are thus of a no common order. He must know Tactics and Strategy, and be possessed, besides, of a political intellect. By *Tactics* are meant the movements or manoeuvres of troops in and around the battle-field; while *Strategy* applies to the preparatory marches intended to take the ene-

my at unawares, and to impart to the battle particular results.

Almost all the battles of Napoleon and Frederick the Great were preceded by strategic marches. The familiar adage, "Knowledge is power." applies eminently to war. There is little hope in war without knowledge. It is the knowledge of the art of war that makes European armies easily vanquish their adversaries in every part of the globe. Look at the victories of the English in the Indies! Spain, which, in the present age, was by no means marked for its warlike spirit, was recently seen to reap, in Morocco, victory after victory against the Moors, a most valiant race. It is by the application of art that a general is enabled to turn the tide of battle; to repose under the shelter of night, then begin anew, and again recline on the gory bed, and then again resume the strife, and at last extort victory. What were the combats of the Titans to a battle of two or three days, such as fought by the disciplined and inspired hosts of Napoleon? Where the semblance of it in the annals of antiquity?

Mobility, variety, and precision, these are the terms in which the meaning of modern tactics may be summed up. Strange as it may appear, it is an irrefragable fact that it is but little more than 100 years since armies first learned how to march. It was Marshal Saxe, under Louis XV., who first in-

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troduced the marching in close order, the soldiers feeling each others' elbows. It was he that first discovered the *cadenced* step, the charm of rhythm in the marching order. Without this, no manœuvres worth the name are at all possible; certainly not that steady, majestic, onward march which invariably carries with it such moral weight. The very earth seems as if to incline in veneration beneath the footprints of such a moving battle array.

No doubt, good systematic dispositions, with a well-organized and well-disciplined army, are not always sufficient to insure success, especially if the enemy enjoys the same advantages; but knowledge and systematic combinations are sure to guarantee against errors and palpable blunders. The chief thing in war, says Napoleon, is to trust as little as possible to hazard. The broad outlines of the plan of a campaign, for offensive or defensive operations, the defense and attack of fortified places, defiles, bridges, etc., the nature of marching orders, the forms of the battle array, the nature of the outpost service—all are comprehended in the military code of the present time. Indeed, it is a no common sight to behold tens of thousands of human beings, a prey to passion and enthusiasm, moved with regularity and precision amid the clashing of swords, the tramp of the horse, and the boom of hundreds of guns, by the will of a single mind!

And this happens, in a greater or less degree, with every well-disciplined army. War, in short, has now its fixed, well-defined rules, subject only to small modifications and few exceptions. It can no more be said that the science of war is covered with darkness. If it is covered with any thing, it is with blood.

The first systematic change in the form of the line of battle dates from Gustavus Adolphus. That hero-king, who also perceived the necessity of subdivision in order to arrive at mobility, reduced the battle-line to six ranks deep. Marshal Saxe went farther, reducing it to four ranks deep; while Frederick the Great introduced the three-rank line, which continues, in most armies, down to the present time. In England and the United States the line of battle has for many years been formed on two ranks, the same form having been used by Marshal St. Arnaud in the Crimea.

In these gradual reforms one may thus find a rough survey of the general progress of the art of war, apart from the progress implied in the invention of new arms. In fact, the invention of the mere bayonet, which dates from the beginning of the 18th century, and which is ascribed to Vauban, has alone caused a sort of revolution in warfare. The bayonet, it must be remembered, is not in vain called the "queen of arms;" it is the sole weapon

fit for desperate close combat; it can boast of the noblest victories, even in the hand of young soldiers; it is never unfaithful if wielded by the brave. The recent improvement of the fire-arms—the rifled guns—also served to produce tactic alterations.

That the tactic subdivisions of an army, from the company to the corps d'armée, stand in close harmony with the chief principles of military operations, is hardly necessary to say; and it is equally evident that the command of the respective subdivisions demands far different acquirements. The leader of a corps d'armée, called upon to act separately, must know something more of military art than the brigadier or the general of a division; and what will be sufficient to know for a captain of a company or a squadron, can not be enough for the commander of a regiment. All officers must try to master every thing belonging to their sphere; the higher officers not to disdain to learn the duties of even the corporal, though, in many respects, the parts are quite different.

There has been certainly more than one great military leader who would have made a poor drilling sergeant; the talent required for planning campaigns, fighting great battles, has little in common with the minutiae of military drill and routine. Napoleon, who, from an artillery officer, became at once the commander in chief of a great army, count-

ed more than one sergeant in his lines who could better pass through the *Ecole de Bataillon* than himself. But he knew what they did not know, the best possible application of the elementary manœuvres, and also the grand tactics. And if generals are not, like poets, born; and if they must learn war and see war, it is as true, on the other hand, that intellect and natural aptitude will greatly shorten the duration of apprenticeship. Frederick the Great has disposed of this point in his own peculiar way. Discoursing one day with an old military pedant, who stood up fiercely for all officers of long years' service, he asked him abruptly whether a mule that had made seven campaigns under Prince Eugene of Savoy was a better tactician than at the beginning. Yet the philosopher king knew pretty well how to appreciate military knowledge and experience. And he knew, also, what a great many generals of long service did not know and do not know. Amid the din and terror of battle, he would sit down and write verses. Totally beaten, and with the loss of 101 guns, he retreated across a narrow valley and took up position on the opposite height, almost in reach of the enemy's batteries. General Bem exhibited similar feats in the Hungarian war of 1848. Such strokes are the appanages of genius, conscious of his moral hold and superiority over his followers and the enemy. This

qualification of a leader, his moral influence, which is of such moment, and which can be acquired neither by study nor long service, can fully manifest itself only after continued successes or single brilliant feats. It was after the tall grenadier veterans saw the little stripling Napoleon press in their midst on the bridge of Lodi that they, with one outburst of enthusiasm, proclaimed him their corporal.

CHAPTER II.

THE ARMY.

Component Parts of an Army.—The Three Arms.—Tactic Sub-divisions of an Army.—French and Austrian Armies.—Levying of an Army.—Reserves.—Meaning of the Staff.—Elementary Infantry Manceuvres or Forms of Battle Array.—Value of the different Forms.—Skirmishers.—Latest Skirmishing System.—Tactics of Cavalry.—The Artillery.—Value of the new Fire-arms.—Bugeaud's Tactics in Algiers.—Moral Momentum of an Army.—Frederick the Great at Leuthen.

ANY considerable number of armed men, subject to certain rules and commanded by certain chiefs, may be called an army. But to really deserve that name, it must attain a certain degree of perfection in its organization both as regards its military instruction and administration. Every well-organized army is composed of three arms—*Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery*; the technic corps, including the engineers, sappers, miners, and pontoniers, enter only into the general combination as fractions.

The infantry is the basis and marrow of every army. It forms generally about four fifths of the whole army. The proportion of cavalry varies, according to the nature of the theatre of war, from one fifth to one eighth; that of artillery averages

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from one to four pieces per thousand men. New troops require more artillery. Much also depends in these compositions upon the nature of the enemy and the particular aim in view.

The reason of the great preponderance of infantry is obvious enough. It is easily recruited, easily instructed, and easily nourished. It can march over ground and take position where it can be followed neither by artillery nor cavalry. The foot soldier has the additional advantage of being able to carry with him a whole week's provisions and fifty or sixty cartridges—the whole weight not exceeding as many pounds. Nor is the infantry less important from its intrinsic value. The present rifle, with range of 600 or 800 yards, added to the bayonet, is a most formidable weapon; it is alike effective for the offensive and defensive. The infantry can, moreover, stand its ground alone without the assistance of the other two arms.

An army, especially in time of war, must have its *dépôts*, formed of the reserves and recruits necessary for the filling up of the gaps which are sure to occur.

The primary requisites of an army in the field are discipline, a fair knowledge of the proper use of its arms, and the usual movements consisting of the drilling practice.* These movements or ma-

* Drilling manœuvres are generally designated by the name of "School of Battalion," "Field Evolutions," "Regulations of Drill

nœuvres are the means of what is called *Tactics*, and which appertain to the knowledge of the officers. It will suffice for the soldiers to know the mechanism of the movements or tactic formations, but it is necessary that the officers know their true meaning and intrinsic value. Hence the advantage of a fair proportion of officers. In Austria and Prussia, for example, the average proportion is one officer for fifty soldiers; in France, one for thirty-five.

To act and move well, either separately or in large masses, every army is made to consist of subdivisions or *tactic unities*. The battalion, regiment, brigade, division, corps d'armée, all present a tactic part of an army. Even the squad of eight or twelve men, led by the corporal, has its tactic meaning. The highest tactic unity is the corps d'armée; it is chiefly intended for independent separate operations. In France this division is only temporary, when required by exigencies of war. With regard to cavalry, the squadron answers to the battalion of infantry. The battery is the tactic unity of artillery.

Generally speaking, two or three battalions make a regiment, as many regiments a brigade, as many

Practice," etc. ; but nowhere by the name of "Tactics," as is the case in the United States. In European philosophy these manœuvres are no more tactics than the conjugation of verbs is rhetoric. A man may, for example, know by heart the tactics of Scott and Hardee, and other similar manuals of drilling practice, without at all approaching a tactician. Tactics is the Science or Art of which the drilling manœuvres are the means.

brigades a division, and two or three divisions form a corps d'armée. Twenty thousand is the average strength of the latter.

Each of the three arms consists of two classes—*Light* and *Heavy*, each having its particular task on the field of operation.

The French army, exclusive of the Guard, numbers:

INFANTRY.

103 regiments of the line (heavy).
 20 battalions of *chasseurs à pied*.
 3 regiments of *Zouaves*.
 3 battalions of light infantry *d'Afrique*.
 3 regiments of *Algeriens*.

CAVALRY.

10 regiments of cuirassiers,	} heavy.
21 " " dragoons,	
8 " " lancers,	} light.
12 " " chasseurs,	
8 " " hussars,	
3 " " chasseurs <i>d'Afrique</i> ,	
3 " " spahis,	

ARTILLERY.

5 foot regiments,
 7 mounted "
 4 horse "

Besides these, there is a regiment of pontoniers. The whole artillery forms 16 foot batteries, 10 mounted, and 8 horse batteries. On a war footing, the total army, including the reserves, amounts to about 600,000. The numbers of the generals are, 12 marshals, 80 generals of divisions, and 160 brigadiers.

The Austrian army numbers:

INFANTRY.

80 regiments of the line,
25 " " chasseurs, or *Jägers*,
14 " " border regiments (also light infantry).

CAVALRY.

8 regiments of cuirasseurs,
8 " " dragoons,
12 " " lancers,
12 " " hussars.

ARTILLERY.

12 regiments of field artillery,
14 " " heavy or garrison artillery,
1 " " rockets; each regiment forming 3, 4,
or 6 batteries.

It is hardly necessary to say that it is of great importance that the classification be something more than nominal. The light infantry, which generally opens the battle, and which is used as skirmishers, requires particular instruction and practice; such special names as riflemen, sharpshooters, etc., will avail very little in the reality of war.

Whether an army be raised by voluntary enlistment or conscription is a question of policy. In 1793, France, threatened by vast coalitions, had recourse to both modes of recruitment, and a million and a half of enthusiastic recruits were raised and organized within a few months. The army was divided into demi-brigades, formed of one old and two young regiments. Advancement happened

partly by seniority and partly by choice, the volunteers electing their own officers. The Directory soon found necessary to rescind this privilege of the volunteers, and, under the Consulate, it was entirely done away with. Napoleon declares decidedly in favor of conscription without exemption. He calls this system the root of a nation—its moral purification.

All European armies, the English excepted, are now based on conscription. Every Frenchman who has attained his twentieth year is subject to military service; and the annual contingent thus raised amounts to about 100,000. The reserves, which constitute about one third, are, in regular armies, chiefly formed of the soldiers on leave, which is obtained after a service of a couple of years, as also of the recruits kept at the *dépôts*.

The Prussian system of reserves rests mainly on the *Landwehr*, comprising the male population from the age of 25 to 40, and who assemble annually in autumn for the sake of drill practice. It is the perfect organization of reserves that enables a country easily to place an army from its peace footing on a war footing.

The foregoing figures will suffice to give a general idea of the proportion of the *Three Arms* in usual circumstances; and all that is necessary here to add is that an army, to be efficient for field oper-

ations, must also have a well-organized *Etat major*, or "Staff." Whatever the genius and activity of the commanding general be, he must needs have at his side officers to aid him in developing his ideas and carrying out his plans, and to keep him informed of the state of the army. It is this kind of officers that form the Staff. They must be possessed of general culture and superior attainments as military men. They are sent out to make reconnoisances, to trace an encampment, and sometimes they are ordered to direct the operations on the battle-field. The drawing up of the "orders of the day" and the making up of reports, which fall to the share of the staff, is in itself no easy task. Many evils have been caused in war from imperfect, ambiguous instructions. Under Napoleon, the *Etat major* was brought to the highest perfection. Read, for example, the marching orders of Marshal Berthier of 1805, and you have the strategic history of that marvelous campaign.

Let us now proceed to the explanation of the tactic forms.

The usual tactic formations which armies have to pass through before and in battle, and which the officers ought well to know and comprehend, are the following—to begin with infantry:


There are four tactic forms in which infantry usually goes to battle:

1st. Deployed in line of battle, two or three ranks deep.


2d. In columns.

3d. In mixed order.

4th. In squares.



The respective value of these formations may easily be seen. The evident advantage of the *deployed* form is, that it offers a wide front, and enables the fire-arms to have their full play; and it is the natural mode of attack; but it has also its disadvantages. This form, from its want of solidity or depth, is apt to be easily broken through; it offers but a feeble defense against cavalry; and it is,



moreover, not practicable except on an unbroken ground. It was owing to these inconveniences that the other formations have been gradually devised.

A battalion formed in *columns*, by battalion, company, or platoon, offers at once the advantage of easy movement and vigorous attack. The very form of a column, as also the proximity of the officers to the men, raises the courage of the soldiers; and if carried on with energy, an attack in columns can seldom fail, unless exposed to a heavy artillery fire. The disadvantage of the column, on the other hand, is the paucity of its fire, and hence the necessity of skirmishers to protect the flanks of the column. Too deep columns, formed of whole regiments or brigades placed behind each other, are to be avoided as most ruinous. Napoleon had to experience this lesson both at Wagram and Waterloo; and recently the same lesson was taught at Inkermann and the Tschernaya. The mission of columns is to carry strong fortified positions or points. This form, however, is also available for the defensive against cavalry. The nature of the "mixed form" may be understood by itself; it consists in the disposing of the troops according to what is aimed at, partly in line and partly in columns.

The *square* is essentially a defensive formation against cavalry. The usual square is formed of a battalion or regiment, and sometimes of even larger

bodies. The effect of several squares flanking each other was tried for the first time, with signal success, by Napoleon, in Egypt, against the intrepid Mamelukes. Generally speaking, squares are hollow; that is, four or six ranks deep. Sometimes, however, they present a solid mass. In the former case the artillery may be placed inside.

In addition to these formations, which, with a few modifications, constitute the only practical manœuvres of infantry, mention must also be made of the *Tirailleurs* or "Skirmishers."

Skirmishers are light infantry, which go to battle at different distances from each other, free from the forms above mentioned. They are, as it were, irregular regulars. They date from the French Revolution, when many intelligent, enthusiastic youths rushed to the field of battle before having had the opportunity to pass through the usual school of training. The share of skirmishers in the bloody task of war has since been rendered more systematic. The recent exploits of the French *tirailleurs* in the Crimea, and on the fields of Magenta and Solferino, are familiar enough. The task of skirmishers is to open the battle; to unmask the enemy's position, and to annoy him from a quarter where he least expects to be attacked. Besides being a good marksman, the skirmisher must also be courageous, agile, and self-reliant. He is, as it were, his own

general. The French character is very fit for this kind of service; and this might also be the case with the soldier of the United States. A single company of good skirmishers will often render useless the efforts of a formidable battery, by shooting down the gunners, as was the case at the battle of Alma.

We shall here add a few details, as set forth in the "Ordnance" of 1858 for the *Chasseurs à Pied*.

The movements of the French skirmishers happen usually with the *pas de charge*—130 paces per minute; or, if necessary, the *pas gymnastique*, which varies from 160 to 180 paces per minute. The skirmishing line or chain may be formed of companies or battalions, according to the number of troops present. A skirmishing company is divided into two or four sections, guided by the non-commissioned officers, and groups consisting of four men, called *camarades de combat*. The latter form, in case of need, rough squares. These comrades must try not to be more distant than five paces from each other. A company sent forward to cover a battalion extends over the whole battalion front; sometimes they break to the right and left to cover the flanks. Each skirmishing line must have its reserve, which must follow the movements of the line. The distance of the reserve from the line is about 150 paces. The captain and the com-

manding sub-officers follow the chain a few paces behind, to survey and guide the movement, each accompanied by four men and a bugler. The command or signal must be repeated by the sub-officers. The reserve must generally be strong enough to relieve half of the number thrown forward.

The skirmishing line is formed on two ranks. The men ought to know how to load in every position—kneeling, lying on the ground, and moving. They take advantage, in advancing, of every cover or shelter offered by the nature of the ground, without heeding the form of the line. Skirmishers must, above all, take sure aim. The firing happens either from the line in position or marching. The first rank fires and hastens to load again. This done, the second rank fires, and so both ranks keep up the fire. If the line is marching, then, at the command "Fire," the men of the first rank halt, fire, and load before marching farther. Meanwhile the second rank passes 10 or 12 paces beyond the first rank, halts, and fires; and so the firing is kept up. The skirmishers must take care to keep the direction, so as not to lose the connection between each other. If the line is retreating, the first-rank men make front, fire, and retreat behind the second rank; this done, the latter halt, fire, and retreat in the same way; the firing being thus kept up. The rallying must always be done with rapidity. Sometimes

skirmishers are thrown forward in strong numbers—*en grande bande*—to carry certain points or positions.

The *Cavalry* is styled the “arm of the moment,” and very precious moments it sometimes has. On the battle-field its principal task is to fall on the enemy after he has been shaken by the infantry, and to complete his defeat; or to spread confusion by a dash on his rear or flanks. Its main strength lies in the shock, especially formidable to young infantry troops. Fire-arms are of much less use to the cavalry man than the sabre, which he can only use with effect when he is perfect master of his horse. Like the battalion of infantry, the squadron forms a tactic unity of the cavalry.

The cavalry has two tactic formations—in line of battle two ranks deep, and in columns, the one and other being sometimes in *echelons*. The attack in columns is generally used against infantry formed in squares, which demands the greatest effort.

The task of the *Artillery* is to spread destruction in certain points of the enemy’s lines, and to silence his batteries. It is, consequently, a most powerful auxiliary, though it never suffices of itself, but constantly needs the protection of the other two arms. It forms usually for action in batteries consisting of six or eight pieces. As its action is exercised on single points, the choice of position is often very dif-

ficult. In military language, artillery is a "defensive" arm, just as much as cavalry is an "offensive" one.

The Artillery is divided into two classes—field artillery and siege artillery. The field-pieces in France and the United States are eight and twelve pounder guns and twelve-pounder howitzers. The Austrians have different calibres, such as three, six, and twelve pounders, besides rocket batteries—a quite recent invention.

The *new fire-arms* present, no doubt, a most formidable apparatus of destruction, both from their precision and wide range, as also from the variety of the missiles. They have thus necessarily modified the system of tactics. The most manifest result of the new fire-arms has been to enhance the value of the skirmishing form, and to establish the *two-rank* line of battle in preference to the *three-rank* formation, which is, however, yet adhered to obstinately in several European armies. Much argument is not wanted to prove that, with the precision of the rifled arms, if two armies—one two ranks, the other three ranks deep—advance upon each other, the latter will suffer most from the fire. Again, a battalion drawn up in two ranks will naturally cover a wider front than one drawn up on three lines. Nor does the latter present the advantage of solidity. The infantry soldier can fire two

or three times in a minute. With all the allowance made for the difference between rifle-shooting at the schools of Vincennes and Hythe and the firing on the battle-field, it must be acknowledged that the present rifle is greatly superior to the former musket. The old English musket, for example, gave, at 110 yards, about 60 per cent; at 200 yards, 30 per cent; and at 600 yards, hardly 7 per cent. How different is the case with the Minié or Enfield rifle. A tolerably good rifleman will now fire with effect at 600 or 800 yards. The *tirailleur*, taking his aim at leisure, will thus outrange the old 6-pounder gun, the point-blank range of which is 300 yards.

The extreme range of the old 6-pounder is about 1600 yards; that of the 12-pounder, 1650 yards; and that of the 24-pounder, 1950 yards. The average range of rifled guns is:

6-pounder, 3000 yards.
12-pounder, 4500 " "
24-pounder, 5500 "

Imagine the variety of projectiles at command—such as the solid shot, the hollow shell, the canister or cylindrical case filled with small iron balls, the grapeshot, the shrapnel or spherical case shot, with its wide range, the fire-balls, meant to light up the enemy's position, etc.—and you will have a fair idea of the workings of artillery nowadays.

Good artillerists will fire with effect a light piece five or six times a minute. A horse battery, if well

practiced, will be able to clear a distance of about 300 paces, and put itself in position, ready to fire, in the space of one minute. Such is the present mobility of artillery.

The foot artillery follows the manœuvres of the infantry, the horse artillery those of the cavalry.

Every well-organized artillery comprises Guns, Howitzers, and Mortars.

The *Howitzer* throws shells and grapeshot, and is particularly used for setting fire to buildings. It produces *ricochet* or "rebounding" fire, and thus reaches objects unattainable by direct aiming. The short *Mortar* produces a vertical fire, and is principally used to batter down vaults and fortified points. The French battery, and also that of the United States, consists of four guns and two howitzers. Two pieces form a section, the smallest tactic subdivision. The "train" of a battery consists, in France, of 30 carriages; its *personnel* of about 200 men.

As already observed, the proportion of artillery varies from 2, 3, or 4 pieces for 1000 men. But there is no rule without exceptions, and there may be circumstances when double the proportion might be of use, or, on the contrary, where artillery may be altogether dispensed with. This latter theory was propounded, to the great displeasure and amazement of the French army, by Marshal *Bugeaud*.

After several defeats of the French in Algiers, the government determined to give the chief command to Bugeaud. Arriving at the scene of action, the general convoked the officers, and spoke to them substantially as follows:

"Messieurs,—Though I have made six years' war in Spain, which resembles, in many respects, Algiers, I am unexperienced in African warfare, and will thus need your councils. I shall be thankful for your advice and ideas; though, as I have alone to bear the responsibility, I can not promise you to follow them. Remember that in thus speaking to you I can not mean you to criticise my conduct out of my presence, and before the troops, whose confidence I hope soon to gain. Our material means are not very ample; let us, therefore, endeavor to raise the *morale* of the soldiers. Tell them that hitherto I was never beaten, and that I trust they will not allow me to lose this precious advantage in Africa."

After this preamble, Bugeaud addressed in particular the chief of artillery, and ordered him to send back artillery and train to France. Great was the consternation of the latter, who was fully convinced that without the artillery the French army would have been lost over and over again. Bugeaud, resolute in his purpose, and willing besides to gain the general consent, thus continued:

“Messieurs,—You tell me that the artillery keeps up the courage of the troops; I know this feeling, and in Europe it is well founded; but we must show the troops that it is not so in Africa. What! you could not fight the Arabs without guns, who themselves have none—you, who have three advantages over them, organization, discipline, and tactics! You may as well say that the French soldiers are inferior to the Arabs. I, for my part, think them much superior, especially when officered by such men as you are. You tell me, farther, that the guns keep the Arabs at a distance; but I will not keep them away; on the contrary, I wish them to gain confidence, in order to get them into serious combat. You also say that the artillery diminishes the number of the wounded by keeping the Arabs at a distance. I believe exactly the contrary; it is the artillery that procures you the greatest number of the wounded. I will tell you how: by your guns and train you are tied to one single line; you can not make a long thorough charge, because you can not carry the material after you, and to which you must return. These charges, ranging over a few hundred yards, can produce no results; as soon as you return to your convoy the Arabs again harass you; the skirmishing fight lasts thus all day, and you thus have many wounded. Quite different would it be if you were not tied down to one line,

and had your movements free. By a single thorough charge the enemy can be defeated. Serious combats are short. I was also told that the Arabs succeed in carrying away their dead and wounded. I defy them to do so in the presence of my tactics."

General Bugeaud, it is well known, carried out his new tactics with a high hand. The test of military genius is to know when to recur to exceptions; and in war, as in any thing else, pedantic, lifeless adherence to established rules will prove as pernicious as willful neglect.

An army is as much a moral as physical machine; and if it is of absolute necessity that it be familiar with the mechanical part of warfare, much of its success will also depend on its *morale*. Enthusiasm is the soul of tactics; and it is principally from the leaders that the combatants draw their inspiration. Who ignores the wondrous effects produced by the inspiring harangues of Napoleon? Each *ordre de jour* of his was worth a corps d'armée. In his heartfelt, glowing words, one could perceive the rays of coming victory. The rapid conquest by Garibaldi of the Two Sicilies with a handful of young badly-armed volunteers was in part owing to his innate power of inspiring his followers. The campaign of Frederick the Great in 1757 offers a singular example of the weight of the moral momentum. We can not help briefly refer-

ring to it, presenting, as it does, traits of tragic grandeur.

Unable to forget the conquest of Silesia by Frederick, Austria commenced a fresh war fourteen years after its conquest. The most formidable coalition ever formed up to that date against a single power was ready to crush the "heretic" and revolutionary "Fritz." It embraced Austria, France, Russia, Sweden, and part of the German States. In the second campaign Frederick had, by his rapid marches and the irresistible shock of his cavalry, indeed succeeded in gaining a most signal victory over the French at Rosbach; but his enemies were yet more than enough to crush his army, if they were allowed to concentrate. They penetrated into his dominions from all sides. While he conquered at Rosbach, the Austrians defeated his army of observation in Silesia under the Prince of Bevern, took Breslau and other strong places.

Frederick determined to march back to meet the Austrians before Breslau. He fully felt the risk involved in the attempt; but there was no other alternative; waiting could only have made ruin more ruinous. All he could take with him amounted to about 32,000 men; the Austrians numbered between 80,000 and 90,000. His troops had decidedly the advantage of manœuvring properties, but they were, on the other hand, discouraged by

the reverses in Silesia, and felt that they were few. Frederick tried, above all, to raise their morale. Assembling the superior officers, the king addressed them thus:

“Gentlemen,— You are well aware that the Prince of Lorraine has succeeded in defeating the Prince of Bevern and in taking Breslau, while I was forced to arrest the French and the troops of the Empire. The reverses of fortune would have reached their climax had I not put unbounded confidence in your courage, constancy, and love of country. I acknowledge your services from my inmost heart. There is none among you but has distinguished himself by some great and noble deed, and I trust this will also happen in the future. The opportunity is at hand. I would deem myself to have done nothing were I to permit the Austrians to keep Silesia. Know, therefore, that I shall attack the three armies—stronger army though it be—against the rules of the art of war. We have neither inquired after their number nor their position. Your valor and constancy will replace every thing. I must try, or we are lost. We must beat the enemy, or be buried before his batteries. I am determined to act so. Make this, my determination, known to my officers; prepare the soldiers for the coming task; tell them what I expect from them—implicit obedience. Besides, if they are

Prussians, they will certainly know how to act; but, should there be those in the lines who hesitate to share in all our dangers, they can receive their leave to-day, without having to fear any reproach on my part."

The kindling countenances of the officers at once betrayed the effects of the address to the king, who concluded :

"I see—and I knew it before—that I can reckon on you, and consequently on victory. Should I fall, the Fatherland will reward you when you repair to your camps and tell the soldiers what I have told you. If there should be a cavalry regiment refusing, when ordered, to precipitate itself on the enemy, that regiment will, after battle, be deprived of its horses and ordered to garrison duty. The infantry regiment which, in its advance, shall betray hesitation, will be deprived of its standard-facings. Adieu."

Before engaging in battle, Frederick ordered a hussar officer with 50 men for his body-guard. To the officer he said :

"I shall expose myself to-day more than I have ever done. Take care not to leave me and allow me to fall into the hands of the *canaille*. If I fall, cover my body with your cloak, order a carriage, put in the body, and no word; the battle will go on, and the enemy will be beaten."

The Austrian camp, meanwhile, presented a scene of wildest merriment, so sure were they of victory over the *Parade Guard* of Berlin—so they styled the small army of the king. To incite Frederick to the attack, they actually abandoned their strong positions. The Prussian king was not slow to avail himself of this unexpected advantage. He surveyed their position from a height which was behind the village of Leuthen, and determined to attack the left wing, which was deemed the most vulnerable. To cover his designs, he first ordered an attack on the right, and withdrew his own right, thus forming an oblique line. The Austrians took this movement for a retreat. The attack commenced at 1 o'clock P.M., and before the sun set the Austrians left the field in flight. "Like an organ-player," says Kugler, one of his biographers, "who, with the light pressure of the fingers, knows how to call forth the tide of sounds, and blend them in majestic harmony, so Frederick knew how to bring into wondrous harmony all the movements of his army." And so it was. The results of the battle of Leuthen, fought December 5th, 1757, were enormous. The Austrians lost 27,000 men, 116 pieces, 51 standards, and hundreds of wagons. The hero-king himself hastened to the pursuit of the enemy with a detachment of hussars, in the dark, cold night, and dashed right into the midst of the enemy's rear.

Eighteen thousand Austrians, holding Breslau, were soon forced to surrender; Silesia was cleared, and the Prussians went to their winter quarters, according to the then usage of war. Such were the consequences of the moral momentum in the hands of Frederick.

CHAPTER III.

SECONDARY OPERATIONS.

Outposts—Divisions and Objects of.—Distance from the Main Body.—Relative Strength of Outposts.—Detachments—Compositions and Object of.—Convoys.—Reconnoissances—Different Kinds of.—Importance of Offensive Reconnoissances.

THE principal object of an army in the field is to fight decisive battles, and to overcome or destroy the enemy; but it has also to perform minor duties, which, however seemingly insignificant, are of vital importance for the whole command. These secondary operations refer to *Outposts*, *Detachments*, *Convoys*, and *Reconnoissances*.

Every army, whatever its number, and whether camping, or in cantonments, or marching, must, above all, be guarded against surprises; hence the necessity of outposts and vanguards, which are not improperly called the eyes of the army. The outposts have a double mission—to observe the enemy and give notice of their approach, and also to arrest him, if possible, in order to allow time for preparation to the principal body. This service requires much skill and tact; and its command can only be safely intrusted to a competent, intelligent officer.

The present war in the United States has offered more than one example of the sad effects of defective outpost service.

The outposts are subdivided into grand guards, small and intermediary posts, sentinels, and patrols. They form, so to say, a network of three lines or chains, the grand guard being the nearest to the main army. Then come the small posts, and then the sentinels, which form the extremest line. The grand guard is placed, if possible, in the centre of the ground to be observed; and, if practicable, it occupies a covered and elevated position, in order to perceive the enemy from a distance, and not be seen by him. As soon as it is placed, the commander must reconnoitre the country and the roads all around, and try to get information of the whereabouts of the enemy. This done, he proceeds to the *emplacement* or distributing of the small posts and sentinels, generally commanded by non-commissioned officers. For the sentinels, it is of particular importance to be covered, if the locality permits it. The sentinels (called *vedettes*, if composed of cavalry) must always be ready to fire. It is their duty to fire on the approaching enemy, though they be convinced of the uselessness of their defense, for the sake of advising the others. The sentinels keep small distances, so as to be able to signal each other.

The extent of the ground occupied by the outposts, as well as its distance from the main body, depends much on the nature of the ground and the respective forces of the two armies; but, in every case, the distance ought to be neither too small to allow the enemy time to come down on a sudden upon the main body, nor too great to expose the outposts themselves to be taken. The usual distance between the camp and the extreme outpost line of an army of several thousand strong is three quarters or half a mile; that between the grand guard and the small posts, and between the latter and the sentinels, is from 340 to 500 yards. In open ground, where they are more exposed to sudden attack, the sentinels are placed at half the distance from the small posts. At night, the outposts are always drawn in to a smaller distance. The sentinels must always be so posted as to be able to see or signal to each other.

The force employed at the outposts consists of one fifth to a tenth of the main body. Usually it is formed of both infantry and cavalry; though the latter enter in small proportion, especially in broken, mountainous country. The cavalry outposts can of course be placed at greater distances; and, in open country, they serve as the advanced posts of the infantry guards.

The small posts, inclusive of the sentinels, form,

usually, about one third of the whole outpost force. The sentinels (which, if of cavalry, are called vedettes) are, properly speaking, detached and advanced small posts. They occupy the cross-ways, angles of marshes, and hills. Sometimes, especially with young troops, there are double sentinels, or even three or four, at one post. The sentinels ought to be impressed with the importance of their duty, and avoid smoking and chatting, not to speak of making fires.

As night offers the best opportunity for surprise, half of the grand guard must remain awake and armed, while the rest repose with the arms at their side. The horses of the cavalry must always remain saddled and bridled, the bridles to be kept in hand.

The patrols are the completing links of the outpost service. They are flying sentinels; their duty is to visit the outposts, and, at the same time, examine the intervals.

If attacked, the commander of the grand guard must at once give notice thereof to the commanding officer; and, if not occupying a particular position—for example, a defile—he may venture to meet the enemy. He will endeavor to keep his ground till the arrival of re-enforcements; and, this not being the case, he must try gradually to effect his retreat to the main body.

The position for the outpost is generally looked out by the commanding officer, or the members of his staff, from whom the commander of the grand guard receives his instructions, and again instructs the small posts and sentinels. Outposts ought, at night, to guard against making fires; nay, they may put on fires on different places beyond or without their lines, in order to mislead the enemy. It is useless to observe that the *radius* of the outposts is always toward the enemy.

Detachments are small portions of troops detached from the main body for the accomplishment of certain services, such as to take or occupy a certain post; to protect or attack a convoy; to annoy an isolated column of the enemy; to destroy the enemy's stores; to cut off his communication, or to render assistance to a besieged place, etc.

Where rapidity is required, then cavalry alone is employed; generally, however, detachments are of a mixed character—infantry and cavalry. Here, too, a determined, expert commanding officer is indispensable. He must understand topography, and have the faculty of estimating distances; and he ought to be assisted by good maps and guides.

Before starting, the commander is bound to inspect every thing relating to equipment and ammunition of his troops. He must march like other bodies, surrounded by vanguard, rearguard, and

flankers. These guards form about one third or one fourth of the whole force under his command. His duty is to keep at the head of the column, though he will occasionally halt to review the whole, and he will also occasionally repair to the vanguard. He ought never to forget that he may be attacked at any moment, and make up his mind for the occasion.

An infantry detachment ought to march in small columns or sections, eight or twelve, so as to be able to rally easily. A cavalry detachment ought to observe the same rule; and they ought, if possible, to leave part of the road free, in order to be able to face about, in case of need, without confusion. An infantry detachment sent to take a position of importance may at once begin to fortify itself or to raise barricades. If attacked and obliged to fight, it must do it according to the general rules. These will be explained hereafter. Detachments, in fine, are generally formed of tactic unities, viz., battalions, companies, squadrons, and platoons. Artillery is only used in particular cases in such detachments. A detachment should never enter a village or a defile before it has been reconnoitred by the vanguard, which in daytime, and in an open country, may precede the principal column half a mile.

Convoys are meant for carrying money, provisions, cattle, and ammunition after the army, and

sometimes for the transportation of the wounded or prisoners. Near the enemy this branch of service demands uncommon circumspection, and hence the necessity of proportionate escorts, which are generally formed both of infantry and cavalry. The escorting of a convoy, especially of gunpowder, is a most delicate mission. In fact, nothing can be more easily stopped or attacked than a long train of wagons. To guard, in a manner, against these difficulties, the train must be divided into small sections, to follow each other with small intervals. The ammunition is generally placed in the centre, together with the more costly articles; the provisions and other effects follow and precede it.

The force of the escort depends upon the length of the road to be traversed, and the nature of the enemy that is apprehended, as also of the extent of the convoy. The cavalry escort goes one or two miles ahead, to make sure of defiles and bridges. The convoy, like an army, must move defended by vanguard, rearguard, and flankers. In an open country, special care must be given to the defense of the flanks. A convoy of importance is also accompanied by a corps of sappers to remove obstacles, or to raise one in case of an attack. The wagons and sections must keep their distance, and if one breaks down it is to be removed out of the way to let the others pass, and then close in at the rear.

In halts for the night the wagons are placed in several ranks, axle-tree against axle-tree, and the shafts in the same direction, the ranks being divided by the interval necessary for the passing of the horses. If an attack is apprehended, the wagons are formed in squares, with the hind wheels outside, the horses remaining within the squares. If attacked, especially if communication is at stake, the chief object is to keep the enemy at a distance, if possible; the wagons set on fire must be speedily removed, especially if they are near ammunition wagons, and, if this is not practicable, then the latter are to be taken out of the way. In the worst case, one part of the convoy will be abandoned to the enemy to save the rest; and this failing, the duty of the commander of the escort is to save at least the horses; and if no hope whatever remains, he will rather destroy wagons, horses, and every thing, than let it fall into the hands of the enemy.

Reconnoissances partake sometimes of much higher character than the secondary operation hitherto spoken of. Every movement of troops, having for its object the discovering or verifying one or more points relative to the position or movements of the enemy, or the topographical nature of the scene of action, is a reconnaissance. It precedes every operation, and it is thus the basis of every enterprise. Without it there are, with the best troops, very lit-

tle chance of success. There are three kinds of reconnoissances—Daily, Special, and Offensive reconnoissances.

The object of the *daily reconnaissance* is to look after the safety of the camp, cantonment, and the outposts; farther, to ascertain whether the enemy, favored by the nature of the ground or other circumstances, does not intend an offensive movement or prepare an ambuscade; whether his outposts have shifted or been augmented; in short, whether something in his camp does not indicate preparations for marching or attack. This is a purely defensive operation, though it may lead to the offensive. The reconnoitring detachment must venture beyond the extreme line of outposts, and may fall in with the enemy. Both arms are used for this service, the cavalry chiefly in an open country, and the infantry in a broken, woody, mountainous *terrain*. They start at different hours by day and night, and require but small numbers; though they must be preceded by a vanguard, and accompanied by flankers. To see, without being seen, is one of the first advantages.

The object of the *special reconnaissance* is to observe the distance, examine the configuration of the surrounding country, and especially the positions occupied by the enemy, as well as the roads and rivers. These delicate missions are generally con-

fided to the officers of the staff, who, in well-organized armies, are particularly qualified for this kind of service. An officer without some special knowledge can not possibly perform such a task. In such expeditions encounters can hardly be avoided, such, for example, as chasing the enemy's post from a point necessary for the survey.

The meaning of the *offensive reconnaissance* is clear enough. It is undertaken with the view of absolutely and quite precisely examining the enemy's position, his forces, and means of defense. Sometimes they are mere demonstrations, but more frequently the preludes of battles; in some instances they become real battles. The enemy's line of outposts must always be thrown back, and, coming in conflict with part of his army, can also not be easily avoided. To examine minutely implies to advance closely. These reconnoissances are not inappropriately called *combats d'essai*. Such expeditions can, therefore, only be ordered by the commander-in-chief, or by a commander who operates separately. An offensive reconnaissance requires a much stronger force than the two others; Frederick the Great and Napoleon were wont to accomplish such missions in person. In the days of Hannibal and Cæsar, when the armies were massed together in a narrow compass, and rifles and guns did not exist, such exertions on the part of the generals might

have been superfluous, and of considerable ease; but not so in modern warfare.

So far as the army at large is concerned, there is little difference between the minor and grand operations; the forms of the movements and evolutions remain essentially the same. But quite different is the case with regard to the commanders. To choose a base of operation for a large army, to draw up the plan of a campaign, or to fight a great battle, requires more talent and more knowledge than to lead a detachment or make a reconnoissance.

CHAPTER IV.

COMBATS.

What are Combats?—Influence of Locality and the different Arms.—Division of Troops for the Battle Array.—Combat of Infantry against Infantry.—Cavalry and Infantry.—Retreats.—Formation *en Echelon* and *Echquier*.—Combat in open Ground —In Mountainous broken Ground.—Combats in Villages, Woods, and Defiles.—Historical Illustrations of Combats.—Montebello,—Robochetto.—Busaco.—Infantry against Cavalry.—Cavalry against Cavalry.—*Esprit*.

EVERY war is marked by great as well as minor battles, not entering closely into the general plan, and which are generally designated by the words “Engagement” or “Combat.”

The principles by which great and small battles are conducted remain essentially the same; though, as regards execution, the difficulty increases with the numbers. To put in position and bring into action a division twelve or fifteen thousand men strong, covering a front of three or four miles, will obviously require more skill and circumspection than the handling of three or four thousand men, occupying a comparatively narrow compass.

The variety of ground—level, mountainous, woody tracts, etc.—as well as the difference of

arms, demand necessarily different tactic forms, different modes of action both for offense and the defensive. The manœuvres practicable on a level plain can not be executed on broken, woody, or mountainous ground; and the tactics of a contest between infantry and infantry is different from one between infantry and cavalry, as we shall presently see.

In combats as in battles, it is often of much advantage to take the initiative, unless the enemy be much stronger in numbers, or disposes of better troops, or be favored by his position. The attacking party carries always with it a moral superiority; and the best mode of saving a retreating army is to assume, from time to time, the offensive.

The commanding officer, as soon as he foresees an engagement, must closely ascertain the condition of his troops, impart his plans to the other superior officers, and point out to them, in particular, how to effect their retreat in case of non-success. The affectionation of secrecy in this respect is ruinous; the more the troops surmise of the intentions of their leader, the better it is. A feigned retreat will sometimes discourage the best army. Napoleon, in his harangues, frequently gave hints to his followers of what he was going to do.

Before engaging, the disposable troops will be divided in three parts or lines, viz., first line, second

line, and the reserve. The latter forms, according to circumstances and the respective nature of the adversary, about one third or one fourth of the total force, and it ought to consist of the best troops. The usual distance between the first and the second line varies from 200 to 300 yards in open ground; otherwise, and where it is not exposed to the fire of the enemy, the second line may be drawn nearer. The reserve, which ought to enjoy full repose, is placed at double the distance from the second line. The second line is formed in columns, to be able to advance rapidly to the support of the first line, while the reserve stands grouped in different masses. The first line is deployed in line of battle, forming the battle front. The fight of infantry against infantry is, as General Dufour says, the very image of battle.

Supposing the ground is level, the skirmishers open the engagement, and advance a few hundred yards ahead, to distract the attention of the enemy and unmask his position. In the mean time, the first line deploys in line of battle, and advances on the enemy's front. Three hundred yards is considered the mean distance for the commencing to fire with effect, which happens either by battalion, company, platoon, or at will. The former kind of firing, though evidently much more impressive, can not be long sustained in the terror and confusion of

battle, unless with unusually steady troops. Hence the advantage of firing at will, which allows the soldier to take his aim. The fire by battalion or company is used with great effect from positions where an army awaits an advancing enemy; and this fire must begin at much shorter distance, say at 40 or 50 yards. The armies having closed in, the second line marches forward to support the first, and, to impart to the attack all possible energy, the assailing columns charge with the bayonet. If both lines fail to produce the desired effect, then the reserve is called into action. The hitting on the right moment for the summoning up of the reserve is one of the most difficult points in military operations. A few moments too soon or too late will cause a wide difference. It is a task in which great generals seldom fail. Napoleon's calling into action the reserve was an *evenement*—event; yet at Waterloo his wondrous tact failed. Marshal Marmont, nowise a common authority, expresses his belief that if it had not been for the bringing up the reserve too late, Waterloo would have ended in French victory. These points will be referred to hereafter, in speaking of battles.

The front of battle may also be formed in the mixed order, partly in line and partly in columns, according as to which point the energy of the attack is to be directed. It is always advisable to

have at hand a few columns, to push on the attack with all possible energy on the most vulnerable point of the enemy. However equally formed originally, the line of battle will present during combat some inequalities; the one wing will advance, the other waver or recede, so that renewed dispositions are always necessary. The three lines are meant to support each other, and, if necessary, alternately to occupy each other's position. If the first line is beaten back, then it is for the second to step into its place while the former rallies behind. If both fail, then the reserve comes up, and the effort is renewed with the whole force together.

If all the three arms, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, are presented in the combat, the following dispositions are generally made. The cavalry stands in *echelons*, on the wings of the line of battle, and also in the rear of the centre, ready to fall upon the enemy's flanks or other points already shaken. Its task is also to confound the enemy by demonstrations; to attack his artillery; and, above all, to pursue the enemy if routed.

Part of the artillery takes generally position in advance of the line, though one must beware of advancing too far, and thus expose the pieces to being taken. Artillery ought, in general, to occupy those points where it may play on the enemy's flanks, and, if possible, to *enfilade* or "rake" his whole line.

To silence the enemy's batteries is one of its primary functions; but when the army is on the defensive, it must direct its fire principally on the advancing enemy.

Whatever the dispositions of battle may be, they ought always, as far as possible, to be kept secret beforehand from the enemy, in order to deprive him of the benefit of making counter dispositions. As every battle-field has its domineering point—or, as it is expressed in other words, the *key of the position*—the whole energy of the attack ought to be directed against that point, and with the necessary dispositions meant to mask the real attack. In a broken, covered country, such concealed manœuvres are easily executed; but in open ground the misleading the judgment of the enemy requires often long circuitous marches. Rapidity is always indispensable in similar manœuvres.

Retreats, even in the best case, leave little choice of form, either with small or large armies. The best mode of retreating is in *echelons*, or *checkerwise* (*echiquer*),* by which one offers at least a partial front to the enemy. Every favorable spot affording defense ought to be made use of for the rallying of the troops from time to time. The rallying place ought to be marked out in advance by the commanding officer or his staff. We shall have op-

* See Diagrams, p 27.

portunity to treat more at large of retreats; and it may suffice here briefly to observe, that there are cases when retreats ought to be effected with double quick, and even the run.

The difference of ground, as already observed, greatly influences the dispositions of combat.

If, for example, the enemy occupies a height, a front attack with the line of battle is often impossible. In this case the attack must be directed on his flanks, and an attempt made to turn his rear, supported at the same time by a menace or attack in front. Here the services of the skirmishers are of particular importance. Their well-directed fire, driving back the enemy's advance toward the summit, permits the succeeding columns to approach the declivities, and to precipitate themselves upward on the enemy with the point of the bayonet. And it is only by an impetuous bayonet charge that heights can be carried. The fire of a deployed line, even if practicable, would be but of little use. The storming columns must not be too deep, which would deprive them of mobility, so essential in a similar attack. They ought to advance simultaneously, so as to support each other. The campaigns of Wellington in the Spanish Peninsula were relieved with numerous engagements of this description; indeed, many of the great battles fought there consisted of three or four desperate combats carried

on on separate rugged mountain ridges. A height strengthened by artificial works offers, of course, a still more difficult problem, unless commanded by another height within gun reach. Here cavalry is of little avail. The capture of heights, therefore, belongs to infantry, aided by artillery and cavalry.

Woods are equally points of attack and defense, chiefly for infantry. The attack is conducted partly like that of a height with skirmishers, but it seldom admits of an attack in columns. The deeper the column, the greater would be its danger in a wood, and the more intense the ensuing disorder. The taking of a wood is principally the task of skirmishers in large numbers, successively supported. A wood, before being attacked, must be closely reconnoitred. The intervening space between the point of starting and the wood is traversed rapidly; the penetrating troops, once in the wood, feel their way with caution, place themselves behind the trees, and advance till they have mastered certain parts, and where they may rally. The different sections keep each other in eye, and, arriving at an intervening clear space, they form in line or column. The principal attack is to be directed against the enemy's line of retreat. If the wood is not large, the enemy can be attacked in his rear. The operations are to be executed by the usual rules, the troops being divided into three parts, placed at supporting distances from each other.

Combats, as already observed, are small battles; they are the connecting links between great battles; yet the distinction between the two consists rather in the spirit of the dispositions, and the combinations in general, than in numbers. At the combat of Montebello, which opened the Italian war of 1859, the Austrians had as large a force as Napoleon Bonaparte had at Marengo, one of the most decisive battles on record with regard to its results.

In the same Italian war of 1859, the combat of Robochetto paved the way to the victory of Magenta. This village lies on the left bank of the Ticino, and commands the road leading to Magenta. Marshal M'Mahon, passing the Ticino in his flank march, hastened to possess himself of this village (but weakly occupied by the Austrians) with a regiment of Algerian chasseurs. The three battalions formed in three columns, and, preceded by skirmishing companies, advanced on the village in three different directions, converging, however, as they approached; and, with the assistance of another regiment and a battery, which soon arrived, Robochetto was carried. This success enabled M'Mahon to continue next day, without resistance, his march toward Buffalora and Magenta. We shall have occasion to speak of Magenta in another place.

The true offensive power of the soldier, and his

fortitude, shows itself best on a rugged height difficult of access and torn by ravines. There is something awful and majestic in the commingling of the assailants and occupants on a narrow crest of a mountain. It is the *morale* borne on the point of the bayonet that decides in such peculiar moments of victory. In the first years of the Peninsular War, the French utterly disregarded the difficulties of ground with unparalleled heroism; no mountain ridge, however high and steep, and however bristling with artillery and bayonets, was too difficult for them; they crowned every height they were ordered to take. At the battle of Busaco, in 1810, they mastered, for some time, every summit occupied by the English, though, as Napier says, "forty thousand men were employed to storm a mountain on which sixty thousand enemies were posted;" yet, once discouraged and demoralized by long retreats, the same French troops failed to defend similar positions against the enemy, though when inferior in numbers! At a combat on the heights of Santa Barbara in 1813, fifteen hundred English compelled to precipitate flight six thousand French.

Villages, which often play an important rôle in great battles, are likewise fields of combat, chiefly for infantry assisted by artillery. The mode of defending a village is natural enough. The infantry

may place itself behind the fences, at the windows, on the tops of the houses, and thus easily defy the invading enemy. The erection of barricades, and the raising of other obstacles, may also serve to arrest the advancing enemy. The difficulty of attack is thus obvious, and it should seldom be tried unless with superior forces. The usual manœuvre is a simultaneous attack in front and the rear of the houses, conducted by small columns, whose approach ought to be aided and masked by a strong fire of the skirmishers. The enemy in the street can then be forced to retreat with the point of the bayonet; and, if divided in the houses, then there is no other remedy but a fight from house to house, unless, indeed, the houses be of wood. In the latter case, the easiest way is to set fire to the village. Strange to say, the abode of the dead—the church-yards—form, generally, the most sanguinary points of conflict.

To refer, now, briefly to “Defiles.” A *Defile* is a narrow outlet or passage surrounded by lateral obstacles, as, for example, a road through mountains. Whether it deserves that name or not will of course depend, in many instances, upon the strength of the army that has to pass it. A defile can generally be defended with forces much inferior in numbers to the attacking party; and here, too, the principal *rôle* devolves on the infantry, sustained by artillery.

In many respects, the passage through a village or forest is the passage of a defile, and so is that of a bridge. The modes of attack and defense of defiles chiefly depends on the nature of the ground in front, on both sides, and the nature of the lateral obstacles.

It is evidently of immense advantage for the attacking party if it can take position under cover, and be sheltered against the enemy's fire, through the distance intervening between its position and the defile. On the other hand, the defending party is in great advantage if the lateral obstacles are such as to render a flank or rear attack, if not impossible, extremely difficult. In the latter case, and where turning manœuvres are impracticable, there is no other way left but to "take the bull by the horns," if the passage is absolutely necessary. The artillery tries to dislodge the enemy from the front, and to occupy or silence his batteries, while the infantry, formed in small columns, rushes to the attack with the point of the bayonet. If successful, it forms in line on the other side, trying, in particular, to cover its flanks; the reserve being massed at the outlet, to offer speedy assistance in case of a renewed attack by the enemy. If the position seems tenable, then it is time for the whole cavalry, the artillery, and train to pass. If the lateral heights are accessible, then the first measures must be taken for

obtaining them, both by means of skirmishers and column attacks; and it is only after these are secured that the front attack commences. A short defile may be cleared by the artillery alone. It is always necessary, says Dufour, to occupy first the heights before engaging one's self inside; "it is a principle which can not be violated with impunity."

We shall have opportunity to return to defiles in speaking of marches, and all we here intended was to complete our exposition of the elementary tactics under different circumstances.

In the combat of *infantry against cavalry*, the infantry has to dread a cavalry attack only in open level ground, and in this case it usually forms in columns or squares. It ought to receive the charge with salvos, and not fire by file, which will, at any rate, stop the ardor of the horses. The firing may begin, especially with the Minié or Enfield rifle, at three or four hundred yards. The infantry ought to remain firm in awaiting the attack, and, in the worst case, oppose the bayonet. With reference to squares, Marshal Bugeaud very justly observes that the danger of the cavalry attack is only measured by the part of cavalry which faces the square, and that, consequently, great squares do not carry with them more strength; because, if, on the one hand, the great square commands more fire, it in-

creases, on the other hand, the number of the assailants. The marshal thus recommends small squares flanking each other, which form a system of redoubts.

In a combat of *cavalry against cavalry*, the advantage is always on the side of the attacking party. The property of cavalry being motion, rapidity, to await the attack in position would be as much as voluntarily to renounce its advantages. Light cavalry will break with ease through the lines of even heavy horse when the latter awaits the attack. A charging column of cavalry begins with the walk, then the trot, and, when near the enemy, the gallop, and, lastly, it launches into full speed. Cavalry seldom charges in unbroken line; its usual attack is in échelons; and, like to the infantry tactics, the cavalry charge, to be successful, must be guided with art; the energy of the attack to be directed on certain points of the enemy's position. That bad cavalry is the real *impedimenta* is an acknowledged fact in war. It is doubly obnoxious, from its tendency to lull into fatal security, and its consuming propensities.

From what has been already explained, it will be easily seen that an army, whatever its strength, and wherever it may operate, must possess certain tactic or manœuvring capabilities, such as to change direction or front; to form from line of battle into

column, and vice versa, and from line or column into squares. The rest of manœuvres, as frequently witnessed on the parade-ground, are appropriately styled by Bugeaud *manœuvres de tiroir*, "toilet manœuvres."

That no precise manœuvres, under trying circumstances, are possible without strict *discipline*, is a fact which no one will dare to deny. One of the primary virtues of a soldier is, therefore, obedience under all circumstances. He must, moreover, try to get, as it were, befriended with and attached to his arm, and learn, above all, to revere his flag. The Roman soldiers regarded their standards as their *numina*, or deities. Napoleon well understood the moral power bound up in this symbol, and thus we see him reserve to himself the privilege of nominating the bearers of the imperial eagle.

CHAPTER V.

RIVERS AND BRIDGES.

Passage of Rivers.—Defense and Attack of Rivers and Bridges.—Historical Examples.—Trenton and Princeton.—The Limmat.—Lodi.—Esslingen.—Beresina.—Tschernaja.—Buffalora.—Increased Importance of Rivers in Military Operations.

AN army can hardly undertake any operation at a considerable distance without rivers to pass. If the river is fordable and the enemy distant, the task is easy; but quite different is the case when you have a wide, deep river before you, with the enemy defending its banks. If there is a bridge, it is sure to be protected by works generally known by the name of *têtes de pont*. If there be no bridge, or if it has been destroyed by the enemy, then you have to construct one in the presence of his batteries and swarms of skirmishers—a most delicate enterprise; and how much more critical for a retreating army, with an enemy close upon your heels, and, besides, with part of his army ready to receive you on the other side of the river! Yet, with the aid of skillful manœuvring and valor, rivers may be passed under almost every circumstance, as will

be presently seen. No general with sound judgment will, however, undertake such a delicate operation without having sufficient reasons for so doing, and without a due reconnoissance of both banks of the river. The enemy, for example, may allow part of your troops to pass the bridge, then fall upon you with superior forces, destroy the bridge, and have you at his mercy.

In ordinary cases, rivers must be passed when flowing across the marching line; but there may also be particular objects to be obtained by the passage. You may pass a river to take up an advantageous position, or to prevent the enemy from taking up one or from concentrating. You may attempt, by the passage, to get on the flank of the enemy, or to cut off his line of retreat. Again, you may have to pass a river, from absolute necessity, on your own line of retreat.

In such cases, as well as in all military attempts, the standing maxim ought to be, not to "take the bull by the horns" if you can get at him otherwise. The defense and attack of rivers requires, in particular, skillful manœuvring and skillful distribution of the troops on the banks and the rear. The different detachments intended to support each other ought, above all, to be concealed from the enemy, as far as the locality or the ground permits it. If fordable, the passage ought to be tried on several

points, aided by feints. In 1797, Bonaparte passed the Tagliamento, in pursuit of the Austrians, in line of battle.

The main defense of bridges are intrenchments, or *têtes de pont*, which, if you hold both banks, may be raised on both sides, near the bridge. The strength and extent of these works naturally depend on the strength of the respective forces. Here the artillery acts an important part. Batteries are disposed on different points along the bank, so as to enfilade, if possible, the advanced forces of the enemy; and it must, besides, be ready to destroy the bridge, if deemed necessary. The skirmishers line the banks; the rest of the troops are kept behind, in small columns, out of range of the enemy's fire. A strong reserve, massed together, awaits the action farther back. If the two banks be not of equal height, then the army situated on the higher bank will have all the advantage of the firing; the other party having, in this case, to counteract its disadvantage by the fire of howitzers. Once begun, the attack of the columns must be carried on with double-quick and vigor.

The mode of attack may easily be understood from that of defense, though the attacking party must never neglect to make use of stratagems and demonstrations calculated to mislead the enemy. The best of these is to attempt feigned passages on

several points, by means of temporary bridges prepared for the occasion. With the materials at hand, a military bridge may now be thrown over a large river in a few hours. Such are the results of mechanical progress on war. With what self-complacency Cæsar relates his construction of a bridge over the Rhine, a work which cost him more than a week. Much larger masses of troops have since passed the Rhine on bridges made ready in two hours.

The throwing of bridges really meant for passage generally happens under the cover of night. Small detachments are, in the rule, shipped to the other side in small boats while the work is in progress. Upon reaching the shore, they immediately occupy the most defensible points, and sometimes fortify themselves, so as to be able to resist, at least, the advance of the enemy. In a mountainous country, where rivers are apt to swell all on a sudden, the construction of bridges and the passage require particular care. Even without a shadow of the enemy's presence, the passage over a bridge demands caution, as does that of every other defile. The vanguard, preceded by a few *éclaireurs*, or scouting patrols, passes first, and instantly occupies all the *debouches* or outlets leading to the bridge; and this being done, the whole army follows. A bridge is, properly speaking, a defile in the air.

Let us now proceed to examples. In the most critical moments of the campaign of 1776, General Washington, after having been obliged to seek refuge from a part of the British troops under Cornwallis by abandoning New Jersey and crossing the Delaware, resolved, on receiving some re-enforcements, to recross that river, and thus to take by surprise the different British corps stationed on its banks. His plan was to effect simultaneously the passage, by means of boats, on three different points. He, with the small body under his immediate command, had fixed on a point above Trenton. According to his biographer, Washington had with him no more than 2400 men, with 24 pieces of artillery. The latter thus formed a rather too strong proportion compared to the infantry; it naturally enhanced the difficulties of the passage, and much more so the difficulties of a forced retreat, which might have ensued. But the patriotic leader, knowing his adversaries, resolved to dare to forestall their farther concentration, despite the obstacles encountered by the half-frozen state of the river. This *coup de main*, it is well known, fully succeeded. The English were completely taken by surprise, the Americans making about 1000 prisoners, capturing several field-pieces, and several hundred stands of arms. This success Washington gained unassisted by his other two corps. He thus hast-

ened to recross the Delaware, and, being re-enforced, again passed over to the side of the enemy. By a rapid turning manœuvre, executed in one night, he gained another victory at Princeton. In the presence of more active enemies than Lord Cornwallis and Howe, such manœuvres would, of course, have been, if not impossible, highly perilous. It is enough to call to mind Lord Cornwallis's conduct subsequently, in 1781, to form an idea of his tactics. With the Gallo-American army assembled at Williamsburg, he kept his army divided on both sides of York River! Such tactics will hardly find imitators.

In 1799, Massena stood with the Swiss troops on the left bank of the River Limmat and the Lake of Zurich. On the other side were the Russians, under Korsakoff, awaiting their junction with Suvarrow. The French general, bent upon forestalling or preventing this junction, determined to effect a passage through the Limmat. He had chosen for that purpose a point near a place called Dietikon, where the left bank was higher, and where the woody bank on the other side, besides, recommended itself for the defensive. Two thousand Russians stood in position near the right bank. The bringing together of the materials offered no usual difficulties. The necessary timber, rafts, barks, and the smaller craft, all had to be brought from the distance, and on car-

riages. Massena's plan was to effect first the passage of a small force by means of small boats, and then by the bridge. Under the cover of night, the means of the passage were made ready ; the troops, the artillery, all occupied in silence their proper places, and before dawn the troops began to embark in the small boats. Not the slightest clangor of arms was heard. Six hundred thus gained the opposite bank, driving before them the Russian outposts. Now the bridge materials were rapidly brought forward, and the bridging commenced. In a few hours six thousand infantry stood in position on the right bank of the Limmat. The light artillery and cavalry soon followed, and in four hours all stood in battle array on the plateau commanding the right bank. General Dufour declares this passage one of the most instructive on record. It should be noted that, to mislead the Russians, Massena had made great ostensible preparations on quite another point.

The passage of the Adda, over the bridge of Lodi, 1796, teaches a different lesson.

After having ended one part of his campaign by severing the Piedmontese from the Austrians, and forcing them to peace, Napoleon hastened to fall upon the Austrians, driving them from the Po at Piacenza to Lodi on the Adda. Here the Austrians, under Beaulieu, took up position. Thinking

themselves secure enough, they allowed the bridge to stand, keeping occupied both banks of the river, which is here about 160 yards wide. The *gros* of the Austrian forces was on the left bank—the whole consisting of 12,000 infantry and 4000 horse, with 20 pieces of artillery. Napoleon arrived at Lodi, which is situated on the right bank, at five o'clock P.M. (May 11), and immediately determined to force the passage. The Austrians posted on the right bank were soon made to retreat. Meanwhile, Napoleon, while putting in position his batteries, sent a detachment of cavalry to ford the river a few miles higher up, and then he disposed his grenadiers, who stood under cover amid the houses of Lodi, in columns to force the passage of the bridge. Nor did he neglect to give his followers the benefit of his stirring harangues. "Soldiers," he said, "you have passed the Po; shall you hesitate to pass one of its tributaries? Remember! this way leads to Rome, to Italy, to Europe."

The solid column loosened and debouched from amid the houses, and moved with quick pace on to the wooden defile. The commander-in-chief, Berthier, Massena, and Lannes, mingled with and inspired the masses. The Austrian artillery and the fire-arms played all the while; the heads of the storming columns were mowed down as they moved along; now and then the whole mass wavered and

stopped; but the cheering voice of the general was felt above all; on they rolled, and the left bank was gained. In the twinkling of an eye, the Austrian gunners lay dead at their pieces. Beaulieu now tried to concentrate his forces, and to try a fresh attack; but it was too late. Already were the cavalry, sent by Napoleon to pass the river higher up, seen to come down upon his flank. All that the Austrian general could do was to give up Milan and Lombardy, and to seek safety behind the ramparts of Mantua.

It was after this wondrous campaign of 1796, finished in six weeks, that Napoleon told his soldiers, in a proclamation, that the greatest distinction to be accorded to them hereafter will be to say, "He was of the army of Italy." Old Beaulieu, it may be remembered, was perfectly shocked at Napoleon's tactics at Lodi, who, as he was convinced, had deserved to have been totally beaten and annihilated.

Nothing could exceed the enthusiasm of the soldiers for their young leader after the passage of the bridge of Lodi. The brave veterans, who then indulged the habit of discussing the merits of their much younger generals, proclaimed him "corporal." *Le petit Caporal* was the title they fondly applied to their hero-leader.


The passage of the Danube by Napoleon in 1809, which led to the two days' battle of Esslingen,

though it had no other immediate result except a vast effusion of blood, is instructive enough merely as exemplifying indomitable energy and unbounded self-confidence. The hero, who on every occasion had smitten his enemies for more than twelve years, deemed nothing impossible for his genius. Frederick the Great acted in like manner on one occasion, having, at Hochkirchen, pitched his camp in sight of the Austrians. "The Austrians deserve to be hanged if they do not come and bag us all," said one of the generals to the king. "The Austrians, I believe, are more afraid of us than of the gallows," replied Frederick. His temerity cost the hero-king more than 100 guns; yet he succeeded in extricating himself from his forlorn position by the aid of his genius and his moral superiority over his adversaries. In this, as we shall see, Napoleon also succeeded at Esslingen, or Essling.

In 1809, Austria, inspired by the French war in Spain and the English subsidies, took, for the fourth time, the offensive. Napoleon, with his usual celerity, assembled all his disposable forces in Germany, driving before him his enemies to the gates of Vienna. The capital capitulated, and vast stores of provisions, arms, and ammunition fell into the hands of the victors. Meanwhile a large Austrian army concentrated on the left bank of the Danube, a few miles from Vienna. It was commanded by

the Archduke Charles, the ablest Austrian general, and who did not disdain to profit by the tactics and strategy of his revolutionary adversary. To prevent their farther concentration, Napoleon determined to attack them.

The chief difficulty naturally was, where and how to get to the left side of the wide, rapid Danube. A bridge there was none. The work had thus to be made. The point where the Danube



forms the small island Lobau appeared to Napoleon the most advantageous for that purpose, despite its proximity to the Austrian lines. The island, it must be here added, is about one mile long, and nearly as much deep, being woody, and intersected by small ditches and rivulets. The distance from the right bank to the island is about 500 yards;

that from the left bank, 200 yards. The smaller arm of the Danube to be passed was thus on the side of the enemy. This constituted an obvious advantage for the attempt to effect a passage.

Leaving details for another chapter, it may be enough briefly to say that one division passed (May 18) to the island by means of boats, and that, two days afterward, several bridges were thrown over both arms of the Danube. Evidently the archduke was not vigilant enough. On the 20th of May, a few regiments, both of infantry and cavalry, first passed to the left bank, being favored by the woody nature of the ground. They were succeeded next morning by the other corps and the artillery. The two villages, Esslingen and Aspern, formed the two extreme points of the French lines; the latter was on the left; the former on the right. In front of this woody ground extends a level table ground, known by the name of the plain of Marchfeld. From the steeple of Esslingen the position of the Austrians could be distinctly seen. They formed an extended semicircle opposite the French lines. The Austrians were between 90,000 and 100,000 strong. Napoleon's total forces were 80,000; but only 25,000 were on the left bank at the moment we speak of, and when the archduke determined to take the offensive.

It was, happily for the French, already three

o'clock P.M., the bridges having broken down repeatedly during the day. The Austrians advanced to the attack in five columns. The French, after repeated efforts, were thrown back on the two villages, the main stays of their position. Here the contest was renewed with more fury ; but Lannes on the right, and Massena on the left, performed wonders by their valor and manœuvres, till the combatants were separated by the darkness of the night. Thus passed the first day, May 21, almost miraculous for the French, the breaking down of the bridges having rendered impossible the bringing up of re-enforcements. Napoleon, however, was not thankful for having escaped the fate of beholding part of his army thrown upon the river, a prey to its waves. The bridges were, during the night, repaired ; re-enforcements were brought up all night, and, next morning, he stood ready to take the offensive.

He now had upward of fifty thousand men, which made the contest much more equal ; he labored, however, under the evident disadvantage of leaning on a river, with most of his ammunition and supplies on the other side, connected with bridges exposed to be broken or destroyed. After many hours of obstinate fighting without apparent result, Napoleon, with his natural genius, perceiving where the *knot* of the battle was, determined to

break the Austrian centre. Lannes, on whom the mission devolved, eagerly formed his starving columns, supported by Oudinot's grenadiers and masses of heavy cavalry. The columns broke forward, unmindful of the numerous batteries of the enemy sweeping the plain. The shock was terrific. The Austrians gave way; farther and farther they retreated; already the centre seemed to be split in two, when the ominous news of the breaking of the bridges on the right arm reached Napoleon. A most inauspicious occurrence! It was already toward evening. Napoleon, as calm as ever, thereupon ordered Lannes to slacken his pursuit, and to gradually fall back. The hero of so many battles had now determined to leave altogether the left bank, and to retreat to the island, without, however, letting the enemy see through his intentions.

But the Austrian general was, in the mean time, not remiss in taking advantage of the backward movement of the French. The batteries were pushed forward; the infantry and cavalry, now encouraged, charged the retreating enemy with redoubled vigor; but the French finally gained their original position, and there they made a stand. Eight times was Esslingen taken and re-taken. Night again separated the combatants. The retreat to the island commenced at midnight, and not before the wounded had been, by the order of Napoleon, car-

ried away. Meanwhile he took a closer survey of the island, ordering preparatory defensive measures for the retreating troops. The total loss of the Austrians in the two days was 26,000; that of the French, 15,000. Characteristic enough of the spirit of both armies is the fact that no prisoners were made on either side. To try to dislodge the enemy from the island of Lobau was more than what the Archduke Charles dared to do. It thus remained occupied by a French division under Massena, to serve as a basis or pivot of new operations, which led to the victory of Wagram. We shall return to Wagram in speaking of positions and battles.

We here continue the passage of rivers.

In 1812, Napoleon, who had passed the Rhine with more than 400,000 men, and penetrated into Russia amid successive victories and unparalleled fatigues, had to turn backward from the severe cold of the Russian climate and the flames of Moscow with hardly more than 80,000 men. Part of these perished from cold and hunger before reaching, on his retreat, the banks of the Beresina; even the horses died by thousands from the severe weather; and his numerous artillery, otherwise so useful, now became a most fatal *impedimenta*. There was no possible rescue without passing the Beresina; but the question was how? The *gros* of the Russians, under Witgenstein, followed closely in pursuit of

the French rear, while another corps, under Tchitch-agoff, had already passed to the other side of the river. The bridge of Borisor, the only one existing, was occupied by the Russians.

The French seemed apparently in a forlorn position. The only favorable circumstance was that the banks were woody, and thus allowed Napoleon to make his manœuvres. Determined to effect the passage, cost what it would, Napoleon was, above all, anxious to ascertain the position of the Russians on the other or right bank. Spies were not to be had, as on other former occasions; nothing, therefore, remained but to attempt to make a few prisoners by a *coup de main*, and extort from them the true position of the enemy. A cavalry officer, by name Jaquemont (a name well worthy to be mentioned), gallantly undertook the mission. Accompanied by a few men, he forded the half-frozen river, and returned with his live trophy—a prisoner. Having now learned that the Russians were in position near the bridge of Borisor, Napoleon determined to throw a bridge at a small distance higher up. Amid a series of fighting and different manœuvres, the bridge was made ready; the passing of the greater part of the troops occupied two days and two nights. The division commanded by Victor, about 15,000 strong, remained on the left bank, in position, to cover the retreat. The Russians,

perceiving what had happened; attacked that very night, with overwhelming forces, the French that were on the left bank. Next day—it was the 27th of November—the battle was resumed on both banks of the river, but there was yet life enough in the French warriors to baffle the efforts of their elated and more numerous enemies. On the right bank the Russians were repelled; while Victor, with his small forces diminished to one half, was able to protract the contest on the left bank all day, and ultimately to effect his retreat over the bridge under cover of night. This being done, the bridge was ordered to be burned down, and thousands of stragglers and camp-followers, who thronged on it when already burning, perished amid its flames.

This is not the place to dwell on the horrors of the passage of the Beresina; nor did misfortune overtake Napoleon from want of combination and forethought. He had calculated the Russian weather for fifty years back, and found that severe cold only began about the middle of December; and he had reckoned, and not without sufficient reason, on finding comfortable winter quarters in Moscow. The burning of Moscow could hardly have entered into his combinations.

The French, in a manner, revenged Beresina on the banks of the Tschernaia in 1855. At the siege of Sebastopol, that river separated part of the French

from the Russians. The central position of the French, in front of the river, was at the bridge of Traktir; and they were supported on the flanks by the Turks and Piedmontese. The position was covered, in part, by heights, and the bridge defended by a *tête de pont*, while a small corps, suitably disposed of, guarded the approach on the other side. A line of skirmishers was distributed along the banks. The Russians, about 50,000 strong, advanced in heavy columns on the centre of the allies, after having passed the river by means of flying bridges, and broke through the French lines with irresistible impetuosity. The reserve, which consisted in part of English cavalry, being brought up, with a few battalions deployed on the enemy's flanks, the heavy Russian columns, after sustaining severe losses from the concentrated fire of the defenders, were forced to retreat. The French, who numbered hardly 10,000 men, inflicted on the Russians a loss of about 7000. The battle of the Tschernaya, like that of Inkerman, where 5000 English resisted 40,000 Russians, has thus given a fresh lesson of the perils of heavy columns in the presence of the new fire-arms.

From what has been said, it will thus be seen that the passage of rivers is a but little less delicate operation in offensive movements than in retreats closely pressed by the enemy. The taking up of a

position with a river in your rear must consequently be a very exceptional case, though with more than one bridge in your possession leading to your line of retreat.

The Italian war of 1859 enjoins the lesson of the necessity of careful preparations for insuring the destruction of well-built bridges. The failure of the destruction of the bridge of Buffalora greatly contributed to the French success at Magenta. In their retreat before the Hungarians in 1849, the Austrians likewise failed in the attempt to destroy the magnificent suspension bridge over the Danube at Pesth. The battle of Magenta might indeed be called the battle of the six bridges, such being the number which the French had to pass to get at the Austrian lines. Had these bridges been destroyed after the retreat of the Austrians to the left bank of the Ticino, then the turning manœuvre of M'Mahon, which decided the fate of the day, would have proved a great calamity for the French. We shall have occasion to revert again to Magenta.

With the progress already made in navigation, the military importance of rivers, for countries possessing ample naval power, and in climates mild enough to prevent the freezing up of the water-courses, is naturally much heightened, especially for offensive operations. In fact, rivers may now be considered in many respects as *Lines of Operation*.

They are the new-born handmaids of strategy ; and, whether running parallel or transversely with the lines of operation of an army, their presence is sure to make itself felt more and more. By their aid, a daring adversary may achieve miracles. It is, indeed, no small advantage for a commander to be able to throw, in a few hours, several thousand men from one side of a river to the other.

The present war in the United States will, in all probability, greatly enrich the history of the art of war in this respect. Pittsburgh Landing gave the world the first example of the effects of running water on the fire of battle. Imagine, for the sake of example, part of General Buell's army landing a little higher up, and taking the Confederates, who had precipitated themselves headlong in pursuit of the federal troops, in flank and rear ! A beautiful manœuvre !

CHAPTER VI.

MARCHES AND MANŒUVRES.

Ordinary and Manœuvring, or Strategic Marches.—Marching Order of an Army.—The Van and Rearguard.—Choice of Marching Routes.—Meaning of Strategic Marches.—Scott in Mexico.—Napoleon's Manœuvring Marches in 1809 and 1805.—Manœuvre of Frederick the Great at Rosbach.—Flank Manœuvres.—Napoleon at Arcole.—Manœuvres of Garibaldi and Bem.—Influence of Steam Communication on Marches.—Manœuvres on the Battle-field.

ALMOST every operating army has to perform a series of marches of greater or less extent, whether advancing in anticipation of victory, or retreating from defeat. An army must always march according to certain rules, which can not be violated or ignored with impunity. Marches are the sinews of the plan of operation. They may be divided in two classes—*Ordinary Marches* and *Manœuvring Marches*. The former is the simple movement of an army from one place to another; the latter belongs to the sphere of strategy, and implies some particular combination or aim by which the enemy is to be taken at disadvantage.

In regard to ordinary marches, the rules apply chiefly to the form in which the different parts of

an army have to move, so as to answer the exigencies of tactics in view of an eventual attack. Besides, marching in order is a valuable drilling school in itself; the steady movement of the column is best acquired in marches. In addition to form, marches must be regulated by space; a moving corps must neither be too compressed nor too much extended. To march in columns, with as broad a front as permitted by the width of the road, is the general rule of marches. A battalion about 800 men strong, marching four abreast, covers between 8 and 10 paces in width, and about 400 paces in depth; in platoons, it covers 30 paces in width, and about 250 paces in depth, the depth being modified according as the respective columns follow each other at full or deploying distance, or are closely drawn to each other. Few roads permit a broader front than by platoon. With regard to cavalry, which requires more space, the difference applies chiefly to the depth; a cavalry platoon will, for example, occupy about 500 paces in depth. In usual circumstances, on a good road, the infantry makes 1000 paces in 10 minutes, or 100 paces in one minute. The cavalry can make 130 paces in one minute on a walk, twice as much on a trot, and again twice as much in a gallop.

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surprise and to afford it time to put itself in battle array. Its task is also to face the enemy if attacked; if forced by superior force, it falls back upon the main body. The same rules apply to the rear-guard in case of retreat, though its duties are in most instances of a more arduous nature. There are circumstances when an army always finds itself in a state of retreat, as, for example, the French in Algiers, the Kabyles never failing to attack them in the rear.

Every column ought to be preceded in its march by a detachment of sappers, to remove the obstacles that may present themselves. The heavy artillery and the *gros* of the cavalry form the rear part of the column, the train following always behind, escorted by a small detachment.

For a large army, it is obviously of advantage to march on more than one route, if there are any. Divided on different routes, an army can easier find the necessary provisions, and march quicker. But near the enemy, this mode of marching must be regulated by other considerations. Such marches, either parallel or only converging toward one point, go by the name of *Manœuvring Marches*. They differ from ordinary marches by having a particular offensive character. They are the result of strategic combinations.

When, for example, General Scott debouched into

the valley through which he was to lead his victorious troops to the capital of Mexico, 1846, he found two roads before him ; the one, the direct road, run by the Lake Tezcuco ; the other, difficult, rugged, winding, was at a few miles distance to the left. Having ascertained by a reconnoissance that the enemy had erected strong defensive works on the direct road, General Scott determined to pave his way by the other. The Mexicans had indeed gained time to throw over in time a considerable force to the left road, yet the turning manœuvre succeeded. The positions the enemy afterward took up proved of no use to them. With a stronger force at command, the American general would probably have attempted a simultaneous march on both roads.

What ought to be the strength of each column in marching on different roads, and what the distance separating one column from the other, are questions the answers to which will necessarily depend chiefly on the character and strength of the enemy. It is, however, an understood thing, that an army 15,000 or 18,000 strong ought to be able to hold its ground half a day, or sometimes, in a favorable position, even a whole day, against a superior force. Columns of this strength may thus, without risk, march on parallel roads eight or ten miles distant from each other, even in the presence of a daring,

energetic enemy, provided that no great natural obstacle lies between the two roads. The secret of success in combined marches lies in an energetic, severe execution of the disposition made. Feint movements should, if practicable, always be made, in order to mask the real manœuvre.

Napoleon has left the world the finest examples of manœuvring marches. The operations of 1809, on the Danube, in Germany, offer the singular spectacle of two generals endeavoring to outmanœuvre and outwing each other by the very same process. While Napoleon was drawing together his forces between Ulm, Ratisbon, and Augsburg, hoping thence to advance on Vienna, the Archduke Charles, the worthy adversary of Napoleon, passed the Inn, in hopes to beat separately the French, encamped on the Danube, and then to pursue his march across the Rhine. The respective armies were each about 160,000 strong. The Austrians, divided in three columns, marched by Landshut toward the Iser, and passed that river without resistance. The *gras* of the Austrians was thus only a few miles from the French left wing, resting on Ratisbon. From the Iser the Austrians moved on two roads, distant from each other about 25 miles, toward the Danube. The nature of the ground, however—intersected, as it was, by small rivulets, copse, and swamps—rendered rapidity impossible. The left wing, and the

most threatened, was commanded by Davoust, a calm, courageous, unflinching general; Lannes stood at Augsburg, and Massena at Ulm, forming the right, each of the three corps being about 50,000 strong. Napoleon arrived at the scene of action at the very right moment. Massena was at once ordered, under ostensible preparations for a march into the Tyrol, to move rapidly toward the Danube, while Davaust received orders to leave a small garrison at Ratisbon, and likewise to march along the Danube. This manœuvre exposed, indeed, the French left to find itself inclosed between the river and the *gros* of the Austrians; but Davoust felt sure for every emergency. The result of these manœuvres, supported by Massena on the left, briefly was, that the Austrians had taken Ratisbon, with a French regiment prisoners, while the French army slipped through the Austrian centre, and appeared in its rear when entangled in disadvantageous ground. Napoleon thus opened his way to Vienna, the primary object of the campaign. With the French in his rear, the Archduke Charles, instead of thinking to advance from Ratisbon to the Rhine, endeavored to effect his retreat to Bohemia, thus leaving the capital unprotected. Napoleon, who well knew when to pursue a retreating enemy and when to do something better, determined, in this instance, to prefer the possession of the Austrian

capital to a promising pursuit. From Ratisbon to Vienna, where the French found vast quantities of provisions and ammunition, Napoleon marched, amid several bloody battles, in less than a month, having had to pass rivers on his march, and to take fortresses. It was this series of manœuvres that led to the battle of *Esslingen*, already referred to.

Equally remarkable were the manœuvring marches of Napoleon toward the Danube in 1805. The Austrians, under Mack, occupied a position from Ulm to Meningen, there awaiting the arrival of the Russians, their allies. The road from Strasburg to Ulm leads through the Black Forest, and offers great facilities for defense, of which the Austrians, under General Mack, took care to avail themselves. Napoleon determined to turn the Austrian right flank, and to get into their rear, so as to render retreat impossible. For this purpose, he passed the Rhine at four different points. With the exception of a few thousand, who made boisterous demonstrations in the Black Forest, the army was on different routes, at a distance of about 25 miles, directed on the right flank of the enemy. Meanwhile two other corps, stationed in Holland and Hanover, were ordered to march on Wurtzburg, and who, by a simple left oblique march from the latter place, found themselves in the rear of the enemy, while the other four corps closed in on his

right. All the six corps debouched into the plain of the Danube at the exact time appointed (October 6th). Mack held out a few days, during which he did his best to strengthen his position; but, after a series of battles, by which he was forced to abandon the outer positions round Ulm, he determined not to await the assault, and to surrender. About 30,000 men filed off before Napoleon; many thousands who had escaped were overtaken in pursuit.

“ Soldiers,” said Napoleon, the day after the surrender, “ in a fortnight we have made a campaign; we have driven the troops of the house of Austria out of Bavaria. Out of 100,000 men that composed that army, 60,000 are prisoners: they shall go and replace our conscripts in the labors of our fields. Two hundred pieces of cannon, ninety colors, all the generals, are in our power; not fifteen thousand of that army has escaped. Soldiers, I had promised you a great battle; but, thanks to the vicious combinations of the enemy, I have been enabled to obtain the same success without running the risk. What is unexampled in the history of nations is, that such a great result has only caused us 1500 *hors de combat*. But we shall not stop here; you are impatient to commence a second campaign; that Russian army, which the gold of England has brought from the extremities of the earth, shall share the same fate.”

This last threat, it will be remembered, was realized in less than six weeks on the field of Austerlitz.

It is certainly not given to every general to manœuvre like Napoleon; but every military leader must try to employ some art in his movements; the *pons asinorum* can not always be followed with advantage. In plain language, manœuvring means to do something for which the enemy is not prepared, or, seeing it, does not know its purpose. The more mere brute force is assisted by skill and art, the better it acts. With an army which, by its organization, is wanting in mobility, all manœuvring must be carefully avoided, especially near to the enemy. The secret of the success of Frederick the Great over the Austrians lay as well in his genius as in the superior mobility of his troops. And he could thus undertake operations against them which would have proved ruinous in the presence of another adversary.

Take, for example, the battle of Rosbach (Nov., 1757), where he had to deal with a Gallo-German army led by incompetent generals. The enemy, knowing his small numbers, decided on a turning manœuvre, with the object of cutting off his retreat, and taking king and army prisoners. Frederick, who at once saw the meaning of the enemy's movement, feigned complete ignorance; and, the better to confirm the enemy in his hopes, he caused noisy

preparations to be made for a sort of banquet. Deeming the moment had arrived to fall on the divided enemy, he broke up, turned round first on those who were in his rear, and then on those in front, and defeated both with equal ease. The whole affair lasted two hours. The allies lost about 9000 in killed and wounded, and 5000 prisoners; the greater part of their artillery and baggage. His army was about 22,000 strong; that of the enemy more than 60,000. The battle of Rosbach sufficiently shows the delicate nature of flank movements in the presence of a keen-sighted, active enemy, if executed near his lines.

A *Flank Movement* or *Manœuvre* means, in plain language, that movement which, instead of a line of battle, presents to the enemy the form of flank. It is thus meant for an attack upon only part of the enemy's lines, which, if successful, may cause his total defeat. Such a movement may be undertaken from a distance, and then it is called a "flank march," or when extemporized on the battle-field, when it is a "flank attack." In the latter case, it can, of course, only be attempted with a portion of the army. Sometimes the direction of the roads will compel an army to a flank march.

The battle of Arcole (1797) furnishes the most singular example of a flank movement with a whole army.

Napoleon lay encamped before Verona, with his front covered by the Adige; the Austrians stood on the opposite side of the river, preparing to attack him in his defensive position. Napoleon, though considerably weaker in numbers, decided to take the offensive by a flank movement. He ordered (to mask his designs) ostensible preparations for the defense of the place, while he passed the Adige in the night, on a bridge of boats, a few miles below Verona, and thus advanced on the enemy's flank and rear. He marched in three columns, on three different roads, surrounded by swamps and marshes, which, with the Adige, admirably covered his flanks. The bridge over the Alpon, a small river he had to pass before reaching the Austrians, having been strongly defended, interfered, indeed, with the execution of his plan; the battle was thus protracted for three days. But, in spite of this difficulty, he had all the advantages of position, considering the relative strength of both armies. In open ground, where the Austrians might have deployed and brought into action their numerous army, the French would have, in all probability, been ruined; but in the partial encounters that took place, the French had, by their superior tactics, a decided advantage; the numerous Austrian cavalry was, in the circumstances, of very slight use to them. Having worn out and weakened the Aus-

trians in two days' manœuvres, Napoleon threw a bridge over the Alpon, resumed the third day the fight in full earnest, and gained the renowned victory of Arcole. In attempting this manœuvre, Napoleon, of course, felt that there was no danger of his being thrown into the Adige or the swamps by a mere attack on his front.

One of the simplest manœuvres, and which has often produced the greatest results, is, for example, to feign a retreat. This Napoleon tried with success on the eve of the battle of Austerlitz, and to this Garibaldi owed his entry into Palermo. On advancing, with his "Thousand" and the Sicilian volunteers, on the capital, he found the Neapolitan army too strong for him to force a passage into the city, and consequently recurred to manœuvres. While turning back with five guns (this was all the artillery he then had), escorted by a weak detachment, on the high road toward Carleone, he took the way, with the rest of his volunteers, into the mountains to the right, through which he paved himself a way to the lower part of the city, which was less fortified. The enemy, seeing the artillery turning back on the high road, naturally judged that the whole army was retreating that way, and consequently set out in earnest pursuit of the Garibaldians on that road. The Neapolitans, indeed, took the five sorry guns, but, in the mean time, Garibaldi took Palermo.



A similar manoeuvre was executed in the Hungarian war of 1849 by General Bem. This general operated separately with a corps d'armée in Transylvania, where the Austrians, after having sustained repeated losses, demanded and obtained an auxiliary corps of Russians from the army stationed in the Danubian principalities. The central position of the Austro-Russians was Hermanstadt, a fortified town of great importance. Having attempted to take that town with a force much inferior in numbers to that of the garrison, Bem was repulsed, with severe losses, from its walls. But, with his accustomed audacity, he took up a position with his beaten army a few miles from Hermanstadt. The opportunity seemed very tempting to Puchner, the Austrian commander. Leaving behind the Russians to guard the city, General Puchner took his army on a circuitous road, in full hopes of getting in Bem's rear and annihilating him. Bem, apprised by scouts of Puchner's movement, left back troops enough to form what is called a "curtain," to keep up Puchner's illusion to the last moment, while with the rest of his troops he advanced, in double quick, by the direct road, on Hermanstadt. The national troops broke their way into the town, through the trenches and palisades, and charged with vehemence the Russian garrison, which was quite unprepared for such an event. Hermanstadt

was taken, and the Russians pursued till over the frontier, which is but a few miles from the town. This being accomplished, Bem turned against Puchner, and the Austrian army too was obliged to seek refuge on the soil of the Principalities. A most ingenious manœuvre that was! By a single stroke it finished the campaign. A timid general, or one not confiding in his own resources, will naturally never dream of a similar movement, and which actually exposes the manœuvring army to get between two fires.

However, whether intending some manœuvre or not, a general has always well to consider by which road to advance, if there is more than one open before him. We shall touch on this point in speaking of *Lines of Operation*. What ought to be here borne in mind is that every movement of an army must have some object in view, as nothing dispirits troops more than the moving about without any ostensible purpose.

The importance of railroads with regard to marches of concentration has, for the first time, fully proved itself in the Italian war of 1859. In a few days about 200,000 Gallo-Italian troops were collected in the environs of the fortress of Alexandria, ready to take the offensive out of the hands of the Austrians. What miracles would Napoleon Bonaparte not have performed with the aid of such

facilities! In fact, at the battle of Magenta, the French used the railway for marching as a common road, and by this means they were enabled to advance simultaneously in three different columns. In many circumstances, with the present perfection in the construction of vessels, rivers might be used in the same manner. The time appears to be fast approaching when war will only be possible for very rich countries, who can enchain victory to their banners by dint of their vast means. But to proceed :

Manœuvring Marches, or marching manœuvres, always imply distance, and ought not to be confounded with the manœuvres on the battle-field. The manœuvres on the battle-field belong to the province of *grand tactics*; their meaning is to handle the troops to the best possible advantage, according to the nature of the ground and the dispositions of the enemy. The grand tactics teach how to distribute the three arms, on which point to concentrate the attack, and how to modify or change the original dispositions during the fluctuations of battle. Every thing can not possibly be foreseen; even an adversary of moderate resources will sometimes make a move puzzling enough, and which must soon be met.

The battle-field is no doubt a chess-board, but with this difference, that in battle you can not take

your time. Sometimes the tide of a great battle will be turned by the right move of a single regiment. At the battle of Talavera, 1809, the English centre, formed of the guards, was broken by the impetuous charge of the French; and, this being the key of the position, the battle appeared fairly lost, when the opportune advance of the 48th restored the balance. "It seemed," says General Napier, "as if this regiment must be carried away with the retreating crowds; but, wheeling back by companies, it let them pass through the intervals, and then, resuming its proud and beautiful line, struck against the right of the pursuing enemy, plying such a destructive musketry, and closing with such a firm countenance, that his forward movement was checked." If the command of the respective tactic subdivisions be in competent hands, then the partial manœuvres rendered necessary by the fluctuations of battle are a matter of comparative ease; and, without the knowledge of the meaning of tactics on the part of the commanding officers, a battle will be nothing else than wholesale slaughter, tempered by the ceremonies of command. "Victory will always declare for the army that best knows how to manœuvre," says Napoleon. Knowledge is power.

CHAPTER VII.

PLAN OF CAMPAIGN.

What is a Campaign?—Outlines of a Plan of Campaign.—Influence of Topography.—Campaigns of Napoleon and Wellington.—Basis of Operation.—Lines of Operation.—Strategic Points.—Single and Double Lines of Operation.—True Meaning of Concentration.—Illustration: Route to Richmond.—Bad Plans of Campaign.—Offensive and Defensive Plans.—Fortresses.—Napoleon's Double Plan in 1800.—The Campaign of 1805.—Marengo.—Ulm and Austerlitz.—Napoleon and Wellington.

PREVIOUS to the French Revolution, a Plan of Campaign meant a series of combined operations executed in one season—the summer; the troops having, with the beginning of the cold season, gone to their winter quarters. Revolutionary France has done away with this respect for seasons. The old practice of fortifying camps, and carrying along tents, was also discontinued, while a more perfect system of organization and tactics likewise contributed to the mobility of the army; and thus it came to pass that most decisive campaigns have since been brought to a close in two or three months, independent of seasons.

Plan and Execution.—These are the primary requisites of all military operations. In war, execu-

tion is perhaps more difficult than in any thing else, and without it, the best possible plan is of no avail; but it is, beyond doubt, an immense advantage to know, at least, what is to be executed. Strategy and Tactics both ought to have their due share in a plan of operations; the former prepares the way for battles, and by the latter they are fought through. Whether the plan be offensive or defensive depends often as much upon political as military considerations. The respective demerits of a plan can be traced to different causes. Besides inadequate knowledge, a plan may, for example, be bad from the want of means or causes inherent in the circumstances. However, whatever be the causes, the defects of the plan can not be long hidden; in fact, sometimes its viciousness is disclosed by the very victories. When we see a series of victories with ephemeral or doubtful result, we may know that the plan was bad.

A striking example of the influence of circumstances on the plan of campaign is furnished by the wars of Napoleon in Spain. His original adversaries were the Spaniards as a people, refusing to pay homage to his brother Joseph. Excited by fanatic priests and monks, they all rose in insurrection, from the inhabitants at the foot of the Pyrenees to the proud Andalusians and the mountain shepherds of Estremadura. Committees, or *Juntas*,

were rapidly formed in every province; levies *en masse* were decreed, and a general crusade began against the French rule. Large bands of guerrillas soon crowded all the mountain passes. This state of things necessitated a divided plan of operations, both to enforce obedience in the different provinces, and to utilize their resources—the latter consideration was, indeed, of primary importance. The Spaniards alone considered, the multiplicity of the plans of operation would have, indeed, mattered little; the Spaniards knew how to die, but not how to fight. The scales were, however, at once turned as soon as the English army appeared on the theatre of war. Nor was it easy even for the genius of Napoleon to remedy the original defects of the plan of operations, especially from the distance, and while having other more important combinations on hand.

Subsequently, after a partial concentration of the French troops under Massena in 1809, his best conceived plans were again half smothered from want of means of transportation and scarcity of provisions. As to the want of means in general, its influences on the plan of campaigns are often of a merely transitory character, as was recently proved by the Hungarian war of 1848. Taken by surprise, and wanting both time to raise a sufficient army and the opportunity to get arms, the Hungarians

had at first no other plan but that of retreat before the concentrated Austrian army; and, having thus gained two months, the plan of retreat was turned into one of offensive preparations.

Every plan, to be good, must, above all, be adapted to the nature of the army, the forces of the enemy, and the topographical features of the theatre of war.

Particular circumstances will generally beforehand decide the character of a plan of campaign, viz., whether it be defensive or offensive. A country waiting for an ally, or an army occupying impregnable positions, may naturally prefer the defensive, if not more anxious than its adversary to pass through the crisis of war. In 1779 we thus beheld General Washington, from the consideration of the embarrassed state of finances, and in expectation of French assistance, decide for a defensive campaign. Very often, however, the character of the campaign is decided by the character of the general commanding. Take Wellington (in the Spanish Peninsula) and Napoleon, and you have the distinct types of the defensive and offensive. In more than one instance the English general neglected to take the offensive, even in the shape of pursuit, after he had won victory. Being convinced that the want of provisions and other necessaries would not fail to tell upon the French by delay, he

preferred to risk nothing. His tactics were "to surround the French by a desert."

In 1809, while Massena prepared for the invasion of Portugal, and laid siege to the frontier fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo, which was to serve as his basis, Wellington remained quiet in his strong position of Viseu, absolutely refusing to make any diversion in favor of the besieged fortress, despite the supplications of the Spanish garrison. After the taking of this and another frontier fortress, Massena advanced and attacked the English in the almost impregnable position of Busaco. The French were repelled with severe losses, and Wellington, after his victory, hastened to march back to the famous lines of Torres Vedras, which he had caused to be constructed beforehand, near Lisbon, between the Tagus and the sea; and there he sat, with an army numbering upward of 60,000 men, besides thousands of the militia, looking down, for six months, at 50,000 French, who vainly hoped to force this impregnable bulwark, bristling with 700 guns.

"The French," says De Rocca, "remained six months before the lines of Torres Vedras, supporting patiently every privation, in the hope of soon reducing their opponents to despair. They supposed that the immense crowds of people, of all ages and sexes, which had retired before them, and were shut up with the population of the capital in a narrow and barren space, would starve the enemy's army, and oblige them either to fight or to re-embark; but the English and Portuguese had the vast ocean behind them,

and their numerous shipping communicated freely with both hemispheres. . . . Massena was engaged in constructing a number of boats for the purpose of throwing bridges over the Tagus; this was a difficult undertaking in a country deserted by its inhabitants, and offering, in other respects, but few resources at any time. . . . It was a matter of as much importance to the English to prevent, as it was to the French to effect the passage of the river, for the fate of Portugal, and the success of the ulterior operations of both parties, appeared at that time to depend upon the measure. If Massena succeeded in crossing the Tagus, he would oblige the English to divide their forces, and to weaken themselves by extending their line of operation to both sides of the river. . . . At the commencement of the month of March, Massena had succeeded in constructing two hundred boats, and all his preparations were completed; but he could not attempt the passage of the Tagus without receiving fresh re-enforcements. Marshal Massena's forces, on the contrary, had been daily diminishing for the last seven months, by the attacks of the irregulars, the want of supplies, and by sickness; it was reduced to one half of the original number that entered Portugal. . . . Such was the situation of the French at the beginning of March, when a convoy of biscuit, on its way from France, was carried off by the Spanish partisans. On the eve of being totally without provisions, they were forced to think of retreating, and they at last abandoned Portugal, after a campaign of seven months' duration, without having fought a single pitched battle. They yielded to the constancy with which the British commander adhered to a system that deprived his enemy of every chance of victory, by withholding every opportunity of fighting."

It ought to be remembered that the jealousies and ill will existing between Massena and his generals proved no less ruinous to the French than Wellington's tactics.

Wellington and Napoleon teach also another les-

son; in them one may behold the difference between tactics and strategy. The genius of the latter was essentially strategic. By preparatory manœuvres, Napoleon knew how to give, and sometimes to dictate, great decisive battles. One great battle of Napoleon finished a campaign; the enemy, defeated on the battle-field, was generally cut off, at the same time, from his base or line of operations; whereas with Wellington, the advantages of victory were circumscribed, and confined to the tactic success on the battle-field. Hence the steady but slow progress of the English in the Spanish Peninsula. The victories of Busaco, Fuentes Onoro, Salamanca, and Vittoria were all of but little avail. To march from the Mondego to the Garonne it took the victorious English five years; nor were the operations brought to a close before the spreading in the French lines of the doleful and discouraging tale of the abdication of Fontainebleau.

How different the strategic campaigns of Napoleon! In 1800 we see Napoleon, after passing the Alps, rapidly march on Milan, seating himself, as it were, on the basis of his adversary, and then soon retrace his steps toward the Bormida, and there end the three weeks' campaign by the battle of Marengo. The same strategic value Napoleon imparted five years afterward to the victory of Austerlitz. In short, Napoleon was the first general that taught

the world both how to fight decisive battles and how to render them decisive in results. Strategy and tactics marched with him hand in hand, while Wellington owed his victories solely to his tactics.

Battles, decisive both on the battle-field and in their results, are, and must be in most cases, the aim of the plan of campaign. No plan of operations is imaginable without a knowledge of the prospected theatre of war. The broad features of the plan of campaign embody the *Basis of Operation*, the *Lines of Operation*, and the *Strategic Points*.

By *Basis of Operation* is understood that space where an army is collected and prepared for taking the field. *Lines of Operation* are the direction by which it intends to advance, and which, in case of retreat, may be called lines of retreat. *Strategic Points* are those points or places on the line of operation which, either from military or other considerations, possess a certain importance.

Capitals and large towns stand in the first class of strategic points; a defile on a high road, the connecting point of several lines of communication, strong-built bridges, all are considered as strategic points. To seize on such points on the line of operation is thus of utmost importance. The taking of the capital will frequently finish the campaign or war. Whenever Napoleon appeared on the



Rhine to take the field against Austria, his eagle glance darted on Vienna. Strategic points are also called *Objective Points*, implying that they are the aim or object of operation; while, on the other hand, the points or places comprised in the basis of operation are by some designated as *Subjective Points*. But, whatever be the value of these technicalities, it ought not to be forgotten that the idea, the principle which underlies these terms, is nowise a chimera or a phantasm. The greater an army is, the greater its necessity to lean on and start from a good basis, and the greater its need to have traced out its line of operation.

The basis of operation is generally chosen on the frontiers or near the territory of the adversary. It presupposes perfect security in the rear; and it must present some protection in front, such as a mountain chain or a broad river. The Alps, for example, form naturally a base for France and Italy; and so is the Rhine with regard to France and Germany. It may easily be understood that the perfected state of navigation tends to diminish the value of rivers, considered as bases of operation, unless with fortified points on the banks.

Lines of Operation are, as already said, directions which the army proposes to follow toward the attainment of its object; we say directions, and not roads, because every line presupposes more than

one road. Several parallel or *quasi* parallel roads form only one line of operation.


If an army has a long line of operation before itself, then it must needs look, during its progress, for a *Secondary Basis*. This is rendered necessary not only as a point of support, but also as a *dépôt* for necessary provisions and ammunition. An army can not take with itself more ammunition than what is necessary for one or two battles. These necessaries are sent after an army by convoys. The nearer the stores or magazines are, the easier the army is provided.

The following observations of Decker, as contained in his treatise on Strategy, will serve to illustrate more fully the point in question :

"If the enemy's basis is similar and parallel to ours, then two things are to be considered : 1st, when both parties intend to take the offensive, in which case the advantages and disadvantages would be equally balanced ; 2d, when the enemy advances and we withdraw within our *subjective points* (or our basis). In the latter case, the enemy labors under the disadvantage of removing from his basis, and, consequently, his supplies, besides being obliged to detach troops to guard or lay siege to the points abandoned by us ; but, on the other hand, he has the advantage of the initiative. We may indeed, in this case, have the means of injuring him by cutting off his communications ; but these are mere palliatives by which we may imperil our very existence. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance to know the first movements of the enemy, in order to make counter-movements ; and, to be able to do this, we must, above all, have a good system of outposts. Then we have,


at least, the choice either to accept battle or not. The third case to be considered is when we leave our basis to advance, which is the second case in an inverse sense: secrecy of our movements is naturally the principal point on our part.

"Supposing, now, that our basis, *c d*, is perpendicular to the basis, *a b*, of the enemy:



"In this case, the strategic circumstance is clear enough. If the enemy's corps *e* makes front against ours at *f*, then its basis is confined to *a*, whereas the army *f* may lean equally on both subjunctive points *c* and *d*. This advantage will, however, be modified by the relative distance from *f* to *d* and *c*, and the nature of the roads.

"There is yet another relation in which the two bases may stand toward each other; the one may be the *enclosed*, the other the *enclosing*, as for example:



c a b being the enclosed, and *g f h* the enclosing basis. If the two armies *x* and *u* stand near each other in masses, then the sole advantage of *u* is that it can freely move to every side, in consequence of its wide basis; but the enclosing form is, after all, of little advantage, as was proved by the campaign in Russia of 1806. Should, for example, the army *u* divide in *u* and *v*, and thus advance against the enemy's basis, then the latter may concentrate on *z*, and annihilate one of the two. True, part of the *u* army might again take *z* in flank, or threaten the base *a b*; but, to provide against the possibility of such a move, *z* may leave behind a corps in *z*. The danger, it must be remembered, does not lie in the division of the forces, but in allowing the enemy to unite first. If the enclosed army succeeds in first uniting either at *z* or *x*, then it will be enabled to beat *v* or *u* separately, considering the great distance by which they are separated from each other. The enclosed army possesses the indisputable advantage of having short marching lines leading to its union."

Decker then arrives at the following conclusions:

- “1. That a basis furnishes an army more advantages, with regard to the supply of its necessaries, than a single *subjective* point.
- “2. That in the case of an army depending for its supplies on magazines, there is an absolute necessity for a good basis.

“3. A basis offers, in case of a necessitated retreat, more security than a single subjective point.

“4. An army leaning on a good basis can not be easily deprived of its means of subsistence.

“5. In defensive war the value of the basis is still greater.

“6. That, if much distant behind the army, then the basis loses its importance partially, and sometimes even entirely, especially with regard to supplies, in consequence of the difficulty of transportation.

“7. That, being too near, the basis likewise loses its importance.

“8. That, once taken in flank, the basis loses all its efficacy.

“9. An enclosed basis affords the advantage of a central position.

“10. An enclosing basis, on the other hand, to be of use, must be marked by simultaneousness in the operations.

“11. That, however good the basis, it can only be maintained by skillful movements.

“12. That a campaign may indeed be begun without a basis, but only under peculiarly favorable circumstances.

“13. That, even in a most successful campaign, it is advisable the soonest to look after a basis, if the successes earned, and, in some respects, existence itself, is not to be put at jeopardy.

“The lines of operation (continues Decker) are of great importance also on account of their connecting an army with its supplies. Formerly whole campaigns were carried on about the possession of the line of operation. Frederick and Napoleon, on the other hand, have often rashly abandoned their lines of operation.

“Supposing the army *a* facing the army *b*, while it detaches a corps *c* against the line of operation of the army *b*:

“In this case (supposing the armies of equal strength), the army *a* renders itself obviously vulnerable; an active adversary, if not obstructed by the nature of the ground, will fall with all his force on the part of the army *a* that remained in its position, and



overwhelm it. The object of the detachment will then, of itself, fail. Tactically (that is, in the battle-field), a flank or rear attack may prove of much weight; but not so in strategy, unless against an army inferior in numbers, and incapable of taking the offensive."

Decker thus arrives at the conclusion that, with equal forces, it is not advisable to attempt a flank or rear attack on the enemy's line by a single detachment; such an attempt implies the imperiling of one's own line in hopes of gaining that of the enemy. It may, indeed, happen that a general will purposely abandon his line of operation to gain that of the enemy, but this is only done from particular

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as much. No; that two is more than one is not a Napoleonic discovery.

Nor is it true that Napoleon always held his army concentrated. Few advancing armies were more broken up and separated than the one which Napoleon led from Ulm to Austerlitz. It is, in fact, a question whether more armies have been ruined by *de-concentration* or concentration; with the present arms of precision, concentration, in a tactic sense, has, in fact, become of a very questionable character. What Napoleon knew was something different; he knew when to pass from concentration to *de-concentration*, and *vice versa*, and that with rapidity at the very moment and at the very point where the metamorphosis was desirable. His *genius*, peculiarly offensive, looked for the shortest way to the battle-field, whether it was by single or double lines of operation. His keen gaze, as it were, sharpened, red up, amid the terror and confusion of battle. Decisive battles were his stand-bys alike in strategic and tactic respects; well to prepare for as to go

and his art in his own peculiarities. The great art," he says, "consists in separating the separate in order to subdue to fight."

and his art, with as much detail as

is reconcilable with these pages, to some of the grand operations of Napoleon, than which nothing can be more instructive, if, indeed, instruction is possible when the mind is seized by an irresistible and ever-growing feeling of admiration.

The extent of the base of operation depends naturally on circumstances, and the number of the army about to take the field. Sometimes it is a mere spot, sometimes an area of several miles. In the war of the Crimea in 1854, the base of the Anglo-French army was the fleet. Sometimes the genius of the general will be his basis. However, a large army always requires a basis to start from. In 1815, the army which Napoleon transported from the ocean camps to the Rhine covered a front of between 80 and 100 miles, with Strasburg as the centre of the base. His line of operation, which was then meant to be not farther than Vienna, was about 400 miles. After the capture of Ulm, about 100 miles from the original base, Napoleon there formed a secondary base, the line of operation from this point being the principal road, with its sideways, along the Danube. The river was made use of as a means of communication. The distance between the parallel roads on the line of communication must of course not be great, in order to permit the mutual assistance of the several columns. Most, however, depends on the whereabouts of the

enemy. The six columns marching on Ulm were, for example, at times separated from each other by a distance of 10 or 20 miles; on approaching the Austrian lines, they contracted more and more, and converged toward the central point.

If an army is marching toward a certain point on a double line of operation, then mutual assistance, during the march, is out of question. The columns thus separated must be proportionately stronger. The protection of the flanks by natural obstacles, such as water-courses or mountains, is, in such cases, a high advantage. In 1800, Napoleon's plan of campaign in Italy was based on a double line of operation: he himself descended down the valley of the Po by the St. Bernard, while a corps under General Moncey marched from Germany into Lombardy by the St. Gothard. The manœuvre, it is known, succeeded, in spite of almost insuperable difficulties. The obvious advantage in this double march was, that it precluded the possibility of the enemy's throwing himself with concentrated forces on the flank of one of the two corps. On the other hand, when the Austrian general Wurmser tried, in 1796, to envelop Napoleon by a march, on a double line of operation, on both sides of Lake Garda, he was alternately defeated, and finally thrown back on the Tyrolean Alps. For offensive operations, the shorter the line the better.

Double lines of operation may radiate from one basis or two different points. To take a more familiar topic for American readers:

Supposing an army preparing to operate against Richmond, with the Potomac from Washington to Mathias Point for its base. In this case, the natural line of operation would be the road from Acquia Creek by Fredericksburg, along the Richmond and Potomac Railroad, with the left flank advancing by Port Royal and King William Court-house, across the Mattapony River, and the right flank from Alexandria, by Manassas Junction and Brentsville, toward the north arm of the Rappahannock. This river and Fredericksburg would form a secondary basis, rendered still more valuable from its proximity to the Potomac, caused by the bend of that river in the rear of Fredericksburg. Should another army, at the same time, start from its base at Fortress Monroe, and march upon Richmond by Yorktown and Williamsburg, or by Norfolk and Petersburg, then this would constitute a double line of operation. The rendering of mutual assistance between the two lines would, to a certain point, be impossible, both on account of natural obstacles and distance. Quite different would be the case if an army, with Fortress Monroe for its sole basis, advanced partly through the Peninsula and partly between James River and the Norfolk and Petersburg

Railroad, and with a flotilla connecting the two armies. By the aid of this connection, this would, properly speaking, form one or a single line of operation. The great obvious disadvantage of the basis at Fortress Monroe, compared to that of the Potomac, would be the want of a secondary base. It is hardly possible to overrate the importance of a secondary base, especially on longer lines of operation than those here referred to. Irrespective of its importance with regard to the supply of necessities of an army, it is, as already stated, rendered necessary as a rallying-point in case of a forced retreat.

Unless much superior in numbers to the enemy, or with great moral or tactic superiority, it is, of course, safer to choose a single line of operation, except, indeed, if the enemy, on his part, also keeps his forces separated. Generally the lines of operation of the two adversaries run into each other, and are essentially the same, and this is also sometimes the case with the basis; that is to say, that the two bases are parallel with each other. When the primary or secondary basis is formed by a river, it would always be necessary that there be more than one bridge to *debouch*; the passage of rivers being, under almost all circumstances, a delicate operation. Rivers running parallel with the line of operation derive no small importance from their usefulness

as means of communication, and also from their protecting the flanks. In some instances they may, with the present means of communication, form an important line of march in the line of operation.

The essential difference between an *offensive* and *defensive* plan of campaign is conveyed by the very meaning of the words. The one implies movement—an aggressive march forward; the other, strong positions capable of defense. Yet a defensive plan, to be truly effective, must also possess the elements of the offensive. A purely offensive plan, however, always implies greater activity, more energy. It is of the utmost importance that the offensive preserve its character; nothing is more calculated to lower the morale of troops and to raise the spirits of the enemy than an offensive operation marked by slowness and timidity. The advancing army, in this case, besides prematurely betraying its design, is subject to all the disadvantages arising from finding itself at a distance from its base.

An offensive campaign should never assume the character of a *guerre de fatigue*. Napoleon instances as an absurdity the offensive plan of the Duke of Brunswick, who opened, on the part of Prussia, the war against revolutionary France, and which was expected to be brought to an end in ninety days. In forty days the duke advanced eighteen miles! In every great enterprise, Napoleon's main point of

instructions to his generals was to enjoin dispatch. "The world was created in six days," he used to say on such occasions, hinting at the value of time.

A thorough acquaintance with the theatre of war, or the probable fields of operation; a due proportion of the three arms; the securing of the means of transportation, placed under the full control of the commanding general (the quarter-master's institution being peculiar only to the United States); the accumulation of the necessary provisions and ammunition, and an appropriate division of the operating army into minor tactic unities—all must enter into the original plan. A good general will naturally try to mask his intentions by manœuvres and demonstrations, at least at the very outset. His true aim will be to fight decisive battles the soonest possible.

Artificial obstacles met with on the line of operation, such as fortresses, will, in some cases, cause delay and interruptions. But nowadays armies no more stop before strong-holds, as was the custom in the days of Louis XIV. The fate of a campaign is now decided on the open field, despite of fortresses. After the victory of Marengo, Napoleon dictated to the Austrian general the surrender of a dozen fortresses, with the stores and ammunition in them. In 1859, Austria gave up Lombardy, despite the famous *Quadrilateral* formed by Verona, Legnago,

Mantua, and Peschiera. Fortresses have merely a defensive value. They may serve as bases of operation; a beaten army may seek refuge under their ramparts—that is all.

A country may have to separate its army into two different theatres of war, where the unity of the plan of operation is rendered impossible. Such, as we have shown, were the wars of Napoleon in Spain, and sometimes even those in the other countries of Europe. On the other hand, there may be circumstances when two plans, or two different theatres of war, may be made to agree, and to be conducted by one leading idea. This Napoleon did more than once, with his two theatres of war in Germany and Italy, separated by the Alps. The mere extent of a theatre of war, it must be remembered, affects little the principles of the plan of war, especially with the present means of communication. The facilities of communication and the new “precision arms” tend indeed one way—the one, to shorten the period of campaigns; the other, to shorten the duration of battles.

We shall now endeavor to illustrate by example what has been before explained.

To begin with the campaign of 1800,* ended in Italy by Marengo, and in Germany by the battle

* See map at beginning, illustrating Napoleon's Italian Campaigns.

of Hochstadt. This campaign, conducted in Italy by Napoleon, and in Germany by Moreau, will also show the influence of the individuality of the commander on the plan of campaign.

The Austrians had, in 1800, about 300,000 men, nearly equally divided into the army of Italy and that of Germany. The French, on the other hand, had but about 50,000 in Italy, round Genoa, at the Appenines, and a force nearly equal to that of Austria on the Rhine. In these circumstances, it was natural on the part of the Austrians to take the offensive in Italy, where they were also assisted by the English fleet, and to observe the defensive in Germany. The position they held in the latter country was, besides, best adapted for the defensive. It was the woody mountain known as the Black Forest, through the defiles of which the road leads from Strasburg to Augsburg, Ulm, and Vienna. To penetrate into France through the Var by Nice was the principal aim of General Melas, the Austrian commander; and he actually succeeded in breaking through the French army, commanded by Massena, who, with the greater part of his forces, fell back upon Genoa. Napoleon, on his part, drew out the plan of the offensive on the Rhine.

According to this plan, Moreau ought to have passed the river with concentrated forces, so as to get on the left flank of the enemy, and thus to

overwhelm and drive them away from the Alps. But Moreau manœuvred slowly and hesitated; and, in the mean time, part of the Austrians in Italy kept Massena blocked up in Genoa. Only a very weak force, separated from Massena's army, defended the passage of the Var. At last Moreau passed the Rhine on three different points between Strasburg and Basle, and the Austrians fell back. Thus stood affairs about the end of April. Moreau was beginning to make progress on the right bank of the Rhine, Massena was shut up in Genoa, and Melas in full hopes to pass the Var. The Austrians, of course, believed little in the possibility of a third French army being raised in time, and still less thought of that army's passing the glaciers of the Alps; but not so the First Consul of France.

Ever since the commencement of hostilities Napoleon had labored on the creation of an army of reserve, which was ostentatiously assembled at Dijon, whither all the spies and secret agents of the Coalitionists also soon repaired, to the no small satisfaction of the First Consul. What they saw at Dijon might perhaps have been an object of caricature, in which they freely indulged. Napoleon figured, with his army of reserve, in one of these as a boy with a wooden leg. This, however, did not prevent the real army from quietly approaching the foot of the Alps. The army of reserve, led by

Napoleon, was about 36,000 strong, with some 40 guns—a rather small proportion, but more than enough for being transported over the Alps. The army began to ascend the high, towering, icy mass by Mount St. Bernard May 17. The artillery carriages were dismounted, and carried on the backs of mules; the pieces, tied by their trunnions to the trunks of trees, were carried or dragged along by the soldiers, aided by the Alpine rustics; and by the 20th the army debouched into the valley of Northern Italy.

The difficulties of march were overcome; but now began the difficulties of strategy. What direction to follow? To march upon Turin, the headquarters of Melas, or Milan? or hasten to relieve Massena? Napoleon chose the capital of Lombardy. Milan was, in fact, to all intents and purposes, *the* strategic point. From Milan he could rouse the Lombards; and there he stood on the line of operation of the enemy, severing him from his resources and his basis. There, too, he could effect a junction with the corps detached from Moreau's army, marching by Mount St. Gothard. From Milan, his new basis, Napoleon soon marched toward the banks of the Scrivia and Bormida, and on the 14th of June the campaign was closed by the battle of Marengo. Melas, defeated, and cut off from his lines of communication and base, was obliged to accept the conditions dictated by the victor.

A few days after the battle of Marengo the campaign in Germany was ended by the victory of Moreau at Hochstadt, not far from Ulm, though with much less decided results than that of Italy. Such is the brief *exposé* of the double campaign which, though separated by the Alps, had an internal connection—the one being made to depend in part upon the fortunes of the other.

In 1805 we find the theatre of war much more expanded, and Napoleon reversed the order; the Italian chessboard was to be kept tranquil, strictly defensive, while in Germany every thing breathed the offensive. Ulm and Austerlitz—these are the names that mark the two periods which that most wondrous of campaigns formed.

In 1805 Napoleon had to take the field against the third coalition, and in this instance, too, his enemies took the initiative. They were soon disabused; the humble rôle of the défensive and retreat was imposed upon them much sooner than they could possibly have anticipated. The coalition comprised Austria, Russia, Sweden, England, and Naples, and not less than 500,000 men were to be brought into the field.

The plan of the allies was, to use a phrase familiar to American readers, a veritable “anaconda;” but it was a creature much too slow to gain upon Napoleon. The Austrian army was divided, as in


1800, into the army of Italy and that of the Rhine; the latter was to be joined by the Russians, who were set in motion in three principal columns. The advanced column of Russians, under Kutusoff, was to approach the Austrian territory by Moravia; another Russian corps, landing at Stralsund, was to co-operate with the Swedes; while the Russians from the Ionian Islands and the English from Malta were to make a combined descent on Naples, held by a small French force. The two arms of this gigantic plan were evidently the Austrian army in Italy and the Austro-Russian army that was to be concentrated in Germany. Both these armies were to penetrate into France by Switzerland—that is, the Alps. The *gros* of the French army, as the reader may remember, was at that time held by Napoleon in the camps round Boulogne, intended for the invasion of England.

The total effective of Austria was about 200,000; of these, 100,000, under the Archduke Charles, were in Lombardy; some 80,000 composed the army of the Danube or Germany, commanded by General Mack; while a small force under the Archduke John held the defiles of the Tyrolean Alps, forming the connecting link between the two great armies. The distance from Vienna to Boulogne being some 800 miles, the Austrian war council expected to approach France by the Rhine sooner than the army

of Boulogne could be rightly apprised of the move. By the end of August the Austrians stood ready to march into Bavaria, the sole ally of Napoleon. The Austrians drove before them (without defeating) the small Bavarian army, and hastened to occupy their favorite position, the Black Forest, looking on the Rhine and the Lake of Constance. Their central position was thus on the Iser, with Meningen and Ulm on its two angles, leaning with the right on the Danube and the left on the Tyrolean Mountains. This unobstructed advance was deemed in Vienna a great master-stroke.

It was also in the last days of August that the Emperor Napoleon made his first dispositions. The offensive move of the Austrians in Germany was the very thing he wanted, having thus come to his aid in gratuitously shortening his line of operation, while they, on the other hand, widened the distance between themselves and the approaching Russians. The Austrians, in short, offered, by this move, the best possible chances to the offensive genius of their adversary. This conduct on the part of the Austrians may serve as a striking example of the fatalities attendant on a partial, meaningless offensive. Premature disclosure of design is invariably the result of such conduct, which is, in itself, no slight disadvantage. In 1859 the Austrians repeated this error, and they had dearly to pay for it.

With the Austrians so far advanced on the Up-



per Danube, Napoleon's choice of the defensive be-

tween the two theatres of war became a matter of course. The whole energy had to be directed toward the Rhine. The whole army was divided into eight corps d'armée; and of these, only one was destined for Italy, to face the Austrians on the line of the Adige. The corps d'armée of Italy, 50,000 strong, was placed under the command of Massena, a general at once bold and obstinate, and a master of manœuvres—the very man to maintain his ground for any time. The other seven corps, some 200,000 men, were all meant for Mack and Ulm. These seven corps had to be made to converge from thousands of miles.

The first corps d'armée, under Bernadotte, lay in Hanover; Marmont's corps was in Holland; the four corps of Marshals Davoust, Lannes, Soult, and Ney had to be transported to the Rhine from the camps of Boulogne; while the seventh corps d'armée, under Augereau, was to approach that river from the feet of the Pyrenees.

Napoleon had reckoned to have his grand army where he wanted them to be in 24 *étapes* or marches; and so it was. Set in motion on the 1st of September, the army of Boulogne was by the 27th of September *écheloned* on the left bank of the Rhine, looking on the valleys of the Necker and the Main. Meanwhile the Bernadotte and Marmont corps advanced each southward on Wurtz-

burg, situated almost in a straight line with Ulm. There they took up the Bavarians who had retreated before Mack. It was not in vain that Napoleon called this army *La grande armée*; it was so in numbers, and the more so in its tactic organization. The perfect subdivision of the whole into minor unities, the care bestowed on the choice of the commanders of the respective subdivisions, were advantages unknown in the ranks of his enemies. Nor had Napoleon neglected to provide for a reserve; he anticipated the levies of the coming year, left back at the reserve dépôts the third battalions of each regiment, and called in aid, besides, the services of the militia or National Guard. His attention extended even to the smallest details, including the merely administrative parts of the service. Above all, he paid attention to the shoeing, each soldier receiving two pairs of shoes. The corps d'armée consisted each of two or three divisions of infantry and one of cavalry; the artillery was represented in the proportion of four pieces per 1000 men. The reserve consisted of the heavy cavalry, Oudinot's grenadiers, and the Guard. Napoleon was the first in teaching Europe the importance of the reserve. This Guard of Napoleon was something different from a body of parade: it was the glory of the army, the majesty of the empire. He called it, on the field of Marengo, a "pillar of gran-

ite," an appellation which it richly deserved. It stood the fiery tempest of fourteen years, finally to crumble to pieces on the field of Waterloo, before the line of battle of British infantry!

The four corps d'armée under Ney, Soult, Lannes, and Davoust passed the Rhine in the last days of September, preceded by the vanguard under Murat. The passage was effected between Strasburg, Spires, and Mannheim, and facilitated by several bridges constructed for the occasion. The principal points toward which the four corps tended were Gunzburg, Donauwerth, and Neuberg, all situated on the Danube below Ulm, at a few miles' distance from each other. The two corps of Bernadotte and Marmont were ordered to march from Wurtzburg on Ingolstadt, still lower down the river, on the road from the latter place to Munich. This circuitous march on the left bank of the Danube was thus the contrary from that which Moreau accomplished in 1800. The army followed three principal roads. Two corps d'armée, that of Ney and Lannes, and the reserve, passed by the road of Stuttgart and Heidenheim, which runs nearest the Black Forest, and where greater precaution was required. Soult marched by the middle road, passing Heilbronn and Hall; while Davoust took that of Mannheim, Heidelberg, and Ingelfingen. His left could thus, in case of need, form a junction with the corps of Marmont and Bernadotte.

Between the 7th and 8th of October, the four corps that passed the Rhine successively approached the left bank of the Danube by simply wheeling right, each at its proper place. Bernadotte and Marmont arrived too soon at Ingolstadt, where they fell in with the advanced Austrian rear. Mack, who was looking on the Black Forest in his front (where active demonstrations were made by Murat's cavalry) and his left, was fairly taken by surprise. So little had he expected to be attacked in his rear, that he neglected even to occupy or defend properly the principal bridges. The bridges of Donauwerth and Neuberg were taken by a *coup de main*; the Danube was passed at these points, and soon after a passage was forced at Gunzburg, situated much nearer to Ulm. Thus pressed on their right and rear, the situation of the 80,000 Austrians became necessarily precarious in the presence of 150,000 French. To determine on a line of retreat seems not to have entered the mind of Mack; and retreat, under the circumstances, either by passing to the left of the Danube and trying to gain the road to Munich, or by attempting to get into the Tyrol by Meningen, was, indeed, a rather dangerous operation. In fact, a retreat by way of Bavaria had already become a sheer impossibility, for Augsburg and Munich were already occupied. The only resource left to Mack was to draw together his forces

and to strengthen his fortified position. The Russians might turn up in time; the army of the Archduke John, in the Tyrol, had not far to march to hasten to give assistance; and who knew whether the Archduke Charles had not destroyed Massena on the Adige, and was ready to make any diversion with his great army? These hopes must have possessed Mack's mind and that of the Archduke Ferdinand, the commander-in-chief *secundus*. After the lapse of eight days all hopes vanished. The Austrian army, weakened by a series of combats, surrendered (October 17th). The Austrians lost, in and around Ulm, some 60,000 men, almost all their generals, and scores of guns and standards.

Meanwhile the defensive campaign on the other side of the Alps progressed with equal success, exhibiting features as remarkable.

Massena, with 50,000 men, fully stood his ground on the Adige against an enemy almost double in numbers. But, on learning the surrender of Ulm, the defensive would no more content him. Neither the intervening river, nor the numerical superiority of the enemy, nor his formidable position, could deter Massena from taking the offensive. He passed the Adige, and attacked the Austrians encamped between Verona and Caldiera. The attempt at victory was an impossibility, as that of the heights of Busaco proved five years afterward. Yet it result-

ed in hastening the retreat of the Archduke Charles. To mask his retreat, the archduke left behind at Caldiera a few thousand men. Massena "bagged" them; and followed his adversary closely, according to his instructions from Napoleon. The archduke passed the Julian Alps, and, without thinking of striking into the Tyrol to fall upon the French right flank, he chose the safer way of continuing his retreat into Hungary. Thus ended the first period of the campaign of 1805.

After preparing for his army a sort of second base on the Lech at Augsburg, Napoleon hastened to meet the Russians, who were just approaching the Bavarian frontiers. To be provided against any emergency, he made the following dispositions: While he himself, with the *gros*, marched on the high road and sideways toward the Inn, on the Russians, he sent two corps to the Tyrol to disperse the corps of the Archduke John, and, if necessary, to make head against Charles. These two corps were to put themselves in connection with Augereau, who had remained back on the Rhine near Basle. The different rivers, with the several bridges broken down, such as the Inn, Traun, and Enns, proved no greater obstacles to his march than the Russians. On the 11th of November Napoleon's vanguard stood before Vienna. The capital surrendered, abandoning to the victorious enemy immense stores

of necessities. The Russians, and a corps of Austrians who followed them, retreated into Moravia toward Brunn, there expecting to be joined by the other Russian corps that were approaching. But Napoleon followed close behind. After a combat at Hollobrunn, the Russo-Austrians abandoned Brunn and its vast resources to the French, and fell back upon Olmutz.

The battle of Austerlitz (December 2) was now at hand, and with it the close of the campaign. How the battle of Austerlitz was fought will be seen in another place. Here it may suffice briefly to say, that by his victory Napoleon had, at the same time, cut off the Russians from their line of retreat, so that he was, in every respect, master of the position. The vast plan of the coalition disappeared like a phantasm. Napoleon recapitulated the events of the campaign in the following *ordre de jour*, dated December 3 :

“ Soldiers,—I am satisfied with you: in the battle of Austerlitz you have justified all that I expected from your intrepidity. You have decorated your eagles with immense glory. An army of 100,000 men, commanded by the Emperors of Russia and Austria, has been, in less than four hours, either cut in pieces or dispersed. Those who escaped your weapons are drowned in the lakes. Forty colors, the standards of the Imperial Guard of Russia, one hundred and twenty pieces of cannon, more than thirty thousand prisoners, are the result of this ever-celebrated battle. That infantry, so highly vaunted, and superior in number, could not withstand your shocks; and thenceforth you have no rivals to fear.

Thus, in two months, this third coalition has been vanquished and dissolved. Peace can not now be far distant ; but, as I promised my people before I passed the Rhine, I will make only such a peace as gives us guarantees and insures rewards to our allies. Soldiers, when all that is necessary to secure the welfare and the prosperity of our country is accomplished, I will lead you back to France : there you will be the object of my tender concern. My people will see you again with joy ; and it will be sufficient to say, I was at the battle of Austerlitz, for them to reply, 'There is a brave man.'

It ought not to be forgotten that, to arrive at his aim, Napoleon did not disdain to avail himself of minor means. He had his spies and secret agents, who apprised him of the state and movements of the enemy, and also such as spread false news of his own movements ; in short, he never neglected a *ruse de guerre* which could be turned to account. The Austrian generals at Ulm, on the other hand, sent to Vienna the most cheering news up to the last moment, thus rendering themselves culpable for the slow advance of the Russians.

There can be no hesitation in saying that, with regard to grandeur of conception and felicity of execution, the campaign of 1805, in the valleys of the Danube and the Po, stands matchless in the annals of warfare. What a contrast between this campaign and that of Wellington on the Mondego ! Call up to your memory Ulm and Austerlitz, and think, at the same time, of Busaco and Torres Vc-

dras, and you have the distinctest types of the offensive and defensive. However, it may safely be assumed that, if Wellington found it judicious to play the *Cunctator* in Portugal and Spain, he would hardly have followed the Fabian tactics had he had to meet the French on English soil. In England, this imitation and devastating system would have proved by far too expensive. In fact, nowadays, a Fabius Maximus, as we know him from Roman history, would be the ruin of his country. And, after all, even then it was not so much Fabius as the deities withholding Hannibal that saved Rome. The most pernicious conduct, however, as already observed, is an offensive plan allowed suddenly to assume the characteristics of the defensive.

We shall, in the next chapter, analyze the campaigns in Spain of 1812-13, in which Wellington and Marmont were the principal actors. In it we shall in vain look for that unbroken, rapid development and strategic value which distinctly marked the campaign of Ulm and Austerlitz; but, nevertheless, it abounds in traits of singular interest and instruction, presenting, moreover, some features akin to the war in the United States.

CHAPTER VIII.

PLAN OF CAMPAIGN—*Continued.*

Operations of the French in Spain.—Inherent Defects of the Plan of Campaign.—Napoleon's Definition of Lines of Operation.—The Campaign of Portugal, 1810.—Wellington's Tactics.—Overconfidence of the Spaniards.—Campaign of Salamanca.—Its Characteristics.—Campaign of Vittoria.—Napoleon's Campaign in Prussia, 1806.—Jena and Anerstadt.—Second Period.—Eylau.—The French on the Vistula.

WE have briefly referred to the defects inherent in the military operations of the French in the Spanish Peninsula, as well as to the tactics of their formidable antagonist, Wellington. We shall now resume the topic.

The necessity of making the army subsist on the country; the simultaneous outbreak of revolutionary rising in the different provinces, as also the mutual jealousies and hatreds of the commanding generals, were, as already observed, the principal sources of the defects. To this was added the circumstance that the guiding hand, the soul of the enterprise, Napoleon, was, with the exception of three months, distant from the scene of action; and his instructions, sent alternately from Paris, Vienna, the Vis-

tula, and the Niemen, served alike to guide and embarrass his generals operating on the banks of the Tagus and the Duoro. The presence in Spain of Joseph Napoleon, at once king and general, now independent of the other generals, then placed under them, then again above them, was, indeed, sufficient in itself to embroil matters, and render energetic combined action impossible. Almost every critical conjunction from 1809 to 1814 was marked by some glaring error, some palpable neglect. And it is principally in this respect that the examination of the war in Spain is instructive. Nothing is so instructive in war as errors, especially with a Napoleon at hand to furnish you with his comments.

Joseph Napoleon, it will be remembered, made his entry into Madrid in July, 1808, escorted by but a small French corps; but he was no sooner installed than the revolution broke out in the provinces all around, the old Spanish troops joining the people. Soon an English army landed in Portugal, while a French corps, 18,000 strong, under Dupont, entangled in the mountain passes of Andalusia, was obliged to surrender. Things thus assumed a gloomy aspect, whereupon King Joseph determined to abandon the capital, and to retire behind the Ebro. Meanwhile fresh French troops were concentrating at Bayonne, on the other side of the Pyrenees, from which four roads led to Madrid, and all

four through high mountains and narrow defiles: the first by Irún, St. Sebastian, Burgos, and Arenda, across the Ebro and Duoro; the second by St. Jean Pied, Pampeluna, and Tudela; the third by Jaca and Saragossa; the fourth by Perpignan, Barcelona, Lerida, and Saragossa. These roads thus constituted the lines of operation, or rather communication, with Bayonne, the basis. The Ebro naturally formed the first line of defense of the French; but, after the French had advanced, the enemy appeared in their rear. The Spaniards thought the war was over, such was their exultation and confidence in consequence of the surrender of Dupont and the evacuation of Madrid. They thought the English under Sir John Moore and Wellington a perfect superfluity, and spoke of "escorting them through France to Calais." This absurd confidence, says Napier, might have led to great things, if it had been supported by wisdom, activity, or valor; but it was a voice and nothing more.

Unmindful of the numerous enemies in his rear, King Joseph, after concentrating a strong force, took the resolution to advance, and to fall upon the Spaniards that were gathering round Madrid, and thus to regain the central position. He communicated his plan to his brother Napoleon, from whom he received in return the following lesson:

"The proposal is to march with 50,000 on Madrid, keeping them together, and abandoning all communication with France.

"The art of war is an art founded on principles which must not be violated. To change one's line of operation is an operation which only a man of genius ought to attempt. To lose one's line of operation is a performance so dangerous that to be guilty of it is a crime. To preserve it is necessary, in order to avoid being separated from one's dépôt, which is the point of rendezvous, the magazine of supplies, and the place to which one's prisoners, wounded, and sick are to be sent.

"If, when the French were in Madrid, they had extended their forces on the town, and used the Retiro as the deposit of prisoners, of hospitals, and of the means of keeping down a large town and using its resources, they might have lost their line of communication with France, but would have preserved their line of operation, especially if they had seized their opportunity to collect a large amount of supplies, and had established, a day or two's march from the principal débouches, posts like the citadel of Segovia, for the purposes of support and observation.

"But, at this instant, to rush into the interior of Spain without any organized centre or magazines, with hostile armies on one's flanks and in one's rear, would be an attempt without precedent in the history of the world.

"If, before Madrid was taken, and dépôts of subsistence for eight or ten days, and of ammunition, were provided, this army were beaten, what would become of it? where would it rally? where would it send its wounded? whence would it send its supplies? for it is provided only for its current wants. Nothing more need be said. Those who dare to recommend such a step would be the first to lose their heads, as soon as the results began to show its absurdity.

"The garrison of an invested fortress," he continued, "has lost its line of communication, but not its base of operation, for its line of operation is from the glacis to the centre, where are the hospi-

tals, the magazines, and the stores. Is it beaten on a sortie? it rallies on the glacis, and has three or four days to restore the spirit of its men. If troops such as those of the Guard, and generals such as Alexander or Cæsar, could be guilty of such follies, no one could answer for the event—still less with an army in such circumstances as ours. This scheme, opposed, as it is, to all the rules of war, must be given up. A general who attempted such an operation would commit a crime.

“What, then, is to be done?

“What has been already advised. To concentrate the left at Tudela, not by way of a cordon, but posted on each side of the Ebro, ready to pass it if necessary, and keeping its communication with Pampeluna; to concentrate the right about Burgos, intercepting the road between Reinosa and Madrid, the reserve in the second line, ready to move in either direction.

“Under these circumstances, the reserve, Marshal Ney's corps, and that of Marshal Bessières, might be united, and thrown upon the enemy approaching by the Madrid road or by the Palencia road. These 36,000 or 40,000 men may easily make three or four marches in any direction. It is possible, without doubt, that the enemy would not stand the approach of so great a force; if he retreated five or six marches, advantage might be taken of it to seize Reinosa and Santander—very important operations. What encourages the enemy to hold Reinosa is that you occupy Burgos only with cavalry, and show symptoms of abandoning it. In war, all is opinion—opinion as to the enemy, opinion as to one's self. After the loss of a battle, the physical difference in the loss of the conqueror and the conquered is little; the moral difference is enormous, as we see from the effect which two or three squadrons may produce on a beaten army. Nothing has been done to give confidence to the French; there is not a soldier who does not see that every thing breathes timidity; thence he forms his opinion as to the force of the enemy. He has no means of knowing what is opposed to him except what he hears, and the attitude which he is desired to assume.”

Shortly after giving this lecture, Napoleon passed the Pyrenees to show his tactics in practice. He left Bayonne in the beginning of November, 1808; hastened to Tolosa, from here to Vittoria, from Vittoria to Aronda; defeated, with 6000 men, 30,000 Spaniards at Tudela; darted like lightning through the pass of Somosierra, which opened the gates of Madrid and cleared Spain from the English, commanded by Sir John Moore, who hastened to seek refuge on board the fleet anchored in the Bay of Corunna. About the middle of January, that is, after ten weeks' work in Spain, Napoleon had to re-cross the Pyrenees to meet other adversaries, and from that moment the Spanish war again exhibited all the languor and shortcomings arising from causes inherent in the circumstances. Two years had thus passed, during which period sieges, combats, famine, and fatigue cruelly decimated the French armies; and, when fresh re-enforcements were being sent across the Pyrenees, the command of the army intended to take Lisbon and to drive the English from Portugal was, as has been seen, confided by Napoleon to Massena, fresh with the laurels of Esslingen.

The advance of Massena into Portugal resulted, as already related, in his retreat from the lines of Torres Vedras toward his *place d'armes*, or the secondary base of Ciudad Rodrigo, the frontier fortress of Spain. The drawn battle at Fuentes d'Onoro

sealed that campaign, when the contest on the part of the French was about to be renewed under the auspices of Marmont, who replaced Massena in the command of the so-called army of Portugal. Napoleon, it may be remembered, was at that time already planning his Russian campaign.

There were, it will be remembered, several French armies in the Spanish Peninsula: the army of the centre, with its head-quarters at Madrid, under the orders of King Joseph; the army of the north, in the rear of the capital; the army of the south, in rich, fertile Andalusia, under Soult; the army of Portugal; and, besides, several detached bodies, engaged partly in and around strong places, and partly meant to keep in check and punish the numerous partisans.

The latter formed, in several parts of the country, large compact masses, and were obnoxious chiefly from their waylaying convoys and stragglers. They could never stand in open battle before the French except in their bulletins, where they always remained victorious. The extemporized generals, such as Castanos, Palafox, El Capucino, Minas, and scores of others, never would acknowledge a defeat. Such was their conceit and vanity, that they made plans intended to outmanoeuvre, in 1808, Napoleon himself, when, amid a series of brilliant victories on their part, Napoleon advanced from position to

position with celerity, forced the famous pass of Somosierra, while they fled in all directions with the victorious bulletins hanging on their backs. One band of these guerrillas, relates Marmont in way of anecdote, bore the name of *Los mas valientes*, an appellation to which they had become perfectly habituated. Being once routed, they deserted in masses, many of whom fell in with a French general, and, on being asked by him who they were, they naïvely answered, "*Los mas valientes, desertores!*"

The real adversaries of the French were thus the English and the Portuguese-Spanish troops drilled and commanded by English officers. That the swarms of partisans proved of much use to Wellington is hardly necessary to tell; nor did that general derive little assistance from the English fleet, which was, as it were, his *floating basis*. The disadvantages under which the French labored are thus manifest; and the ill will existing between the different French commanders rendered the evil still worse.

The theatre of the campaign of 1812 was the basin of the Duoro, which, with its tributaries, the Tormes and Esla, formed lines of defense for the contending parties. Bloody battles were fought; the double line of defense formed by these rivers was four times alternately taken and re-taken; finally, the French were forced to retreat farther back; and yet no decisive results were obtained!

While Wellington, after reducing the fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo, determined to take the offensive (in the middle of June, 1812), Marmont, who awaited to be re-enforced by the army of the centre and that of the south, lay encamped on the right bank of the Tormes, at Salamanca. His force, according to his own account, consisted of some 35,000 infantry, 2500 horse, and 35 guns. Wellington disposed of a larger force, and was especially stronger in cavalry; which was now, in open ground, of much moment. The French general caused the bridges to be broken down, except the one in front of Salamanca, which was defended by forts, thus trying to gain time. But the English forded the river, and, while Marmont was retreating toward Toro, they set about reducing the forts to secure their rear. The English being thus occupied, the French general, by a rapid manœuvre, passed the Tormes, and took them in flank and rear; but he was forced to repass the river, and soon fell back to the right bank of the Duoro, being followed by the English, who by this time had mastered the forts of Salamanca.

The French lines extended on the Duoro over twelve miles, the centre being at Tordesillas, in front of the bridge, the right leaning on a height, and the left on the Pisuerga, the affluent of the Duoro. The French held, in short, strong defensive

positions, though somewhat extended. The bridge of Tordesillas, carefully defended, served rather as a check on the enemy. Hardly re-enforced with a few thousand men, Marmont, while demonstrating on his centre, threw other bridges over the river, passed it, and, after a circuitous and uninterrupted march of fifty miles, fell on the English left wing. Amid several combats with the retreating enemy he performed another manœuvre toward the Tormes, and already had the English outflanked—that is, threatened to be cut off from their line of retreat. After a month's manœuvring, Marmont had thus brought back his army from the other side of the Duoro to the Tormes, his former base; nay, he passed even the Tormes, thus threatening Ciudad Rodrigo, the English base.

It must not be forgotten that, however skillful these manœuvring marches were, especially considering the small number of French cavalry, their real value depended on the gaining time and opportunity for a junction with the other forces which the French general daily expected. Yet Marmont, either tired or unwilling to wait longer, determined to give battle on the same spot where Wellington might, with much more reason and hopes of success, have done so a month before. Only one night intervened between the passing of the Tormes and the ensuing battle, known by the name of Salamanca or Arapiles.

"It was late," says Napier, in his usual graphic style, "when the light division descended the rough side of the mountain to cross the river, and the night came suddenly down with more than common darkness, for a storm—that common precursor of a battle in the Peninsula—was at hand. Torrents of rain deepened the ford, the water foamed and dashed with increasing violence, the thunder was frequent and deafening, and the lightning passed in sheets of fire close over the column, or played upon the points of the bayonets. One flash, falling among the fifth dragoon guards near Santa Marta, killed many men and horses, while hundreds of frightened animals, breaking loose from their picket-ropes and galloping wildly about, were supposed to be the enemy's cavalry charging in the darkness; and, indeed, some of their patrols were at hand. But, to a military eye, there was nothing more imposing than the close and beautiful order in which the soldiers of that noble light division were seen, by the fiery gleams, to step from the river to the bank, and pursue their march amid this astounding turmoil, defying alike the storm and the enemy."

The forces on both sides engaged in the battle of Salamanca, July 21, were about 100,000—the English being a few thousand stronger. Marmont, who took the offensive, ordered a turning manœu-

the 18th century, the first half of which was a period of relative peace and prosperity, followed by a period of decline and political instability. The 19th century saw the rise of nationalism and the independence movements, leading to the formation of the modern state of India. The 20th century was marked by the struggle for independence, the partition of the country, and the rise of socialism and communism. The 21st century has seen the rise of democracy, the growth of the economy, and the rise of India as a global power.

He was determined to let
nothing stand in his
way. Since Joseph
had closed the line of the
canal to Tiberias, Tiber-
ias, as it were, of the
world and Egypt, had

out any strategic value. He was, besides, threatened to be cut off by the army of the south, under Soult, from his line of retreat to Portugal—his primary and unalterable basis, while attacked in front by those very armies whom he had compelled to retreat, but without depriving them of the means and possibility of reorganizing. And thus it happened that Wellington determined, in September, to leave Madrid, and to resume the pursuit of Clausel. The latter was, however, by that time re-enforced by a few brigades of the reserve kept at Bayonne, and almost ready to stand his ground. To gain still more time, Clausel retreated even from Burgos—not, however, before putting its forts in a state of proper defense. Wellington, before pushing farther, attempted, and hoped to take the fort of Burgos by assault. But, after thirty-three days' investment, and five general assaults, which cost the besiegers about 3000 men, they were forced to retreat.

was the Duoro repassed by the English, were they followed, or rather pursued, to the left bank. The Duoro was, a momentary remedy for the former. recrimination, and despite mutual Joseph and Soult finally effected a united armies passed the Tagus, driving an English corps under Hill. Un-

der these circumstances, Wellington thought it necessary to fall back with all his forces on the line of the Tormes.

After the lapse of three months, and despite the battle of Salamanca, the English were thus glad to occupy a defensive position on the very point whence they then started on a more promising campaign. Nor were they allowed to establish themselves on this last line. After passing the Tormes, Soult, by a rapid march, succeeded in throwing himself on the rear of the enemy; and it was only with the loss of several thousand men that Wellington succeeded in effecting his retreat to Ciudad Rodrigo, and that amid grave and repeated scenes of insubordination on the part of the English soldiers.

From this meagre analysis of the campaign two things may be inferred: 1st, that, with a more active and less cautious offensive on the part of the English general, the French army of Portugal would never have been able to recover from the losses they had sustained at the outset; 2d, that, with a more sincere understanding between the French generals commanding the separate armies, Wellington would probably never have regained the heights of Ciudad Rodrigo. That the French partial successes were mainly owing to the rapidity of their marches and skillful manœuvres is a fact not to be denied; and, considering the endless swarms of par-

tisans hanging always around them, ready to improve on every advantage obtained by the English, they would, without these qualities, have been invariably ruined. It was certainly no slight task for the French soldiers to make long, forced marches, and fight while sometimes laden with 15 or 18 days' provisions. This was actually the case, as Marmont relates it, during the time he had the command. The English, the marshal bitterly observes, had 6000 mules to carry their baggage, the French carried it on their backs; the one had their pay regularly, the other had none, etc.

After the English were thus pushed back into Portugal, both armies went into winter quarters, the contest having been recommenced, on the part of the English, in the spring of 1813.

Let us cast a rapid glance at this last campaign of the English and French in the Peninsula. Napier speaks with raptures of Wellington's manœuvres during this campaign. Thiers, on the other hand, naïvely talks of the English having *accompanied* the French to the Pyrenees. Both historians are in the right—the one, as an actor in the great complicated drama, naturally exulted in finally beholding the successful dénouement; while the other, looking from the distance, counting and comparing the relative forces on each side, may not, without reason, call the English offensive an *acom-*

paniment. But what must not be forgotten is, that King Joseph, now commander-in-chief, neglected to observe the conduct prescribed to him by his brother through Clarke, the minister of war in Paris—

“To occupy Valladolid and Salamanca, to use the utmost exertion to pacify Navarre and Aragon, to keep the communication with France rapid and safe, to be always ready to take the offensive—these are the emperor’s instructions for the campaign, and the principles on which all its operations ought to be founded.

“His majesty thinks that all the hospitals ought to be in Valladolid, Burgos, Vittoria, Tolosa, and Pampeluna. He also wishes a siege-train to be prepared at Burgos, to threaten Ciudad Rodrigo, and make the English fear the invasion of Portugal. This measure will check them, and must be immediately adopted.

“His majesty commands me also to say that it is important to lay heavy contributions on Madrid and Toledo, and to exact their full payment. Circumstances require this manner of providing for the army and for your majesty’s immediate wants.

“His majesty also requests your majesty to make dispositions for receiving, twice a week, a courier from Bayonne. The interruption of our communications is always mischievous, sometimes alarming, and may become fatal. It is necessary that it be seriously attended to, and made not only safe, but expeditious, by making the couriers, escorted by infantry, travel between Bayonne and Valladolid at least a league per hour, without interruption.”

King Joseph little acted in the spirit of these instructions.

Wellington began, May, 1813, to debouch into the valley of the Tormes and Duoro with at least 90,000 men, assisted by large masses of partisans. The French army ready to face him on that line

numbered hardly 40,000 men; a force larger than that having been engaged in keeping in check the partisans in the northern provinces, and in guarding the lines of communication between the different *places d'armes* or pivots. The partisans had, by that time, become so emboldened, on seeing that several thousand French veterans had been withdrawn to join the grand army marching into Russia, that the French were obliged to erect for their protection strong block-houses along the lines of communication between Burgos, Irún, Vitoria, Pamplona, and Tolosa.


Instead of debouching, with all his forces, by the old line on Salamanca, Wellington sent his left, under Graham, to pass the Duoro, from Portugal, through the province of Tras os Montes, which borders on Galicia, then swarming with partisans; he, in the mean time, advanced with the centre on the Tormes, at Salamanca, while the right wing, under Hill, marched in the same direction higher up the river. After passing the Lower Duoro, Graham was to march up the river on the right bank, cross the Esla, unite first with the partisans of Galicia, and then, by wheeling to the right, with the English centre. The turning manœuvre of the English left succeeded, despite the great difficulties of the ground. The English armies thus effected their junction on the Duoro at Zamora, which was pre-

cipitately evacuated by the French, who gradually retreated on Burgos. Impardonable negligence in not putting Burgos in a proper state of defense soon compelled the French to abandon, also, the line of the Ebro. King Joseph, hoping to be yet joined in time by the armies of Navarre and Catalonia (to whom he dispatched couriers, and which never arrived at their places of destination), determined to fall back from Burgos on the plain of Vittoria, intersected by the River Zadora. He was closely followed by Wellington, who, on his onward march, saw his army swelled by numerous bands trickling from the mountains, and who "burst like raging streams from every defile, and went foaming into the basin of Vittoria."

The road of retreat from Vittoria led high up into the defiles of the Pyrenees—a heavy enterprise for a fatigued, famished army encumbered with heavy parks of artillery, courtly baggage, and numerous camp-followers; yet a battle was at hand, and the necessity of subsequent retreat more than probable. The best line of retreat was by the high road passing through the Arlaban mountain ridge and the defiles of Salinas; less practicable was that of Estella and Pampeluna. The king, as if foreseeing what was to follow, had dispatched part of the baggage on the latter road.

The battle came on the 21st of June. The En-

glish, taking the offensive, briskly attacked the French lines before Joseph and his chief of the



SPAIN AND PORTUGAL.

staff had made the proper dispositions. Before the sun set, the English stood conquerors on the plain,

the French having, on their retreat, only carried away two guns out of one hundred and forty-five. This result, it may here briefly be added, was mainly owing to a swamp, and the blocking up of the road by the *impedimenta*. Napier, with his usual candor, declares that the French troops were not half beaten, and that the English owed this great victory to the negligence and poor conduct of the French commanders. In this campaign of six weeks, Napier adds, Wellington, with 100,000 men, marched 600 miles, passed six great rivers, gained one decisive battle, invested two fortresses, and drove 120,000 veteran troops out of Spain. This immense result could not have been attained if Joseph had followed Napoleon's instructions.

That is perfectly true. But the suggestion that arises is, Whether it was not more creditable to the French to have retreated in six weeks, with less than 50,000 men, 600 miles, and passed six rivers, and finally come off with such small loss? At Vitoria, the total French loss in men was about 5000; and as great was the loss of the victors.

We shall now leave these two rival hosts to face each other amid the passes of the Pyrenees, and transport ourselves to another theatre, different both in aspect and essence. In the first place, we shall pass in review Napoleon's campaign in Prussia, 1806. This campaign, which lasted less than

six weeks, is marked by unusual vigor of action and rapidity of motion; but its peculiar characteristic is the relentless energy of the pursuit following victory. The Prussians, broken on the double battle-field of Jena and Auerstadt, could find no possible refuge in retreat; wherever they retreated, whatever direction they took, their fate was only one—to surrender. The pursuing French columns dashed upon them like the foaming waves of a swelling river, from which there was no rescue.

It so happened that Prussia, which had withstood the solicitations of the third coalition against Napoleon, and was spectator to the events taking place between Ulm and Austerlitz, determined, twelve months afterward, to throw the gauntlet to Napoleon single-handed, and at a time when the greater part of the French army was yet in Germany, and only at a few days' march from the Prussian frontiers. The generals of the old school and those of the younger generations alike urged an offensive war. An army some 160,000 strong, well disciplined and drilled, and particularly distinguished by its cavalry, stood completely ready to carry the design into action.

In the month of October, 1806, every thing was ready for the campaign. On the 7th of that month Napoleon received the Prussian ultimatum, in which he was admonished to evacuate Germany, and to

do several other things of a no more flattering nature. The greatest fault of this ultimatum was, of course, that Napoleon had already a large army on the Main, near Wurzburg, separated from Prussia only by the Thuringian Forest, and which was being daily increased. The necessities of the army had been in a few days brought up the Main, while care was taken to draw together a strong reserve on the Rhine. But, on the other hand, it was this very proximity of the French army which encouraged the Prussian courtiers and general. A short line of operation was the very thing they wanted. The Prussian plan of operations was conceived in the true spirit of the offensive. Yet there were too many council-givers, with but little harmony among them, and, besides, still less dispatch.* Napoleon confidently anticipated to do with the Prussians assembled behind the Forest of Thuringia what he had done a year ago with the Austrians at Ulm, who, like the latter, had come to meet him half way.

The *gros* of the French, forming six corps d'armée, about 180,000 strong, were, as already said, at

* Jomini, in his *Vie Militaire de Napoleon*, refers in not very complimentary terms to the Prussian leaders. He speaks of the king having exhumed the old generals of the Seven Years' War, the Duke of Brunswick having learned little during the fourteen years that had passed since he entered the field against revolutionary France. General Mallendorf, as old, was not better than the duke; while the Prince of Hohenlohe had just *assez d'esprit et science pour prendre de la guerre ce qu'il y avait de plus fâch.* Thiers speaks in the same strain of the Prussian generals.

Wurzburg in Franconia, behind the Thuringian



MAP OF JENA, AUERSTADT, AND ERFTAU.

Forest, which is about 50 miles long and 8 miles
H

wide. The Prussians, divided into two parts, commanded by the Duke of Brunswick and the Prince of Hohenlohe, were on the other side of the forest, extending from Eisenach to Weimar and Jena. The left was covered by the Saale, the tributary of the Elbe, being flanked by a corps placed on the right bank of the Saale, and protected, besides, by the strong positions of Schleitz, Saalfeld, Saalburg, and Hof. The army was thus partly in Saxony.

The two hostile armies could have marched upon each other straight through the forest by the defiles of Hof, Schleitz, and Saalfeld, or have turned the forest. While the Prussian generals were disputing with each other as to the true point of attack, whether to march on the right French wing, or to advance by the straight road on their front at Wurzburg, Napoleon had already moved onward on both sides of the Main, approaching the forest by Coburg and Cronach.

On the 8th of November, the right wing, under Soult and Ney, advanced by Nurnberg and Bayreuth on Hof. The centre, under Murat, Bernadotte, and Davoust, and including the Guard, marched from Cronach on Saalburg, Schleitz, and Jena. The left, under Lannes and Augereau, was directed from Schleirefurth on Coburg and Saalfeld. Napoleon's object was to turn the Prussian left. The Prussian advanced posts met with in the defiles

were easily broken and compelled to retreat. Hof, Saalburg, Schleitz, were taken. Lannes gained a brilliant victory at Saalfeld; and soon after dashed into Jena. The Prussian generals, awakened by the guns of Saalfeld, drew together their lines and took position on the Saale. The same was also being done by Napoleon, who endeavored to cut them off from the Elbe in the degree that his troops debouched from the defiles to the banks of the river, and that he thought to have divined the intentions of the enemy. The Prussians, it must be remembered, were on the left bank of the Saale. The river was fordable in some parts, but with rugged banks, the great road leading to Leipzig being connected by the bridges of Jena and Naumburg. These two places thus possessed special interest. To secure these two bridges became now the first care of Napoleon, and in doing this the army was necessarily divided into two parts, being separated from each other by a distance of about seven miles. Davoust, with the third corps d'armée, was directed to Naumburg; the *gros* received orders to approach Jena, where the enemy appeared to concentrate his forces, and here Napoleon remained. It was the 13th of November.

Napoleon prepared his followers for the coming contest by a sort of politico-strategic lecture. He told them that they were about to return to France,

where great festivities awaited them ; that cries of war were raised in Berlin ; that the Prussians foolishly hoped to snatch the laurels from their brows ; that they insisted that the French should evacuate Germany, thus to return home dishonored ; that it can not be that they who had defied seasons, deserts, seas, should return to their homes like fugitives ; that the French eagle could not be affrighted by the Prussian eagles. Woe to those that provoked them. The Prussians should meet with the same fate which they experienced fourteen years ago. In another *ordre de jour* he told them not to be afraid of the Prussian cavalry ; to form in columns and squares, and meet them with the bayonet ; that the Prussians, like the Austrians at Ulm, were cut off from their lines of communication and retreat ; and that they fought neither for glory nor for victory, but for retreat. Napoleon, in fact, had foreseen almost every thing four days before the battle.

Lannes, as already said, had established himself at Jena and its heights, and thus found himself within gunshot from part of the Prussians, commanded by the Prince of Hohenlohe, whose army was *écheloned* on the Weimar road. The ardor of the Prussian generals was, however, evidently cooled by the unexpected advance of the French ; and, at the moment we speak of, they found themselves

in a state of retreat toward the Elbe, which constitutes a natural line of defense of Prussia, covering the capital. The tirailleurs sent forward by Lannes having cleared the heights on the left bank of the Saale, Napoleon was enabled to survey the ground around, and immediately determined to establish himself on this height, called Landgrafen-berg, hence to debouch into the valley extending to Weimar. A company of the engineer corps, working in the night (Oct. 13), rendered it possible to drag up the steep mountain the artillery, which was established in the centre; two divisions took position to the right and left, and the Guard was placed in the rear. The Guard formed a square, with Napoleon's head-quarters established inside. The chief aim in taking hold of this height was hence to descend down the slopes, throw back the enemy's advance, and thus gain sufficient ground for the rest of the army to enter into battle array.

Early in the morning Lannes's divisions broke down the heights, and bore down every thing before them. The engagement soon became general. Soult and Ney, who had received orders to march all night, appeared at the very right moment; and all the efforts of the Prussians proved in vain. The infantry, the cavalry—which made repeated charges—the artillery, all were obliged to yield. The reinforcements seemed to come up only to increase

the defeat. Murat, with his cavalry, launched in pursuit of those who fled, and arrived at Weimar, six miles' distance, with one dash, together with the flying Prussians. Hundreds of guns and many thousands of prisoners remained in the hands of the victors.

This happened at Jena; what took place, at the same time, near Naumburg, was still more extraordinary.

While, the day previous to the battle, the Prussians, under the Prince of Hohenlohe, remained before Jena, the rest of the army, under the commander-in-chief, the Duke of Brunswick, lay encamped at the village of Auerstadt, near Naumburg, toward Dresden. The defile of Kösen—commanding the road connected by the bridge of Naumburg, and from which the French, as yet on the other side of the river, might have descended into the valley of Auerstadt—was left unheeded by the Prussian general, but not by Davoust. He crossed the river early in the morning of the 14th, and secured the defile, determined here to bar the way before the enemy. Had the Prussians, the day before, passed the river and taken the initiative, then Davoust, with his small forces separated from the rest of the French by a distance of seven miles, would probably have been ruined. The seizure of the defile in front of the bridge became the rock of salvation of

the French. The narrow valley on which both armies debouched was soon covered with blood. Charge followed charge; the Prussian cavalry, under Blucher, despite successive efforts, were repeatedly sent reeling back by the French infantry rapidly forming in squares; and, before the close of the day, the Prussians beat a retreat. Twenty-six thousand French defeated sixty thousand Prussians! Almost all the Prussian generals were wounded. They lost on the field about 9000 killed and wounded, and 3000 prisoners. The French, who had 44 guns, took 115 from the enemy.

The retreating columns took the way of Weimar and Sommern, and soon fell in with those that fled from the field of Jena. A growing panic seized both. For days succeeding the battle the pursuit was followed up for hundreds of miles by the troops that were but partially engaged, and the flying corps were overtaken one by one. The general panic had even shaken the constancy of garrisons surrounded by formidable ramparts. The line of the Elbe was cleared, and soon that of the Oder; and the fortresses situated on both these rivers, such as Custrin, Stettin, and Madgeburg, successively surrendered.

The whole campaign lasted one month, of which three weeks were employed in following up the victory. The Prussian army of 160,000 had ceased to

exist. "It was a lamentable sight," says Thiers, "to see such incapacity and imprudence battling with such vigilance and genius!"

From Berlin Napoleon wrote to his brother Joseph, under the date of November 15, "You will see by the bulletins that our affairs are prospering; that my army is on the Vistula; and that Poland is enthusiastic. I am master of all the strong places. I have taken in the campaign 140,000 prisoners, of whom 20,000 are cavalry. I have captured more than 800 pieces of cannon, and 250 standards and colors."

While Napoleon stood at the Vistula, the Russians, the allies of Prussia, arrived at the Niemen. The conjuncture looked thus essentially the same as in the year before, when the Russians approached Bavaria after the Austrians had been overwhelmed at Ulm; and Napoleon was not long in resolving to do now what he had done in 1805—to march on against the Russians. The battle of Eylau was destined to accomplish now what was then done by Austerlitz.*

The Prussian fortresses became the dépôts and *places d'armes* of the operations that were to follow. And, though the campaign of Jena had been brought to a close with comparatively little loss on the French side, Napoleon took every measure for

* See map, p. 137.

raising a fresh reserve. The public revenue of Prussia, added to a war tax, supplied the necessary funds. War was made to support war.

In November, some 80,000 men, under Murat, Davoust, Lannes, and Augereau, left the line of the Oder, advancing through Polish Prussia toward the Vistula, the converging point being Warsaw. Before the French vanguard, led by Murat, reached the banks of the river, the Russians lay already encamped in Warsaw on both sides of the Vistula. On the appearance of the French they withdrew to the right bank of the river, abandoning the town to Murat. As the bridges were broken down, and the river was drifting with ice, which rendered the construction of bridges more difficult, the Russians might have successfully disputed the passage; but, having retreated to the Narew, the French passed the Vistula at Warsaw without obstruction. One strategic point was thus gained. The remnants of the Prussian army, now united with the Russians, were at that time in the country inclosed between the Vistula and the River Pregel, their chief strength lying in the city of Königsberg, situated at the mouth of the latter river. The country just referred to, approaching the Baltic, is intersected by the Narew and several other rivers and lakes.

Napoleon, who evidently inclined to take up his winter quarters, and who thus possessed himself of



the line of the Vistula—with the exception of Dantzig, situated at the mouth of the river—thought the Russians too near, and, consequently, determined to drive them also from the Narew, despite the adverse season and immense difficulties of the locality. This farther retreat of the Russians was effected by the bloody battle of Pultusk, fought the 26th of December, and then the troops went into their cantonments. But the quiet was soon broken. The Russian general, Benningsen, resolved to take the offensive in the depth of winter, proposing, by a circuitous march of eight days, to fall on the French left, encamped on the lower Vistula, and commanded by Bernadotte. Napoleon, who perceived the meaning of the march, determined to fall upon the right wing of the Russians, and to this effect Bernadotte was ordered rapidly to move on the French centre. The courier bearing this order having been taken by the Russians, General Benningsen at once determined to retrace his steps toward Königsberg. Napoleon, on his part, closely pursued the retreating enemy, despite numerous obstacles, for a whole week, when the Russian general made halt at Eylau, determined to give battle.

Eylau, February 8, was a battle of thick strokes. The infantry, the cavalry, the artillery, all worked in masses, especially on the Russian side. From 70,000 to 80,000 Russians and 55,000 French were

mingled in most obstinate combat on the broken and narrow snow-covered field of Eylau, on which the French finally extorted victory. Thiers sets down the Russian loss in killed and wounded at 27,000, besides 3000 prisoners; and that of the French at 10,000. This palpable difference in the losses of the two armies is easily explained by the respective tactics. The Russians worked with heavy, clumsy columns, while the French were from time to time put in the best possible form of battle array. From Eylau Napoleon led back his followers to their cantonments. The bad roads, the snow, the nature of the country, all forbade a farther advance. Never forgetting to look back, Napoleon had taken care to cover his possible retreat by strong *têtes de pont* on the Vistula. Interesting enough are the following lines which Napoleon wrote from these dreary regions to his brother Joseph, then seated on the throne of Naples:

“I refer you to Cæsar Berthier as to your comparison of the services of the army of Naples to those of the grand army. Neither the staff, nor the colonels, nor the other regimental officers have taken their clothes off for the last two months, some not for four months (I myself have been a fortnight without taking off my boots), in the middle of snow and mud, without bread, wine, or brandy, living on potatoes and meat, making long marches and countermarches, without any sort of comfort, fighting with our bayonets frequently under grape-shot; the wounded obliged to be removed in sledges, in the open air, to a distance of fifty leagues. To compare us with

the army of Naples, making war in that beautiful country, where they have bread, wine, oil, linen sheets to their beds, society, and even women, looks like an attempt at a joke. After having destroyed the Prussian monarchy, we are fighting against the remnant of the Prussians, against Russians, Cossacks, and Kalmucks, and the tribes of the north who formerly conquered the Roman empire. We have war in all its fierceness and all its horrors. In such fatigues, every one has been more or less ill except myself, for I never was stronger; I have grown fat."

CHAPTER IX.

PLAN OF CAMPAIGN.—*Concluded.*

The Campaign in France, 1814.—Forces of the Allies.—Their Lines of Operation.—Attitude of Napoleon.—His rapid Movements.—Battle of La Rothiere.—Napoleon again on the Offensive.—Prodigies of his Movements.—Battle of Craon.—The Allies before Paris.—Exterior and Interior Lines of Operation.—The Italian Campaign of 1859.—General Observations.

We shall now rapidly examine the three months' winter campaign in France of the year 1814. That campaign tells a strange tale in many respects. The formidable Captain-Monarch, who had for so many years dictated the rise and fall of kingdoms and dynasties, had, at the end of this campaign, no other choice but to abdicate; yet the purely military events of these three months are, perhaps, what is most calculated to create astonishment.

A reflecting reader justly discredits many of the extraordinary achievements of the heroes of antiquity, as handed down to us by one-sided testimony. A military reader with some judgment will, for example, refuse or hesitate to believe that Alexander the Great, at Arbela, defeated, with some 60,000 men, 1,000,000 of Persians, with the loss of 300,000

on their part. The achievements of Napoleon in the valleys of Champagne, in the basin of Paris, would be entitled to no more credit, were it not for the numerous and incontrovertible testimonies of eye-witnesses, both friend and foe. What a campaign! Hitherto we have seen Napoleon gather his invincible hosts on his base and line of defense—the Rhine—and thence repeatedly march, conquering, to the Danube, Elbe, Oder, and Vistula. Now affairs have changed. The strong line of defense of France was invaded, passed with little obstruction, and three powerful hosts, operating on three different lines, were about converging, to march, apparently without any apprehension of meeting with any serious obstacle, to Paris. Such was the appearance of matters in the last days of December, 1813, resulting mainly from the three days' battle of Leipsic, which ended in a victory of the allies.

The remnants of the French army making the campaign of 1813 repassed the Rhine in November, being, in all, some sixty or seventy thousand. An equal number had remained back in the fortresses on the Oder, Elbe, and other strong places in Germany. The discouraged and outworn troops, thus returned to the left bank of the Rhine, soon became a prey to an epidemic typhus fever. The administrative department, now forgetful of its duty,

increased the miseries of the small army of veterans. The public treasury was empty. Many of the *préfets* already began coqueting with the Bourbons. Treason raised its head in the capital itself; and more than one general, who owed to Napoleon his military skill and fame, had already, by this time, passed to the ranks of his enemies. Yet the allies, numerous and confident as they were, paused and hesitated as they approached the Rhine, now their base of operation; they could not summon up courage enough to follow straight the tracks of the exhausted and receding lion; the vigor and intrepidity of his former bounds was yet fresh in their memory. Napoleon, indeed, inclined to the belief that they would stop short at the Rhine, and refrain from a winter campaign, and he thus hoped to have time for raising a fresh army. The allied sovereigns, however, finally determined otherwise.

Three armies, commanded by Prince Schwartzenberg, Blucher, and Bernadotte, making a total of 300,000 men, stood *écheloned* on the Rhine at the end of December, ready for the invasion of France. Schwartzenberg, with 150,000 men, had to pass the Upper Rhine at Basle, and debouch into the valley of Champagne by Switzerland, or the Jura and Vosges mountains; Blucher was to pass the Rhine with 60,000 men between Mannheim and Strasburg, and advance on the Meuse toward Verdun; while

the army of Bernadotte had orders to pass the river near Dusseldorf, reconquer Holland and Belgium, and then advance on the Moselle, and thus effect its junction with Blucher. The junction between the armies of Blucher and Schwartzenberg, expected sooner, was to be effected when the latter approached the Marne, at Chaumont and Langres. The frontier fortresses, as well as those situated more distant from the Rhine, in which only weak garrisons had been left—such as Strasburg, Metz, Huningen, and Belfort—served but little to retard the progress of the *gros* of the allies. Schwartzenberg, who passed the Rhine December 21, soon approached the banks of the Marne; while Blucher, who, having a shorter line of operation, passed the Rhine a week later, made his way, without meeting with serious resistance, to the Meuse at Verdun. The weak French corps spread along the line of the Rhine gradually fell back.

A glance at a map of France will show that, by obliquing to the left from Verdun, Blucher would gain the Marne at Chalons, and thus be on the straight road to Paris by Meaux, while Schwartzenberg might move on the capital in descending the Seine by Troyes. A middle road to Paris was partly practicable along the Aube, the affluent of the Seine, which runs between the latter and the Marne, and which is, at some places, not more dis-

tant than one march from either. It was on approaching the valley of the Marne and Seine, that is, the basin of Paris, that Napoleon, staying at Paris, determined to go and face his overwhelming adversaries.

The army of Schwartzenberg consisted of seven Austrian divisions, two Russian divisions, three Bavarian, and one of Wirtembergers. The army under Blucher consisted of three Prussian corps d'armée, four Russian corps, and one of Saxons. Bernadotte's army comprised Swedes, Russians, and Germans, to which may also be added the Anglo-Batavian army under Sir Thomas Graham. Wellington had, by that time, driven the French over the Pyrenees; while Murat, whom Napoleon seated on the throne of Naples, passed over to the allies. The French army in Upper Italy, under Eugene Beauharnais, was too distant to hasten to the valley of Champagne; besides, a corps of the Schwartzenberg army remained in Geneva, to watch the events on the other side of the Alps.

It may easily be imagined that Napoleon did not needlessly stay in Paris while the allies thus advanced into the interior of France; he had a double object in view in waiting—first, to create means of resistance; second, to learn the designs of his enemies. As to the latter, there could be no longer any mistake. He now distinctly saw through the

plans of his enemies, hoping to thwart them; but there was no possibility of creating sufficient means. France was discouraged, exhausted, and, in part, longing for the return of the Bourbons.

Napoleon raised in a hurry 8 regiments of the guard; 121 battalions of the national guard were mobilized, and were intended partly to garrison the different strong places situated on the lines of operation; and he took, also, the first measures toward raising 343 battalions of regulars, which, putting the battalions at 840 men, would have made a total of 288,000—a number sufficient in the hands of Napoleon. The total want of horses rendered impossible the creation of a cavalry force. The infantry regiments were being raised, after Napoleon left Paris, under the authority of Marie Louise, the regent, whom he had recommended to the protection of the national guards. There was neither time to instruct the young recruits, nor means to equip them. They received a musket, a knapsack, and a cap or *bonnet de police*, and were hurriedly sent off to the field. These young boys were usually called the *Marie Louise*, apparently an object of pity and derision; but they soon proved that they were not unworthy to be led by a Napoleon.

When Napoleon left Paris, January 25, Blucher, who had reached the Meuse, was just making a flank movement with part of his army to the left

by St. Dizier toward Brienne, situated on the Aube, to effect his communication with Schwartzenberg, whose right wing advanced on Bar, likewise situated on that river. Napoleon took up his headquarters at Chalons, and, as it were, in the midst of the Blucher army, all disposable troops being concentrated round Chalons. His generals, who had expected re-enforcements, were rather startled to see the commander-in-chief bring nobody except himself. Not a single man was to be got, said Napoleon to Marmont, who was more than astonished at this solitary appearance. We must try our fortune. A trial, it will be owned, must necessarily be made under the circumstances, or, indeed, a surrender. There was hardly another alternative. Napoleon's allowing the allies to march undisturbed on Paris was an impossibility. Besides, the initiative, which had hitherto so strongly marked all his operations, was now the only means that could keep together his little army. Marmont, who is by no means inclined to exaggerate Napoleon's exploits in this campaign, states that he never had together, between the Marne and the Seine, more than 40,000 men.


The first trial actually succeeded. He fell upon the rear corps of Blucher at St. Dizier, routed it, and then advanced southward on Brienne, in hopes of overtaking Blucher before his junction with the

Austro-Russian army. At Brienne Napoleon gained another advantage. Blucher was forced to retreat; but he retreated to join the Austrians, who had already reached Bar. Amid these circumstances, Napoleon took up position near the village La Rothière, situated between Brienne and Bar, in the very face of the concentrated enemy. The position was strong enough. The right wing, commanded by Gerard, leaned on the Aube; the left wing, under Marmont, leaned on a village and the wood of Ajou; the centre, under Victor, was behind the village of Rothière. The distribution of the forces was as follows: Gerard, on the right, had 6700 infantry and 640 horse; Victor, 6100 infantry and 5600 horse; Marmont, 4600 infantry and 1800 horse; the reserve consisted of 9700 infantry and 800 horse; total 27,300 infantry and 8840 cavalry. The artillery numbered 128 pieces. The total of the allied forces was 106,700, of which 22,700 were cavalry, with 286 pieces.

The allies began the attack at one o'clock P.M.; the battle raged till about midnight; at last the French centre was broken, Rothière taken, and the French were obliged to beat a retreat. This battle of La Rothière, fought on the 1st of February, cost Napoleon 6000 men, of whom 2400 were made prisoners, besides 54 pieces. It was the first pitched battle on the soil of France. La Rothière thus cost

Napoleon about one sixth of his small army. He retreated to the left bank of the Aube that very night, toward Troyes, and that without molestation, a circumstance sufficiently proving the heavy price of the victory of the allies.

Now Blucher and Schwartzenberg, thinking to have passed through the severest trial, advanced



ENVIRONS OF PARIS.

on Paris by two different lines, the former descending down the Marne, the latter in a nearly parallel direction along the Seine. Napoleon was not slow in availing himself of this division of his enemies, though each separately consisted of far greatly

superior forces to his own. From his position at Nogent, on the Seine, Napoleon, by rapid marches, appeared on the Marne; and while Blucher's advance reached Meaux, only two marches from Paris, he fell upon and defeated one of his corps at Champ-Aubert. The advance corps of Blucher, suddenly in full retreat, was overtaken, beaten at Montmirail, and sent staggering to Soissons, situated on the Aisne; Blucher, with the *gros*, fell back on Chalons. The victory of Montmirail procured Napoleon twenty-six pieces. With these results on the Marne, he again flew to the Seine. After a forced march of sixty miles, performed in thirty-five hours, he reached Schwartzenberg at Guignes, about eighteen miles from Paris, and, after a fierce combat, compelled him to retreat, and ultimately to fall back as far as Troyes.

Both armies were thus alternately forced back to the direction and line they occupied at the moment of their first junction. More than 18,000 prisoners were by this time sent to Paris; but final success was evidently an impossibility, especially considering the feelings of a part of the population and the defections in the army itself; in fact, Napoleon had not now an army strong enough even to be led to a series of certain victories. Blucher, who was about again to be overtaken on the Aisne, was saved from defeat by the treachery of the command-

er of Soissons, who opened the gates of that place, and thus enabled him to pass the river. Napoleon, always hopeful, pursued the enemy on the other side of the Aisne, and attacked him in the strong position of Craon, March 7. The French were about 30,000, the enemy some 50,000. Both armies fought with equal determination, till, at last, Blucher was obliged to retreat. But this bloody victory cost the French 8000 men; and, during this time, Schwartzenberg, who had only a few thousand men before him disputing his progress, again approached Paris. Napoleon, indeed, again transported himself to the Aube, and variously annoyed the rear corps of the Austro-Russian army; but he was too weak now to make a serious impression. Blucher, in the mean time, again appeared on the Marne, and both armies, now united, advanced till in sight of Paris. The combat waged before the walls of Paris, March 30th, was soon followed by an armistice and capitulation; the Bourbons re-entered the Tuileries, and the conqueror, without an army, was sent to the Isle of Elba!

Thus ended the three months' campaign, to which nothing in the modern annals can be compared except the campaigns of Frederick the Great in the Seven Years' War. The hero-king of Prussia never had more than 150,000 men, while his enemies sometimes amounted to between 300,000 and 400,000,

though he was never placed in such adverse circumstances, or surrounded by such treason, as Napoleon was during the campaign of 1814.

This campaign eminently illustrates the value of an interior line of operation *vis-à-vis* two exterior lines; but it must, on the other hand, not be forgotten that, without energy of action and rapidity of marches, an interior line of operation has no meaning, and may prove the most ruinous. It was the rapidity of his movements that enabled Napoleon to draw such immense advantages from his internal position on the Aube. In fact, had Paris not been the very strategic point to all intents and purposes, he might, in remaining on the rear of the allies, have drawn together the forces distributed in the frontier fortresses, and reassumed the offensive.

In following Napoleon's campaigns, one sees exemplified almost all the different guiding rules of warfare; in some instances, indeed, they present patent disregard of established rules, but never without sufficient reason, never without instinctive guidance and certainty of success. In speaking of single and double lines of operation, Napoleon, in his usual clear way, demonstrates the preference of the former by the mere fact of flanks being the weak points of every army. An army operating on a single line will thus offer only two weak points,

while, if it operates on two lines, it will have four weak points, and if on three lines, then it will present six weak points. And, in the face of this argument, we behold him, in Italy, in 1796, take two lines of operation on both sides of the Lake di Garda. The victory of Marengo, too, was preceded by a march on both banks of the Po. In 1809, after the curious manœuvres near Ratisbon, by which he divided in two the Austrian army, we see him hasten to seize the strategic point—Vienna—by advancing on the right bank of the Danube, parallel, as it were, with the line of the enemy, who marched toward the same point by the left bank.

Yet, generally speaking, there was no greater observer of the principles of war than Napoleon. His military genius, as already observed, was essentially, strategic, offensive, and that in every respect. His instinct taught him to bring into harmony in his plans political considerations with the purely military side of war, in the same manner as he knew how to get out of the army the maximum of effort considered both as a physical and moral medium.

As already repeatedly observed, the relative value of single and double lines of operation, though easily understood, is not of a nature to be fixed by unalterable rules. A variety of circumstances will often decide in favor of the one or the other. In some cases, indeed, a double line of operation can

REMARKS BY DR. H.

1. IN PRACTICE OF MEDICINE OR DISEASES OF HUMAN BEINGS, IT IS OF THE GREATEST USE TO THE PHYSICIAN TO HAVE A KNOWLEDGE OF THE DISEASES OF ANIMALS. IN THE SAME MANNER, CONSIDERATION OF THE DISEASES OF ANIMALS IS OF THE GREATEST USE TO THE PHYSICIAN IN THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE. IN HUMAN MEDICINE, THE DISEASES OF ANIMALS ARE OF GREAT USE, AND IN THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE, THE DISEASES OF HUMAN BEINGS ARE OF GREAT USE. IN HUMAN MEDICINE, THE DISEASES OF ANIMALS ARE OF GREAT USE, AND IN THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE, THE DISEASES OF HUMAN BEINGS ARE OF GREAT USE.

2. DR. H. WAS BORN

IN THE VILLAGE OF BONN, HESSE

ON JULY 1, 1813.

3. DR. H. IS

THE SON OF DR. H.

4. DR. H. IS

THE BROTHER OF DR. H.

5. DR. H. IS

THE BROTHER OF DR. H.

6. DR. H. IS

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THE BROTHER OF DR. H.

as the Chiesa, Oglio, Adela, and Ticino, served, as it were, as lines of defense on the theatre of war. The Ticino, it must be remembered, formed the frontier between Austrian Italy and Piedmont; the fortress of Alexandria, situated inside the Piedmontese territory, was the true base of the latter, and its powerful ally.

Each party, Austria and the allies, set in motion about 200,000 men, with, one may say, a small preponderance of numbers in favor of the former. The principal subdivisions in both armies were into corps d'armée and divisions; but unity of command there was only in the army of the allies—a no small advantage indeed! The French emperor, who had hitherto known war only from study, had, as we know, in his memory a no common model, if not to imitate, at any rate to profit by. The principal tactical difference in the two hostile armies was that the French cavalry was formed in separate divisions—cavalry division with three divisions of infantry and one corps d'armée. The whole French army numbered the Guard, five corps d'armée; the Prince Napoleon, was destined to command Italy. The Piedmontese had nine divisions. In the quality of their troops there was but little difference between the two parties; but the allies had the advantage of the field rifled batteries.

The events of the campaign, which we shall presently follow, resolve themselves into four combats and two pitched battles, all of which proved in favor of the allies. There was, no doubt, an unusual *elan* in the French army, a very high morale; and the proclamation of Napoleon III., calling to the memory of the troops the victories of Napoleon Bonaparte, was calculated still more to stimulate their ardor. The French skirmishers, thrown forward in large swarms, exhibited unusual gallantry.

The Austrians, before taking the offensive, stood, about the end of April, concentrated behind the Ticino, extending from Buffalora, their right, to Pavia, the extreme left wing being on the left bank of the Po at Piacenza. The Gallo-Italian army was being assembled between Alexandria, situated on the Bormida, and Valencia and Casale, which are situated on the right bank of the Po. After passing the Ticino, and before reaching the Po at the two latter points, the Austrians had, besides, to pass two small rivers, the Ogogna and Sessia. The central position of both armies was nearly *vis-à-vis*. The Austrians, if operating by their extreme left at Piacenza, might have advanced on the right of the allies by merely ascending the Po, either on the one or on both sides, while in operating by their right they would have threatened Turin. The gradual concentration of the allies was naturally calcu-

lated soon to limit the nature of the offensive manœuvres of the Austrians. Gyulai, the Austrian commander-in-chief, apparently determined to pursue the offensive, occupied, the 3d of April, the line of the Agogna, and advanced the day after to the Sessia. At the beginning of May part of the Austrians passed also the Sessia, making front to the Po, opposite Valencia, the centre of the allies.

On the 20th of May the Austrians finally appeared to prepare a pronounced manœuvre by their left. The fifth corps, under Stadion, passed the Po, and advanced on the great road of Voghera and Alexandria, which branches off to Novi and Genoa. This movement might have had a double object: to reconnoitre the position of the enemy, or to destroy or intersect the line of operation of the French with Genoa, their secondary base. But, whatever was intended by this manœuvre, rapidity was its only chance of success, and this failed.

Having thrown back the Piedmontese outposts at Casteggio, the Austrians advanced slowly, in three columns, on Montebello. Here a bloody, obstinate combat ensued, which lasted all day, when the energy and rapidity with which General Forey brought up and handled his troops finally compelled the Austrians to retreat. The first serious encounter thus served to establish the morale of the allied army. The latter, who had by this time

large forces concentrated on their right toward Voghera, began now, after the affair of Montebello, to shift toward the left.

Now the Emperor Napoleon determined to take the offensive, and to carry it to the left bank of the Ticino, and he thought the best way to attain his aim was by a turning manœuvre. But it was necessary to have it masked by an attack on the Austrian front, placed behind the Sessia, round Mortara. And thus came to pass the combat of Palestro, which is situated on the left bank of the Sessia, and on the great road between Vercelli and Robbio. At the combat of Palestro, May 31, the Austrians lost about 1000 in prisoners and 8 pieces. The *gros* of the French, massed near Novara, now began to execute its manœuvres across the Ticino. Napoleon had chosen the very two points at which Napoleon Bonaparte passed that river in his campaign of Marengo, viz., Buffalora, on the great road to Milan, and Turbigo. The *gros* was to approach the Ticino in the direction of Buffalora by Trecate, while one corps d'armée, under M'Mahon, consisting of only two divisions, but mostly Algerians, was to execute a turning or flank manœuvre by passing the Ticino at Turbigo, about twelve miles distant from Buffalora.

At about one mile's distance from Turbigo, on the right side of the river, is situated the village

Robochetto, on the road leading to Buffalora, Magenta, and Milan. This important point, commanding the great road, was but feebly guarded by the Austrians, and thus greatly facilitated the intended manœuvre. M'Mahon, who passed the Ticino at Turbigo on the third of June, rendered himself master, after a short combat, of Robochetto, and there he waited till the next day, when the general movement to the left bank of the river was to be attempted at Buffalora. Much of the success obviously depended on the simultaneous advance of the *gros* and the two divisions of M'Mahon. The Austrian general, who had by that time retreated to the left bank of the Ticino, had part of his forces concentrated in and around Magenta, and appeared little prepared for the flank attack preparing on his right.

Before reaching the Ticino at Buffalora, the *gros* of the French had to pass a canal, defended by the *tête de pont* of the bridge San Martino, the outworks of which also protected the great bridge of Buffalora over the Ticino. These works, however, were abandoned by the Austrians, though measures were taken, at the same time, to blow up the massive bridge at Buffalora. The Austrians took position behind the Canal Noviglio, running about midway between the Ticino and Magenta. Three roads led from the Ticino to the Austrian positions: in the

centre, the high road to Milan, passing the Noviglio Canal by the bridge called Ponte di Magenta ; to the left, the road of Buffalora ; and on the right, the railway. The Austrian general, it may thus be seen, relied mainly on the canal, and not the Ticino. The Austrian *gros* was placed before Magenta, fronting the canal ; the right wing occupied Buffalora, while the left leaned on Robecco. Another corps, encamped farther down, at Abiate Grasso, was intended for a flank movement on the French right. As the front attack of the allies was made dependent on the turning manœuvre of M'Mahon, the attack on the line of the Noviglio Canal was commenced with but a few battalions, and it thus continued from eight till about two P.M. Now the roar of the guns coming from the direction of Turbigo was heard, and this became the signal for the general attack on the Austrian front. The bridge over the Noviglio, the principal point, was, after a fierce combat of two hours, finally forced by the French, who had only two divisions engaged, the Zouaves and grenadiers, the divisions of Canrobert and Niel having as yet been in the distance. At once the roar of the guns coming from Turbigo was hushed. The two French divisions engaged in front thus found themselves in a rather critical position, when M'Mahon's advance unexpectedly broke forward on Buffalora. It was now about five P.M.

To understand what happened on the road between Turbigo and Buffalora, it must be remembered that M'Mahon advanced on two parallel roads. The left column, under General Espinasse, marched on Magenta by Buscate and Marcallo; the right column marched on Buffalora by Cosate. The right column having met with resistance at the latter place, in sight of Buffalora, new dispositions had to be made, especially as the two columns were threatened with being separated from each other. Perceiving the large force and artillery massed in Buffalora, M'Mahon formed his line of battle, with his right directed on Buffalora—and that only after having established the communication with the left column, which had attained Marcallo—and then advanced with both columns, the spire of the church of Magenta having served as a point of direction to both. The skirmishers of the right column, precipitating themselves forward, soon reached the extreme of the grenadier division at the bridge of San Martino, where they continued to maintain their position against superior forces, without, however, being able to advance a step farther. The key of the position—Magenta—had yet to be attacked; and, by a curious coincidence, it so happened that both the French and the Austrians alike failed to bring together in time sufficient forces on that point. While part of the Austrians were now

obliged to make front against M'Mahon, the divisions of Niel and Canrobert finally approached. The front attack was now renewed with redoubled energy, the French advancing simultaneously on the three roads, and, before one hour more passed, the balance turned decidedly in favor of the French. By seven o'clock the Austrians were finally forced from Magenta, and this decided the fate of the day. The loss on each side, in killed and wounded, was about equal, amounting to 5000; but the French made 7000 prisoners. The forces engaged at the end were, Austrians, 85,000; French, 70,000—a fact which clearly shows that both parties alike failed to bring into action the forces at command. Nor is it necessary to say that, in the presence of a more active enemy, the turning manœuvre executed by M'Mahon, which now so largely contributed to the success of the day, would have produced quite contrary results.

After the battle of Magenta, the Austrians, in their retreat, abandoned Milan, passed the Adda, and then successively, also, the Oglio and Chiesa, and finally retreated to the left bank of the Mincio. Here they found themselves between two angles of the *quadrilateral*, the right wing leaning on Peschiera, the left on Mantua. The French, in their onward march, stopped at the line of the Chiesa. The two armies were thus separated from each other.

er by the ground intervening between the latter river and the Mincio, making a distance of about nine miles. The command of the Austrians had, by this time, passed from the hands of Gyulai into those of the Emperor Francis Joseph, he being, at any rate, the ostensible commander-in-chief.

It would be superfluous to remind the reader of the value of this position of the Austrians for the defensive; and what might have been expected was, not to see the Austrians advance, but, on the contrary, endeavor to allure the allies to the *quadrilateral*; but it happened otherwise. The Austrians, re-formed and reorganized, passed to the right bank of the Mincio to reassume the offensive. The French, at the very same time, in their onward march passed the Chiesa, so that both parties were equally taken by surprise in meeting with each other at the heights of Solferino, June 24.

The battle of Solferino (to which we shall return) was thus what is termed a *bataille de rencontre*. Some 170,000 men were, on each side, engaged in a series of desperate combats, gradually melting together at and around Solferino. The dispositions of the Emperor Napoleon III.—treading the ground so famous from the exploits of Bonaparte in 1796—at last prevailed; the Austrians retreated to Mantua, and the campaign was at an end.

Generally speaking, this campaign, so favorable to the French arms, and to which the intrepidity and agility of the Algerian chasseurs no little contributed, is apt to remind one of Wellington's campaign in Spain. The results obtained by the French were mainly tactic results, little resembling the rapid and overwhelming strategic strides which mark all the campaigns of Napoleon Bonaparte.

That Napoleon Bonaparte was not infallible, and that he, too, despite his genius, his instinct, and his circumspection, occasionally failed, and sinned against the rules of the art of war, which he himself so highly praised, may easily be conceded; but he has left to critics a very small choice: of his fourteen campaigns, only the Russian campaign of 1812 is that which was converted into a sort of impeachment against him. Rogniat, for example, who is, no doubt, an authority of weight, blames Napoleon, with rather too authoritative mien, for having neglected to look for another base beyond the Vistula, while he had yet some six hundred miles to traverse before reaching Moscow. He naïvely styles this campaign "*une invasion dans le genre Asiatique.*" In one sense that is true; the medley of hosts following Napoleon to the Niemen much resembled the uncouth agglomeration of large Asiatic armies; but the issue of the campaign would certainly have proved otherwise had the armies

of his allies not turned against him with the first frown of Fortune. Calmly considering the disasters of this campaign, it will be found that they arose not from error, but mistake. Hoping, not without sufficient reason, to find in Moscow winter quarters, Napoleon met there instead with devouring flames! Who could have foreseen this result?

CHAPTER X.

BATTLES.

Decisive Battles.—Defensive and Offensive Battles.—Battle-fields.—Position for Battle.—Necessity of Reconnoissance.—Pavia.—Busaco.—Distribution of the Troops on the Battle-field.—Orders of Battle.—Their particular Meaning.—Requirements of an Army.—Lines of Battle.—Duties of the different Arms.—Napoleon's Experiments of Squares in Egypt.—Bugeaud at Isly.—Importance of the Reserve.—Alma.—Marengo.—Austerlitz.

LINES of Operation, Marches, Manceuvres, all lead to the battle-field. Battle is the aim of almost every movement; and one decisive battle often decides the fate of the campaign, and even of the war itself. Decisive battles are, consequently, results toward which all the efforts of an army must be concentrated. A multiplicity of ephemeral, incoherent victories little affect the fortunes of war; and humanity and high tactics both point to few but decisive encounters. It rarely happens that both contending parties are equally desirous for battle; but in modern war there is, properly speaking, no choice when the army has entered the field. In the times of the Romans, an army unwilling to accept battle remained quietly in its intrenched camp,

fully sheltered against the attempts of the enemy; but with the present small fire-arms and artillery an ordinary intrenched camp would afford but poor protection. A commander, therefore, must fight, whether willing or not. If an army engages in battle only to maintain its position, it gives a *defensive battle*; and if its object is to advance, then the battle is *offensive*. However, the notions of offensive and defensive must be taken in a qualified sense; the *rôles* are often too soon exchanged, and properly to act on the defensive an army must also recur to offensive movements.

In speaking of battles, two things have to be considered—the topographical nature of the battle-field, and the handling of the troops during the action. It is by no means easy to comprehend the weak and strong sides of a position for battle; the best definition is perhaps that of Rogniat: "An advantageous position," says that general, "is that which allows the free movements of the troops from one end to the other, and from the rear to the front; a field which commands the environs within gunshot; which offers trees, rocks, or valleys to cover the wings, or any other feeble part of the line of battle, and which shelters the troops against the enemy's fire till they enter into action. A disadvantageous battle-field," he continues, "is that which is entirely uncovered (*vue dans tous les sens*), com-

manded by heights within gunshot, and embarrassed by swamps, water-courses, ravines, or defiles." The latter part of the definition, it may be seen, is much more distinct, and it will not always be possible to combine the qualities enumerated in the first part. But this definition may suffice to serve as a guiding rule. Very much depends, indeed, upon the choice of position. Frederick the Great, Napoleon, and Wellington applied all their attention to the choice of locality, and Napoleon emphatically points to the necessity of the personal reconnaissance of the battle-field by the commanding general. The reconnaissance, it ought not to be forgotten, applies to the whole region of the battle-field, including the position of the enemy. There are positions in which to engage in combat is to hasten to defeat and ruin.

The battle of Pavia, 1526, in which Francis I. of France "lost all except honor," furnishes a striking example of the danger of disregarding rules in war. He had laid siege to that town for several months without having been able to produce any effect on the garrison. In these circumstances, an army approached to the relief of the place. Guided by a false feeling of chivalry, the king remained obstinately in his position, accepting battle with the fortress in his rear. The result of this imprudent obstinacy was total defeat.

Napoleon attributed the defeat of the French at Busaco, in Portugal, in 1810, solely to the fact that Massena failed to reconnoitre the position in person, which he would otherwise have turned. In advancing toward Lisbon, on the right bank of the Mondego, Massena found the English in position on the rugged heights of Busaco, commanding the road. The approaches to the English position were difficult in the extreme; the ravines intersecting the mountain ridge permitted only partial attacks, extending over a space of three miles; while Wellington, from the crest of the mountain, had a complete view of the movements of the enemy. The French stole up the heights and returned to the attack repeatedly, overcoming with singular agility and valor all the difficulties of the ground. But they could not possibly establish themselves on the rocky summits in the presence of their brave and more numerous defenders, and were obliged to retreat with a loss of about six thousand men. Had this position been turned, it might have altered the whole nature of the campaign.

Valor must never be permitted to take the place of reason. Briefly speaking, it may be stated, that a position, to be good, must be wide and deep enough to hold the army; that it is of great advantage if the flanks, which are the weak parts of every army, are covered by some natural or artificial obstacle;

farther, that rivers, swamps, or ravines are dangerous in the rear of the position. It is, besides, of great moment that an army about to engage in battle should have a clear, unobstructed line or roads of retreat. Hence the danger of a line of retreat through a defile. Yet there are exceptions even in this respect. Wellington, confident in the steadiness of his troops, more than once placed them with a natural obstacle in their rear, which in such cases served rather to add to the security of the army. At Waterloo his army leaned on a forest, having only one road of retreat through it. We shall see how Napoleon took up a position along and close to the Danube, in the very presence of the enemy. But genius can sometimes afford to have its own way.

That the best possible position is of no use without the proper distribution of the troops is hardly necessary to say. Much is gained if the different troops—infantry, cavalry, and artillery—are at the very outset in their proper places. Experience has taught the inexpediency of engaging at once all the disposable forces; an army is, therefore, generally divided into three parts, drawn up at certain distances one behind the other. In technical language, the form of the battle array is called the *Order of Battle*. Jomini, in his *Précis de l'Art de la Guerre*, enumerates twelve orders of battle, but, practically speaking, these may be reduced to four:*

* See Diagrams, p. 26, 27.

1st. The Parallel Order.

2d. The Oblique.

3d. The Concave.

4th. The Convex Order.

The order *en échelon* is merely an oblique line broken.

It must not, of course, be supposed that these different battle arrays look in reality as regular and smooth as on paper, but, nevertheless, each has its meaning. Supposing the enemy drawn up in a straight line: if you meet him with a line parallel to his, you employ the simplest method, and with very little prospect of success if the troops on both sides are equal in numbers and of equal value. You pay, in this case, like with like. Quite different is the case if some art, some hidden idea, is brought to bear on the battle array. Assuming that you have formed your troops in the oblique order, with the right wing in advance: in this case you keep aloof—or, as it is termed, *refuse*—your left, and apparently threaten only the enemy's left, and yet keep him in suspense as to your real intentions. If you are really determined to attack mainly his left wing, and make your dispositions accordingly to fall upon him on that point with concentrated forces, then the breaking through his left may bring into disorder his centre, and ultimately his whole line. It is an indisputable fact, that, to be

efficient, the energy of the attack must be directed against a certain point or points, which, if successfully carried through, will almost invariably decide the fate of the battle. Every battle has what is called its *knot*, on which all the manœuvres hinge; there is hardly a position which has not its key, the loss of which entails the loss of the battle.

We shall hereafter see what use Napoleon made of the oblique order of battle, extemporized on the field of Marengo after having nearly lost the day. At Austerlitz, Esslingen, Wagram, and Waterloo, we see him aim principally at attacks on the centre. At Esslingen, his order of battle presented the concave form, the two wings leaning on the villages of Aspern and Esslingen, with the centre backward. The convex order of battle is just the contrary, viz., with the centre in advance, and the two wings backward.

These different orders of battle are often dictated by the nature of the battle-field. To arrive at the desired aim, it is, therefore, indispensable that the officers be perfectly informed of the real designs of the commanding general. It is the task of the officers of the staff to assist in carrying out the dispositions determined upon, and sometimes to direct in person the attack on certain points of the line. The commanding general must also not forget to point out beforehand where the different

corps should fall back in case of a necessary retreat. Napoleon's *ordres de jour* are wonderful specimens of clearness and precision in this respect; his generals were never at a doubt as to his intentions. Sometimes an enveloping attack on the whole line of the enemy will recommend itself; but, unless conducted with superior forces, such an attack may easily lead to the breaking through of the attacking army, and often produce its defeat. Equal caution is required in an attack on the flank, which always presupposes circumvention, and, consequently, delay. It is a standing maxim that the turning army exposes itself to be turned. Such manœuvres, if undertaken, must thus be carried through rapidly and with energy. It is, however, undeniable that an unexpected attack in the flank or rear carries with it a great moral influence—the attacked party feels discouraged in finding itself assailed from a quarter whence it expected no danger.

The change of the form of battle during action has often produced wonders; but it is also an operation attended with great danger, if the army performing it is at all pressed by the enemy. Changing direction or front always implies loss of time for yourself and the gaining of time by the enemy. "An army," says a well-known military writer, "that will range itself always in the same way, is sure to be beaten by one that will know to accom-

modate its order of battle to circumstances." Villages, farm-houses, gardens, a cluster of trees, isolated heights, marshes, and other inequalities of ground, all have their full significance in the order of battle. Some of the most brilliant and decisive victories of modern times were earned by the possession of an obscure village or grave-yard. Had Napoleon lost the grave-yard of Eylau, he would also have lost the day. Half of the two armies assembled at Waterloo spent the whole day in contesting the possession of two mouldering, ivy-covered farm-houses. Eight French regiments vainly tried to force the possession of the cemetery of Solferino, defended but by a few battalions; and this abode of the dead, which held victory in its womb, had to be burst open by formidable rifled batteries. Inert matter thus exercises a great influence on the fortune of battles; but it must be remembered that, after all, it is the moving, living element which decides the weakness and strength of positions. No position is strong enough for weak, lifeless, badly-led troops. To make good use of their position, troops must be possessed of certain tactic properties, and be handled accordingly. Courage and knowledge are not merely qualities, but necessities in the leaders.

That it is of immense advantage if an army have some knowledge of the form of battle before being

called upon to face the enemy is evident enough; there is, in fact, nothing of greater importance for troops than the manœuvring practices in which the different shifting and forms of the battle array are reproduced. These evolutions are, as it were, the rehearsals of battle; but an army can only acquire steadiness and calm courage in real fighting, and such opportunities are offered to almost every army before being called upon to engage in great, decisive battles; it is through battle that an army learns to stand the brunt of battle; it is in fighting alone that an army acquires confidence and calm courage; "toilet manœuvres" are of little avail in this respect. A man will never learn to swim by any practice on land; and that holds, also, of the tide of war. However, enthusiasm, buoyancy of mind, will, in many cases, carry an untaught army triumphantly through the first trials. The young American soldiers in the War of Independence, the raw levies of Revolutionary France in 1792, those of Hungary in 1848, passed rapidly through their apprenticeship. The obvious tendency of the perfected fire-arms, it is hardly necessary to say, is to decide victory from a distance; victory seems thus to be monopolized by the varied and vast apparatus of destruction brought to bear on the modern battle-field; yet it is an incontrovertible fact that now, more than ever, it is the skill of man, the re-

sources of the human mind, that decides the turn of the balance. Never was good generalship so necessary and so decisive as at the present time, with the perfected arms and the extended battle-field.

The lines of battle are principally formed by the infantry. The first line, preceded by its skirmishers, is deployed; the second line stands in columns at a distance of 200 or 300 yards behind the first, and the reserve is massed at about double that distance from the second line. The distance observed between the lines depends much upon the nature of the ground and the fire of the enemy, the chief object being to have the second line and the reserve at hand, without exposing them while in an expectant attitude. Small intervals between the regiments, brigades, and divisions always mark the line of battle, though the ground be of a nature to permit a continuous line. The cavalry is usually placed on the wings, and mostly behind the first line. It is hardly necessary to observe that to be able to conceal one's order of battle from the enemy—which is sometimes rendered easy by the nature of the ground—is a great advantage.

The light artillery, excepting that of the reserve, generally takes position on certain points one or two hundred yards in advance of the first line, and at least by batteries at each point. The breaking

up of that arm into smaller tactic unities—as was the custom in the last century, when light pieces were placed separately at small intervals—has proved to be against the true nature of the artillery. To be really useful, the artillery must play with effect. It ought, therefore, to occupy all the salient points, and to aim to produce an enfilading or a cross fire, but always so as not to interfere with the movements of its own infantry. The long range is only in special cases of use. The usual range on the battle-field, it has been proved, never exceeds 1000 or 1200 yards, while very frequently it plays at a much smaller distance, varying between 500, 600, and 800 yards. “The battery,” says Decker, “is the arm which imparts energy to the combat of the infantry. It prepares a favorable issue, and it can establish a doubtful success.” According to this authority, no commander should, at the opening of the action, display all his batteries, so as to let the enemy count them. Decker also gives the preference to a position on the wings over that in advance of the centre; however, the putting in position of the artillery, like many other points of war, can only be indicated, but nowise fixed and determined on mathematical rules.

Any one who was ever in battle might have convinced himself of the moral effect produced by the boom of the guns. Young soldiers will eagerly

ask, "Whose guns are firing: are they ours?" But the three arms must keep to their respective *rôles*. It will never do—even with the present mobility of the horse artillery—to try to make it perform the task of the infantry. The artillery is a most formidable auxiliary, but, withal, a sort of *impedimenta*—always in need of the protection of the other two arms. Whatever may be the value of that school which thinks that the artillery, while causing damage to the enemy, draws, at the same time, the enemy's fire on its own army, it is clear that if the one party has artillery, the other must also have it. Marshal Bugeaud, as we have shown, worked at first in Algiers with sufficient success without the aid of artillery; but as soon as the enemy began to make use of batteries, he had also recourse to that arm. Napoleon, at Wagram, foiled in his attempt to break through the Austrian centre, put in line of battle 80 guns.

The task of the cavalry is to dash on the enemy's infantry; to oppose his cavalry; to make flank charges, and to attack the enemy's artillery. Its rapidity causes surprise, and surprise works wonders. Good cavalry will sweep the field like a hurricane. No cavalry charges on a great scale have been witnessed since the wars of Napoleon. Almost all the great battles of Napoleon are marked by the terrific duels between infantry squares and columns

of cavalry. Such was Hautpoul's fierce charge with twenty-four mailed cuirassier squadrons on the frozen field of Eylau. The impulsive vigor and trampling power of the horse was, perhaps, on no occasion so strongly exhibited as by Murat's charges on the field of Jena. Good cavalry once let loose becomes, as it were, a projectile carried on by its own velocity; and no stronger proof is needed of the excellency of infantry than calmly to await such a charge. Napoleon's experiments of the value of squares in Egypt were the first of the kind. The famous Mameluke cavalry—remarkable alike for the excellency of their horses, their unsurpassed horsemanship, and their natural valor, and who were, besides, armed with six fire-arms—had a traditional and boundless contempt of foot-soldiers. They looked on the French cavalry (which was small in number) with unmixed scorn, and confidently prepared to "cut up the infantry like melons." At the battle of the Pyramids—the first trial—the French infantry was formed in squares flanking each other; the cavalry and artillery were placed inside the squares, the angular walls thus presented to the enemy being six ranks deep. The Mamelukes, rushing to the attack, passed between the squares like a whirlwind, and repeatedly dashed on the bristling walls with boundless intrepidity and swiftness; but they were as often severely pun-

ished. Having thus established the morale of his infantry while he curbed the ardor of the enemy, Bonaparte reduced the depth of the square to three ranks, which subsequently produced like effects. Most dangerous as skirmishers, these matchless horsemen subsequently never could face the French cavalry in regular line of battle. Such are the effects of organization and tactics.

In a like manner, Bugeaud gained, in 1844, the signal victory of Isly over the followers of Abd-el-Kader. The French had at that battle some 9000 infantry and 800 horse, with 16 pieces; the Arabs and Moors numbered some 20,000 horse, 10,000 infantry; with 11 pieces; and the latter were totally routed. From this it may be seen how necessary it is for a general to modify his tactics according to the nature of his enemy. Such troops as Arabs or Mexicans must be dealt with in one way, and European armies in another. Pedantic adherence to rules must, however, be discarded under all circumstances.

The importance of the *Reserve* on the field of battle has been fully understood only since the wars of Napoleon. The reserve forms, according to rule, from one third to one fifth of the army engaged, and consists of all the three arms. The reserve is the last argument of battle, and the moment of its being called into action must depend upon the in-

sight and tact of the commanding general. It is, indeed, one of the most delicate points in war. There are authorities who gravely imply that if Napoleon, who usually had a most felicitous tact in this respect, had summoned up his reserve at Waterloo a few minutes sooner, he might have gained the day and saved the empire. On the other hand, we find that one of his most signal victories—that of Austerlitz—was gained without the reserve, or, more correctly speaking, with but a partial participation of it.

The battle of the Alma, September 20th, 1854, will, in some respects, serve to give a clear and easy idea of the spirit of a battle on a small scale. The Gallo-English troops under Marshal St. Arnaud, after landing in the Crimea, advanced from their basis, the fleet, southward on the road leading from Eupatoria to Sebastopol. The Russian commander, Prince Menchikoff, instead of annoying the allies after their landing, and obstructing their progress, contented himself with taking up a strong position on the left bank of the Alma, intersecting the road. His centre was on the height to the right of the road; the right wing extended to the village of Tarchantar, and the left, which was toward the sea, was protected by the village of Alma-Tamak. The artillery and cavalry was chiefly massed on the centre and the right wing, while the left was, in addi-



tion to the natural obstacles, strengthened by a few field-works. The allies took position on the other side of the Alma, which was fordable, and were placed almost *vis-à-vis* as follows: the Bosquet division, consisting of two brigades and two mounted batteries, formed the right wing; the divisions of Canrobert and Prince Napoleon the centre; and the English the left wing. In the spirit of high tactics, the attack meditated by St. Arnaud ought to have been directed on the Russian right, which, if successful, might have resulted in driving them to or into the sea. But the right wing being strongly occupied, and not of a nature to be turned, St. Arnaud determined to manœuvre by his right against the Russian left wing. Bosquet thus received orders to set first in motion his division, to cut his way up the rugged height by a turning manœuvre; his crowning the heights on the Russian left was to be the signal for the general attack. The Zouaves, accustomed to such work, made their way upward despite all the difficulties of the ground, and, though not without some delay, the two batteries were also dragged up the broken and rugged height, and the action on this point thus commenced seriously. The simultaneous front attack now commenced, though not without considerable delay, on the whole line. While the French centre advanced, the English division of General Lacy, forming the

English right wing, passed the Alma, boldly advancing, despite the burning village of Burlink that stood in their way. This division and that of Lord Codrington was arrested by the Russian batteries, some 56 pieces, playing upon them. The Guards, who were in the second line, now broke from their position, passing the Alma on the run to support the other divisions arrested by the enemy. They deployed in reach of the Russian batteries and put the gunners to flight. In two hours the battle was over, the Russians abandoning the battle-field to the allies. The Russian loss was about 5000, that of the allies some 4000. It has been observed with much reason by some critics that the Russian general committed an error in confining himself entirely to the defensive, and in allowing the allies to come up undisturbed to the Alma, especially as he was greatly their superior in cavalry. The nature of the victory, the want of a sufficient cavalry force, as well as the ignorance of the topographical nature of the theatre of war, all, of course, precluded the idea of pursuit on the part of the allies.

To approach, now, more familiar battle-fields. In 1800, Napoleon, who debouched into the valley of Lombardy after the passage of Mont St. Bernard, marched straight upon Milan, which became his secondary or accidental base, and then he retraced his steps toward the Po and Piedmont. Passing

the Po, the French fell in, at Montebello, with the advance corps of the Austrians, under Ott, which, having been defeated at Montebello, retreated to Alexandria, situated on the left bank of the Bormida. General Melas, the Austrian commander-in-chief, who was then master of Piedmont and Genoa, and, indeed, of almost the whole of Italy, and who at last awoke from his feelings of security, began, at this juncture, to concentrate his forces on the Bormida, evidently with the design of regaining his line of operation, which led to Milan and Mantua.


After the success of Montebello Napoleon advanced farther toward the Scrivia, thus approaching the plain of Marengo and Alexandria. The army marched in three columns, feeling its way as it advanced. On the 13th of June, the advanced corps, under General Victor, consisting of two divisions, passed the Scrivia, and entered St. Giuliana, a village situated on the plain of Marengo, on the great road of Tortona; Lannes' corps was coming up in the rear, while the corps under Desaix was directed to march on the left, following the road of Novi and Genoa. The latter movement happened obviously on the supposition of the Austrians making a flank movement by that road, the real intentions of the enemy having as yet been a mystery to Napoleon. The village of Marengo, situated in

the midst of the plain opposite Alexandria, was a position not to be overlooked by such a general as Napoleon. He accordingly ordered one division to advance from St. Giuliana and occupy Marengo. It was found occupied by a small Austrian corps; but, after a brief combat, the Austrians retreated to the other side of the Bormida, that is, to Alexandria. The little resistance offered by the Austrians on this occasion could not but serve to confirm Napoleon in the supposition that the enemy was not in force before him. We shall see presently that it turned out otherwise.

Marengo, it must be remembered, is one of the greatest plains in Italy, and it is thus especially favorable for the action of cavalry. The plain is traversed by two great roads: the one to the right leads from Alexandria to Tortona, skirting the village of St. Giuliana; the other, on the left, leads to Sale, passing by the village of Castel Ceriole. The plain is here and there besprinkled with trees, especially round the villages, and intersected by two small rivulets; the one, called Fontanone, runs in front of the village of Marengo; the other, called Barbotte, winds to the left, toward the road of Sale.

The French vanguard, after rendering itself master of Marengo, advanced and took up position at the farm of Pedra-Bona, situated at the middle between Marengo and the Bormida. The French

force present, viz., the corps of Victor, Lannes, and the Guard, formed an *échelon* line, with the left in



BATTLE-FIELD OF MARENGO.

advance, and was, in all, about 1800 strong. Next morning this force was attacked by Melas, who ap-

parently intended, in so easily abandoning Marengo, to take the French by surprise. He brought some 32,000 men into action, having passed the Bormida on two bridges, covered by one tête de pont, debouching into the plain of Marengo. The Austrians advanced in three columns; the *gros* of the cavalry, and a few battalions of light infantry, moved on their left, on the road of Sale; the grenadiers, who formed the centre, marched on the village of Marengo, while the right was set in motion on the road of Frugarolo, branching off from the Tortona road. The centre became first engaged, and the small stream of Fontanone witnessed the first serious, obstinate encounter. However, this line was forced. The heavy Austrian column now advanced to the village of Marengo. Here the combat became still more obstinate; but again were the French obliged to retreat. At this juncture, Lannes, who stood *écheloned* backward on the right, pushed forward his columns in support of the Victor divisions. The latter again rallied, but soon retreated again. The Austrians having succeeded in breaking through the centre, the Victor corps, already worn out and decimated, retreated, running full two miles, till it reached St. Giuliana. This retreat naturally exposed to imminent danger Lannes' two divisions, and he, also, was obliged to retreat; but he retreated in a manner such as, per-

haps, no general before ever did. Though assailed by greatly superior forces, and exposed to a heavy fire of artillery—while he had none—Lannes firmly disputed the ground, now receding, now forming attacking columns, now opposing squares, and thus he moved and manœuvred backward for nearly three hours, over a distance of but a couple of miles. But all this was of no avail. The Austrian left column, which consisted chiefly of cavalry, having turned Castel Ceriole, came dashing on the plain in the French rear, threatening to give the final blow on the dispirited and broken ranks.

Napoleon, who saw the danger, and who had at hand but two squadrons of the Guard and two battalions, sent forward into the open plain, some 600 yards in advance, the latter, in all 800, with a few pieces. The 800 Guards advanced as ordered, formed into a square, with the pieces inside, and checked and arrested the numerous charging squadrons. The obstinacy of the Austrian general Elsnitz, commanding this force, who lost his time in repeating his charges on this square to no purpose, was a most happy circumstance, as thereby the other French corps, whom he could have easily borne down, gained time to rally; yet even this feat of valor of the Guard would have served to afford only momentary relief, had the division Monier of Desaix's corps (and which was detached from it)

not come up, ranging itself on Lannes' right, on the one hand, while it leaned with its own right on Castel Ceriole. By the aid of this division, a firm footing was thus, at least, established on the French right wing. Melas, it may be remembered, had, by this time, left the battle-field and retired to the fortress, to prepare his victorious bulletins. Meanwhile heavy Austrian columns pressed on the Tortona road, which formed the line of retreat of the French; and only a few minutes more, and the Austrians would be masters of St. Giuliana, where the broken corps of Victor had run for refuge.

But Desaix, so anxiously looked for, at last arrived, having been led to Marengo by the roar of the guns. It was three o'clock. He thought that a new battle might yet be fought and gained, and so did Napoleon. The latter told his soldiers that they had retreated enough; that they must now begin to advance, as they knew that his custom was to sleep on the battle-field. The soldiers at once grew enthusiastic. A new order of battle had to be formed, and this was done with uncommon rapidity. It presented an oblique line, extending from Castel Ceriole to St. Giuliana, the right wing, at the former place, being in advance. The heavy Austrian columns, advancing confidently on St. Giuliana, had now to meet the fresh troops brought by Desaix, some 6000 strong. The offensive pass-

ed, at this moment, into the French ranks. Desaix had to meet the grenadiers, 5000 strong, led by General Zach, whom Melas had intrusted with the winding up of the battle. Desaix's corps advanced with a masked battery of twelve pieces directed by Marmont. Suddenly unmasked, the battery plied with desolating effect the massive columns; but the grenadiers still pressed on, and only a few yards more, and the battery would have been approached too near to cause harm. At this juncture, Kellerman, who stood in the second line, darted forward with his 800 dragoons, thrusting himself on the flanks of the grenadier columns. Thus assailed from all sides, Zach and his grenadiers soon surrendered. Meanwhile the whole French line gained ground. The Austrians, repulsed and thrown back on all points, made a feeble stand at Marengo, and, driven thence, they fled to the Bormida, many having been taken prisoners in attempting to crowd the two bridges leading to Alexandria. The space on which the Austrians labored forward more than eight hours was now cleared in one single hour. The Austrians lost about 7000 in killed and wounded, 7000 prisoners, besides 13 pieces. The French loss, in killed and wounded, was nearly equal, but they lost but a few hundreds in prisoners.

What greatly enhanced the defeat of the Austrians was, of course, that they found themselves, at

the same time, cut off from their base and line of operation. This enabled Napoleon to dictate peace on his own terms. It required, indeed, a Napoleon to turn to such purpose the accidental arrival of Desaix, though Lannes, the Guard, Desaix, and Kellerman each had their due share in the success of the day.

We shall now follow Napoleon to Austerlitz, where, contrary to what happened at Marengo, he had, on the eve of battle, his forces all at hand, the designs of the enemy unraveled, and his manœuvres fixed accordingly.

After having made prisoners the Austrian army assembled round Ulm, he, as has been seen, hastened to meet the Russians, who had arrived too late to the assistance of the former. These he drove before him through Austria into Moravia, on the road to Vienna and Brunn. From Brunn, a strong place, which was also speedily evacuated by the Russians retreating toward Olmutz, Napoleon's advance corps, under Murat, soon followed the enemy.

The Russians, in thus retreating, did so in part designedly, having expected to be joined by other corps that were advancing from Poland, and which actually arrived. The last re-enforcement the Russians received was the corps under the Grand-Duke Constantine, which reached Olmutz on the 25th of November, the distance from the latter to Brunn

being about 45 miles. At that date, it may be well to observe, Napoleon had as yet his army scattered. Davoust stood at Presburg, in Hungary, watching the movements of the Austrians under the Archduke Charles; Bernadotte stood at Iglau, in Bohemia, observing another Austrian corps; while Marmont guarded the Alpine debouches leading to Italy. Napoleon would thus have found himself in a rather perplexed state if the allies had hastened their offensive and remained at Brunn, instead of retreating to Olmutz, thence to advance anew. The corps of Davoust and Bernadotte had received orders to come up to Brunn by forced marches; but they arrived only the day after the French advance was driven from Wischau—that is, November 29. The possession of Vienna, with its vast stores of provisions and materials of war, no less than that of Brunn, constituted, no doubt, decided advantages in favor of the French.

The armies brought to bear on the field of Austerlitz were nearly equal. The Russians, with the addition of the Austrians, numbered between 80,000 and 85,000; the French about 75,000. On Napoleon's advancing from Brunn on the road to Olmutz, the Russians, after their concentration at Olmutz, took the offensive, advancing toward Brunn. The two armies thus came to approach each other near the village of Austerlitz, fifteen miles distant.

from Brunn. They moved and manoeuvred for two days near each other without coming to any serious engagement. On the 28th of November the French vanguard had been driven from the village called Wischau, situated beyond Austerlitz toward Olmutz, and the day after the French also evacuated Austerlitz. The Russo-Austrians were not a little elated with these partial successes, which apparently forced Napoleon to retreat.

On the eve of battle, December 1, the Russo-Austrian army, favored with the presence of the two emperors, stood in battle array on the rugged and broken heights extending from Posoritz, on the road of Olmutz to the plateau and village of Pratzen—the extreme left extending to Augezd, a village skirted by the ponds or swamps of Satchan and Menitz. By this prolongation, their front of battle spread over four miles. The central position was formed by the height of Pratzen rising in front of Austerlitz; it was the commanding point, the key of the battle-field. The French occupied a position much less in extent, almost *vis-à-vis*, spreading from the Olmutz road, which turned their left, to the plateau of Schlapantz, Sokolnitz to Telnitz, the French right wing being nearly opposite the enemy's centre. The two armies were separated from each other by the small rivulet Goldbach and the brook Bosenitz. The ground toward the Ol-



more level, the cavalry of both
flew massed in that direction—that

is, on the Russian right and the French left. Napoleon had taken care to strengthen his left by the isolated mamelon or hill since known by the name of Santon, on which eighteen heavy pieces were mounted, and which he ordered to be defended to the last man. Lannes commanded the left, Soult held the centre, and Davoust the extreme right. Bernadotte and Murat stood in the second line, about the centre. Nine squadrons under Bessières, ten battalions of the Guard, ten of the Oudinot grenadiers, all formed in columns by battalions, with forty-one guns, formed the general reserve.

The hostile armies stood on the eve before battle within gunshot from each other. From the enemy's movements on their left, Napoleon entertained no doubt that the principal attack would be directed against his left, tending to cut off his way to Brunn and Vienna. He at once made up his mind as to what to do. To seize on the heights of Prat—the key of the position—while the enemy, exposing his line in descending down the narrow engagement, his right, was the inmost thought, a sound idea, of his premeditated manoeuvres. It seems, indeed, simple enough; but its execution depended on the harmonious co-operation of the whole line of battle, the different parts of which each a peculiar *rôle* to perform. The object, the principal object of the enemy's at-

tack, and which was protected by natural obstacles in front, had to receive the attack steadily, but, withal, to observe the defensive, gradually fall back, and thus draw the enemy after it. The left, which was threatened by a large cavalry force, had orders to keep up a bold defensive-offensive—that is, recur to attacks in order to keep the enemy in check and prevent that point from being turned. The Santon hill, with the 18 guns placed on its brow, was meant to facilitate these manœuvres on the left. The initiative of the real offensive was assigned to the centre, including partly the right; but it had to remain in an expectant attitude till the proper moment arrived.

Napoleon made known his plan to his soldiers the night before battle while passing through the bivouac, and he particularly appealed to the infantry. He was full of hope and joy in learning after midnight that the enemy continued to mass their forces on their left, thus baring, in part, the height of Pratzen. Soult now moved toward the right, his place being filled up by Bernadotte; the divisions of the former were formed in storming columns, some on two lines and some on three lines. They passed quietly the Goldbach, occupying the villages of Kobelnitz, Sokolnitz, and Telnitz. Bernadotte was to make a similar movement in advance, so as to join with his right Soult's left.

Lannes had also orders to make a corresponding movement, and, besides, to keep watch with the light cavalry on his extreme left and flank.

On the side of the allies, who were divided into five columns, Prince Bagration commanded the right wing; Prince Lichtenstein, with the *gros* of the cavalry, being placed between the right wing and the centre. Kutusoff, the generalissimo, kept the centre, and General Buxhowden commanded the left wing, which was by far the strongest in the line of battle.

The allied army commenced the attack at eight A.M., while every thing around was as yet enveloped in a dense fog. Three columns descended gradually down the height of Pratzen toward the villages of Sokolnitz and Telnitz, and the Goldbach, where the armies became first engaged. The villages, as might have been expected, were obstinately defended by the French against the superior forces moving on through the narrow roads. After an hour and a half, the Russo-Austrians finally appeared to prevail, and to gain the line of the Goldbach; the French, on their part, using every advantage of the ground, strove to make head while retreating. Meanwhile the battle also began to rage on the road of Olmutz, where Lannes had to face Prince Lichtenstein at the head of some eighty squadrons of cavalry. Napoleon, keeping between

the centre and the right, watched calmly what passed on in that direction. It was half past nine. He asked Soult how much time it would take him to crown the plateau of Pratzen. "Twenty minutes," replied the marshal. "Well, then, let us wait fifteen minutes more," said Napoleon.

The fifteen minutes passed; and Soult, with two divisions formed on two lines, and followed by two batteries, received orders to climb up the steep plateau of Pratzen, left half unoccupied. The allied troops, under the immediate control of Kutusoff, occupying the height, and who were about twelve thousand strong, appeared little prepared for this rapid onset. They were shaken by the first shock; the corps of Bernadotte, that soon came up, supported the attack made by Soult, and the Russo-Austrian battalions were thrown back in confusion down the other side of the plateau, toward the village of Austerlitz. Napoleon now changed front with two of the divisions, and moved on toward the Goldbach, to take the enemy's left wing in the rear. This movement brought between two fires the three columns entangled between Sokolnitz and Telnitz, who struggled, but with little success, to fly from the line of the Goldbach. Their way led through the narrow defiles and swamps, and they retreated amid a terrific carnage. Many thousands surrendered; others fell into the ponds and swamps, the

frozen crust of which was broken up by the batteries. Meanwhile the allies had also been forced to retreat on their right, and Napoleon soon remained undisputed master of the field. The two emperors and their armies sought for refuge in Hungary.

On closely viewing this battle-field, it will be found that the point most threatened by the enemy was, by Napoleon's dispositions, most weakly defended. The French right wing, which the allies attacked with half of their army—40,000 men—hardly consisted of more than 14,000 men; yet the general combination rendered this distribution necessary, while the nature of the ground placed it, moreover, beyond all sudden peril. The moment Pratzen was gained, the right wing was entirely disengaged. The sudden crowning of this height by Soult, it must be remembered, had also its moral effect. The loss of the allies in killed and wounded was estimated at 15,000, and more than as many prisoners, besides 160 guns. The French owned a loss of 7000.

CHAPTER XI.

BATTLES—*Continued.*

Battle of Wagram.—Immense Preparations of Napoleon.—First Day's Battle.—Renewal of the Battle.—Manceuvres and Counter-manceuvres.—Central Attack.—End of the Battle.—Observations.—Battle of Salamanca.—Battle of Solferino.—Battle of Waterloo.—Events preceding the Battle.—Manceuvres.—Attack on the English Left and Centre.—Wellington and Napoleon both expecting Re-enforcements.—Appearance of the Prussians.—Finale.

THE two days' battle of Wagram, which, properly speaking, is the renewal of that of Esslingen after a six weeks' interval, is, contrary to Austerlitz, a battle of complicated manœuvres. Both generals, Napoleon and the Archduke Charles, strove for two days to gain upon each other by constant manœuvring attacks, to repay like with like, and to assist the courage of the troops by art.

Considering the exordium initiated by Napoleon, Wagram is, no doubt, the most remarkable battle on record. Never before has a large army passed a large, deep river, in the face of an enemy holding fortified positions, to form at once, and with the utmost precision, from the order of march into the

order of battle. General Pelet, an eye-witness of no common weight, calls Wagram the model of tactic battles; and so it was throughout. All the tactic forms of the offensive and defensive were brought into play on and around the plain of Marchfeld. This must be understood to apply especially to the second day. Imagine a fine plain rising gradually into a moderate height, with a small stream running partly through it; four villages, marking four angles, and the broad Danube, with its waters divided by a few small islands, rolling in the background, and you will have a rough outline of the battle-field of Wagram. Some three hundred thousand men, surrounded by more than eight hundred guns, fought for two days on this plain and between these villages.

We have shown in another place that after the battle of Esslingen Napoleon retreated to the isle of Lobau, situated but a few miles below Vienna. Ever since that date the Austrians had remained in almost their identical position on the left bank of the Danube, while Napoleon ever since prepared, with astonishing activity, to transform Lobau into an impregnable base for the renewal of hostilities. Lobau thus became a Cyclopean abode, a most formidable intrenched camp, bristling with numerous batteries of heavy and light calibre. It was traversed by newly-made roads and causeways, and


provided with arsenals, magazines, bakeries, and hospitals. Between 800 and 900 guns, of which more than 300 were 18 and 24 pounders, and almost all taken from the arsenals of Vienna, were brought together on the island, partly mounted in batteries toward the left bank of the Danube. On the first of July he had also put into a state of defense several other much smaller islands, rising over the river to the right of Lobau, and which were of great importance in facilitating the passage of the troops to the left side. Above all, Napoleon endeavored to secure his safe communication between the island and the right bank, which formed by far the larger arm. On that side he had constructed two broad bridges, one on piles, the other of boats, taking, besides, the precautions to insure them against being destroyed by heavy timber sent drifting down, which happened so inauspiciously during the battle of Esslingen. Meanwhile every thing was also prepared for the bridging the left arm of the Danube. A small flotilla of flat-boats, mounted with light guns, was improvised to aid in protecting the passage. Both parties also employed the time in concentrating their forces, but in this respect Napoleon had the advantage.

The French were, on the eve of battle, according to general account, between 150,000 and 160,000 strong, while the Austrians numbered 140,000, and

according to another estimate, only 120,000. Napoleon, it may easily be imagined, did not neglect to execute those manœuvres and movements which were necessary to keep the enemy in doubt as to the real point of the intended passage. The design itself was sufficiently betrayed by the vast army that was approaching the right bank of the Danube to pass into the island of Lobau, the general *rendezvous*. The Austrian outposts had no difficulty whatever in observing the immense activity and movements of the French troops. On the former occasion, it will be remembered, the French debouched into the plain between Esslingen and Aspern; now Napoleon prepared for the passage farther up, beyond the village or town of Enzersdorf. This place, as well as Aspern and Esslingen, now kept occupied by the Austrians, were, in a manner, even fortified; but Napoleon hoped and expected to effect a landing despite all that, relying much on the shelter of his heavy batteries of Lobau.

The Austrian army was, at the moment we speak of, encamped behind the Rusbach, on the heights of Wagram and Neusiedel, one corps being placed along the Danube, in the fortified positions of Enzersdorf, Esslingen, and Aspern, connected with each other by a line of intrenchments, General Nordman commanding these advanced troops. To beguile the enemy, Napoleon determined to effect a

landing with a small force, July 2d, near Aspern, his real intention being, as just observed, to pass with his *gros* farther to the right, between Enzersdorf and Vittau, where the ground offered greater facilities for the deploying of the troops. The landing near



Aspern was effected under the shelter of the batteries at Lobau, and the position occupied was maintained against all the efforts of the Austrians. The passage *en gros* from Lobau was fixed for the night

of July 4th. The archduke was half an hour too late. Perceiving the immense masses of troops on the island, he gave orders to open a battery fire on the enemy at half past ten; but the French batteries, of much larger calibre, had already opened their fire at ten o'clock. The terrors of the scene were heightened by the rage of a thunder-storm that suddenly covered the horizon; and, under this double tempest, some 150,000 passed to the left bank of the Danube within a few hours. The left arm of the Danube was about 200 yards broad. Four bridges had been thrown over that arm of the Danube, and that with unparalleled dispatch, one bridge of boats having been made ready in less than an hour and a half. The flotilla of gunboats plied up and down, supporting the manœuvre. The Austrians only perceived at daybreak the large numbers of the enemy massed between Vittau and Enzersdorf. The battle-field presented, on the morning of July 5th, an oblique square, the angles of which were formed by the villages Wagram, Neusiedel, Enzersdorf, and Vittau. The Austrian left rested on Neusiedel, which was provided with a fort, the extreme right extending over Aderklaa to Gerarsdorf. The front was, besides the Rusbach, also covered by the villages of Glinzendorf, Raschdorf, and Süssenbrunn. The Austrian battle array, from Neusiedel to Gerarsdorf, made a front of between seven and eight miles.

Napoleon placed between Vittau and Enzersdorf, in the first line, the four corps d'armée of Davoust, Oudinot, Bernadotte, Massena; Marmont, Eugene, and Wrede, and the Guard, forming the second line and reserve. By nine o'clock the Austrian vanguard was driven from their whole line along the Danube. The French advanced in *échelons*, the right, or Davoust's corps, being in advance; and by noon the centre and left wing gained the direction of the right wing, thus forming a straight line extending from Glinzendorf to Süssenbrunn. The Rusbach alone now separated the two armies, which, though a small river, was not every where fordable, its high banks having, besides, obstructed the march of the cavalry. The archduke, no doubt, designed beforehand to confine his action to the defense of the line of the Rusbach; and he had, also, other reasons for avoiding coming soon into decisive action, having hourly expected the arrival of a corps from Hungary, under his brother, the Archduke John; but this very reason, not ignored by Napoleon, made him the more anxious to follow up the attack. The horse batteries were brought forward, and, assisted by their fire, the French infantry forded the Rusbach.

Now the engagement became general on the whole line, the French storming columns breaking their way up the heights of Wagram. But they

failed to shake the Austrian centre, and, after sunset, were forced to retreat, and to fall back behind the Rusbach. Thus passed the first day. This day's work was what is called a *combat d'essai*. The French remained in position near the Rusbach, the right wing leaning on Glinzendorf; the centre was about Raschdorf, the left spreading to Süssenbrunn. The *gros* of the troops were massed in the centre, drawn up in seven or eight lines. The Austrian line extended from Neusiedel to Gerarsdorf, making a front of eight miles. The corps of Prince Rosenberg was on the left; those of Bellegarde and Hohenzollern were in the centre; while the corps of Generals Klenau and Kollowrath formed the left wing. The cavalry was distributed on the wings, and partly formed the reserve. Now the Austrian commander-in-chief determined to take the offensive. The troops were set in motion an hour after midnight. The principal feature of the archduke's plan was to attack with the greatest energy possible the French left wing, both in front and flank, so as to separate it from the Danube, and thus to cut off their retreat to Lobau. Napoleon, on his part, was resolved to pursue his plan of the day before, and to turn the energy of the attack on the enemy's left wing, and that from two reasons: 1st, because Neusiedel, with its tower, was, as it were, the key of the position; 2d, in order to prevent the

junction of that wing with the re-enforcements from Hungary that were hourly expected. The archduke, no doubt, saw through Napoleon's plan, but obviously trusted to the strength of his position on his left, and thus hoped to execute his own manœuvre sooner. Before daybreak the greatest part of both armies were set in motion toward the opposite extremities of the battle-field, advancing partly by what is termed eccentric lines. Anon, the engagement spread over the whole wide front. It was four o'clock A.M. The Austrians were strong on the wings, Napoleon in the centre. His object being to see, first, the enemy unmask his designs, the French remained calmly till the whole Austrian line loosened. The latter advanced in two lines: the first line in columns in *échelon*; the second deployed, but in close order. Three corps, including the grenadiers, were set in motion against the French left wing. It so happened that the Austrian left advanced sooner than was designed, engaging the extreme right of the French at Glinzendorf; the archduke, perceiving this premature engagement, sent to Prince Rosenberg orders to halt; but it was too late. Davoust, after receiving the first attack of the enemy, passed into the offensive, cleared Glinzendorf, and marched on toward Neusiedel. Meanwhile the Austrians gained ground on their right, the corps of Bellegarde advancing on Ader-

klaa, which protected in part the approaches to Wagram.

Napoleon, who had also in store a plan of an attack on the Austrian centre, next to the turning manœuvre on their left, immediately gave orders to retake Aderklaa. Massena (who, on account of his sickness, was carried in a carriage) advanced with three divisions *écheloned*, the division of St. Cyr in advance; but the Austrians obstinately defended the village, repelling the assailing columns; the Saxon division sent to support the attack met with a similar fate. While Massena's corps, the French left, thus vainly endeavored to obtain a footing in Aderklaa, the two Austrian corps forming the extreme right followed up their turning manœuvre, and penetrated into Aspern. After a short attack, Aspern and its intrenchments were taken; the French division that had been left for its defense was forced to regain the bridge and to seek shelter in Lobau. It was past nine: the French right wing making head on its right, though distant yet from the point desired; the centre, after an obstinate and bloody contest, repelled; and the left fairly turned.

The situation was perplexing enough, even for the genius of Napoleon, who came hastening to the point of danger from the right wing, on which he had to this moment directed his chief attention. A

large intact force, forming the reserve, was at hand about Raschdorf, which could have been made use of alike to relieve Massena—that is, the left—or to try to support the centre and renew the offensive, so as to drive the enemy from his central position, while his right was thus extending toward the Danube. The latter course was obviously the bolder, but it also promised more decisive results; and it had, moreover, the advantage of squaring with the prospected manœuvre of the right wing.

Napoleon had chosen the latter course. To relieve the left wing would, indeed, have been a mere palliative. To arrive at his aim, Napoleon did what no general ever before nor since attempted. The divisions of the reserve were brought forward, and, with their hundred pieces, mostly of the reserve, were at once made to fill up the line on the centre, the heavy cavalry following behind. The massive centre, with its hundred brazen muzzles, advanced in trot till within half distance of gunshot, when volley after volley plied the Austrian battle-line with terrible havoc, thus facilitating, after silencing the Austrian batteries, the advance of the storming columns of infantry and the charges of the heavy cavalry. Aderklaa was again gained, and the enemy forced to retreat to the heights of Wagram. Massena, having meanwhile rallied his divisions, changed front, and anew engaged the en-

emy's right. It was twelve o'clock. The attack of the French now visibly gravitated toward Wagram. Davoust was now ordered to resume, with redoubled energy, his attack on Neusiedel, which, assailed both in front and flank, was finally taken. At this moment, a concentric attack by Davoust and the troops of the centre was directed against Wagram, which was likewise carried, the Austrians retreating on the whole wide line. At four o'clock the French were undisputed masters of the battle-field, and the retreat of the Austrians to Hungary cut off. The Austrians lost in killed and wounded 24,000 men, and between 8000 and 9000 in prisoners, and some 30 pieces. The total loss of the French was about 18,000 men and 12 eagles; and, according to other accounts, also several guns.

The victory of Wagram was not what is called brilliant, but certainly one which put to the hardest trial the genius of Napoleon; and, however one may admire his manœuvres and calmness in the most critical moments of this action, the opening of the battle on the first day must appear a real prodigy, a daring violation of rules by genius conscious of its own resources. Only a few days after the battle of Wagram we find Napoleon putting it down in one of his letters that a general should never risk a battle unless the chances are seventy per cent. in favor of success; yet he certainly risk-

ed enough at Wagram, and, according to his own account, with forces inferior in numbers to those of the enemy.*

The battle of Wagram may serve to illustrate, among other points, the delicate nature of flank at-

* In scolding his brother Joseph, who had, about that time, lost the battle of Talavera, for his impolitic clamors about the small number of his own, and the large forces of the enemy, Napoleon says, in a letter dated from Schonbrunn : "To represent the French as few and the enemy as numerous discourages us and gives confidence to them ; it is to give moral force to the enemy, and to take it from one's self ; for men naturally believe that, in the long run, the small number will be beaten by the greater. . . . The most experienced general finds it difficult, on the field of battle, to estimate the enemy's numbers ; and the instinct of every one is to imagine them greater than they really are. But when a man is so imprudent as to allow such ideas to circulate generally, and to authorize exaggerated accounts of the enemy's strength, every colonel of cavalry who goes on a reconnaissance sees an army, and every captain of *voligeurs* discovers battalions. . . . The art of great captains has always been to make their numbers appear very large to the enemy, and to persuade their own troops of the enemy's great inferiority. This is the first time that a general has been known to depreciate his own resources and to exalt those of the enemy. . . . I desire that all means, direct and indirect, be taken to spread the highest opinion of our numbers. . . . Far from owning that, at Wagram, I had only 100,000 men, I try to prove that I had 220,000. Constantly, in my Italian campaigns, when I had only a handful of men, I exaggerated their numbers : this served my purpose, without diminishing my glory. The skill of my operations, including that of exaggerating my strength, was afterward recognized by generals and intelligent officers.

tacks; all similar manœuvres exposing, in a greater or less degree, the turning army to be itself turned, especially if the manœuvre involves too much extension.

The battle of Salamanca, July 22, 1812, offers a striking example to that effect.

Marmont, who occupied a strong defensive position on the Duoro, where he was to be joined by the army of King Joseph (whose superiority in command he ill brooked), determined to advance and to take the offensive. He passed the Tormes at Salamanca, and took position on a table-land near the river, with a wood covering his rear. Wellington drew up his army opposite, at about a mile's distance, and had them more concentrated. Different ranges of hills surrounded the battle-ground, which presented on one extremity two isolated hills, called variously Arropiles and Hermanitos, rising at gunshot from each other. It so happened that each of the parties obtained possession of one of these hills, which, in a certain degree, commanded the position—the one being in advance of the French left, the other of the English right. Wellington, who never neglected to take advantage of the locality, had the hollow of his hill filled with part of his troops, and which were thus hidden from the enemy. The principal object of the French general obviously was to cut off the English from Ciudad

Rodrigo—their line of retreat to Portugal—and he thus began his manœuvre, with one division under Thomières, by his left. This movement, pushed on too hotly before the other troops had time to deploy in front, caused the isolation of the French left from its centre.

Wellington, who, from the summit of his Aropiles, witnessed the movement, at once determined to strike the blow. The troops crowding the hill, two other divisions, strong columns of cavalry, all were sent against the division of Thomières, which in half an hour was itself turned, broken, and thrown into confusion. Marmont had been, in the mean time, struck by a ball, and all the efforts of Clausel, his successor in command, failed to remedy the fault committed. "Clausel's division," says Napier, "had now joined Thomières, and a new front had been spread on the southern heights, yet loosely and unfit to resist, for the troops were some in double lines, some in columns, some in squares; a powerful sun struck on their eyes, and the light soil, stirred up and driven forward by a breeze, which arose in the west at the moment of attack, came mingled with smoke full upon them in such stifling volumes that, scarcely able to breathe and quite unable to see, their fire was given at random."

Before three hours had passed, and after a few impetuous charges of the English cavalry, the bat-

tle was over, the English remaining uncontrolled masters of the field. Wellington, at Salamanca, has thus given a cogent lesson as to how to profit by the faults of a bold adversary.

The battle of Solferino, June 24, 1859, as already observed, was an unpremeditated battle, a *bataille de rencontre*; the hostile armies passing from necessity, and, as it were, by themselves, from marching order into the order of battle.

The battle-field of Solferino extended over eight miles, being at midway between the Mincio and the Chiesa, and confined on one side by the Lago di Garda. It comprehended the villages of Lonato, Castiglione, Solferino, Carriona, and Volta, the latter of which being situated toward Goito and Mantua. Solferino, with its tower on the southern side, called Spia d'Italia, its grave-yard, its narrow streets, sunk amid two hills, and which, besides, commands the principal road, was the key of the position. It was also strengthened by intrenchments. Here was the central position of the Austrians. The French happened to advance in eight columns, according to an *ordre de jour*, on these very villages; and the first corps, under Baraguay d'Hilliers, forming the French centre, was the first to encounter the Austrians before Solferino. The engagement thus soon spread along the whole extended and broken line.

The forces present were, Austrians, 80,000;

French and Italians, 75,000. Both armies were equally taken by surprise, and neither the one nor the other knew which was the point most threatened. The fire thus continued for a few hours, resembling more a reconnoissance than a battle. The Emperor Napoleon, who hastened to the scene of action from his head-quarters at Montechiaro behind, at once determined, instinctively as it were, to concentrate round Solferino; and the more to make sure of this central position, he gave orders to Canrobert, who was on his right backward, to be on his guard against a possible sortie from Mantua. The infantry of the Guard forming the reserve was also ordered to converge toward Solferino. At that moment the Emperor of Austria and his staff were yet distant from taking any general dispositions.

The Austrians in the first line were the corps of Stadion, which formed the centre, Benedek, on the right, facing the Italians, and the corps of Schwarzenberg and Schafgotsch on the left. The French right was formed by Niel—M'Mahon forming the connecting link between the latter and the centre, the Italians being on the left. Two corps d'armée and part of the Guard were brought to bear on Solferino, defended only by one corps, the French order of battle presenting the convex form. Baraguay's corps, formed in masses by battalion, now attacked Solferino in front, assisted by his batteries

playing from a hill; but that part of the heights, which was covered with cypresses, as well as the grave-yard, arrested the intrepid assailants. The horse batteries now advanced, soon crumbling into dust the walls of the cemetery, against which two divisions had in vain exhausted their ardor. One point was thus gained. Meanwhile Niel made head near Guirdizzole against three corps. On the Austrian right, on the other hand, Benedek gained ground against the Italians; and, had the two corps of Clam-Golass and Zobel, who stood in the second line, hastened up in time to the defense of Solferino, then the balance might have been restored in favor of the Austrians. But, as it happened, only the former advanced, and the support thus brought could no more arrest the French. The surrounding heights, the Spia d'Italia, the village of Solferino, all were successively carried. The key of the position was gained, and through it the day.

It was about three o'clock. The Austrian centre tried, indeed, to make a stand at Carriana, but here it found itself attacked in flank by the corps of M'Mahon, while its rear was hardly pressed by the corps of Baraguay d'Hillary. At this juncture, and while Benedek was as yet making head on the right, orders were given for a general retreat, which was much favored by a thunder-storm that suddenly burst over the horizon, the retreat having been followed up to the other side of the Mincio.


The allies lost 17,000 in killed and wounded, and 3000 prisoners; the Austrian loss was 13,000 in killed and wounded, and about 8000 prisoners, besides 30 guns. It is hardly necessary to observe that, with more self-confidence and different dispositions, the battle of Solferino would hardly have been a lost battle for Austria.

We shall now pause, before concluding, at the field of Waterloo, which sealed a wondrous campaign of five days, and sent into irremediable exile the most overwhelming conqueror that ever trod this earth.

The battle of Waterloo has, ever since it took place, been the object of study and discussion of military readers, and it has very recently become familiar to tens of thousands of non-military readers by the author of *Les Misérables*. That poet-philosopher styles that battle the changing the front of the universe. However that be, what is a patent fact is, that it was a decisive battle worth an empire. Properly speaking, Waterloo was the sequel of two other battles.

Napoleon (who, after having landed in the south of France with 1200 men, gathered around him, in his progress, the remains of his old warriors) marched to Belgium to meet the Anglo-Belgian army commanded by Wellington, and the Prussian army under Blucher. The first hostilities commenced

between the Meuse and the Sambre on the 14th of June. On the 15th he passed the latter river at Charleroi, despite the opposition of the Prussians, who fell back toward Fleurus and Ligny, the latter place being about thirty miles from Brussels.



VICINITY OF WATERLOO.

The English were then near Brussels, spread on the road leading from that town to Nivelles, and passing by the village of Waterloo, which is some ten miles distant from Brussels. To prevent the union of the Prussian and English armies, and thus to try to engage the former the soonest in decisive

battle, became now a matter of course for Napoleon, and this took place next day, June 16th. Blucher took up position on the heights of Bry, his front being covered by the villages of St. Armand and Ligny. He expected to be joined by the English, part of whom were approaching Quatre-Bras.

But Napoleon sent Ney against the English, while he, with the *gros*, attacked the Prussians at Ligny. The battle commenced at three P.M., and was continued with signal obstinacy till night, when the Prussians were thrown from all their positions and forced to retreat. Meanwhile Ney engaged the English at Quatre-Bras, but not with the vigor expected by Napoleon. Here both armies remained, at night, in their respective positions. Thus passed the 16th of June—a signal victory at Ligny against the Prussians, a drawn battle with part of the English at Quatre-Bras. Wellington, on learning these events at Brussels, amid the gayeties of a ball, hastened to Quatre-Bras that very night.

Next day Napoleon divided his army in two columns: 34,000, placed under the command of Grouchy, were sent in pursuit of the Prussians, while he, with 70,000, marched on Quatre-Bras, joining Ney. The English fell gradually back toward Brussels, amid continuous skirmishing between the rear of the former and the French vanguard; and the two armies, toward evening, thus approached the forest

of Soignes, through which passes the road of Brussels, and on the other side of which is situated the hamlet of Waterloo. The rain fell down in torrents all day, telling with terrible effect on the roads, so that both armies were equally worn out with the fatigues of the day.

The hostile armies encamped at about a mile's distance from each other, being separated by an undulating valley rising into the plateau of Mont St. Jean. This height, which makes the intersection of the road leading from Brussels to Nivelles and Charleroi, was the central position of the English, the forest of Soignes being in their rear. Napoleon was not a little rejoiced to see his adversary occupy a position with a defile in his rear. In the event of a forced retreat, this, it is easy to see, would indeed have been a fatal circumstance; but Wellington had also his reasons for posting himself at the entrance of this swampy forest: it was certainly the best point for covering Brussels; and here, too, he expected to be the soonest joined by Blucher. For steady troops, such as Wellington's veterans were, this position, for the defensive, undisputedly possessed many advantages.

We shall presently return to this battle-field; but, before doing so, we must look for Grouchy, who was as indispensable to Napoleon as Blucher was to Wellington. The orders which Grouchy

received were to pursue briskly the enemy, and never lose him out of sight; and he accordingly marched from Ligny toward Gembloux, whither the Prussians were supposed to have retreated. Toward evening, June 17, Grouchy actually reached Gembloux; but, at the same time, Blucher had made his way to Wavre, situated at six miles' distance from the former. The French arrived at Gembloux at six P.M., wet and hungry; and they fell eagerly to preparing their camp and soup. The general now learned that the enemy was at Wavre. The distance was small, the orders positive, the men fatigued, rain in torrents, roads bad—a variety of conflicting considerations! Grouchy determined to wait till morning. This determination was to prefix, in a manner, the fate of the battle preparing, during a dismal night, near the forest of Soignes. Napoleon learned the news that Grouchy was at Gembloux, and that Blucher had reached Wavre, at eleven o'clock at night, and immediately sent a courier to the former, advising him that a great battle would be fought next morning; that he should hasten his march, and detach a small corps in advance to join the extreme right of the French.


The rainy night passed, giving way to a cloudy, overcast dawn. Early in the morning, June 18, the beginning of offensive movements was put altogether out of question, the rain having loosened

the ground in such a manner as to render the manœuvres of the infantry and artillery next to an impossibility; but hopes were entertained that a few hours without rain would produce a material change in the ground. After eight o'clock, the aids sent out to reconnoitre the field actually announced that it had dried up enough even for the artillery to manœuvre.

It is as difficult to determine the exact time of the beginning of the battle as the exact numbers on both sides. Wellington, in a dispatch written a few days previous to this date, says that he, with 70,000, and Blucher with his 80,000 "will be able to give a good account even of Bonaparte." Napoleon, on the other hand, says that Wellington had at Waterloo 90,000; while his own, Grouchy not included, amounted to about 70,000. According to other accounts, the French were above this number, and the English less. Most probably the numbers on both sides were nearly equal, ranging from 70,000 to 80,000 men.

The troops commanded by Wellington consisted of English, Belgians, and Germans, the English forming about one half. Their central position, as already said, was the terrace of Mont St. Jean, the advanced line leaning on four *points d'appui*. The right rested on the chateau of Hougoumont, which was surrounded with a strong loop-holed wall; be-

hind, the chateau was environed by orchards, while



BATTLE-FIELD OF WATERLOO.

a wood, covering between two and three acres, spread in front, the chateau being situated on the

road leading from Brussels to Nivelles. Almost opposite to Mont St. Jean, in advance, stood the farm La Haye Sainte, on the road to Charleroi; farther, on the English left, the farm Papelotte; and, still farther to the left, the village La Haye. The English front spread over an area of about a mile and a half. The French stood opposite, on a lower ground, with the plateau of Belle Alliance for their centre; the right leaned on Planchenoit, the left facing Hougoumont.

Never, perhaps, was Napoleon, before engaging in battle, so hopeful. "The enemy's army," he said, "is superior in numbers to ours by one fourth, yet we have ninety chances for us against ten." Ney even thought that the English were decamping; but the emperor at once consoled him by showing that now retreat was too late, and that the battle must come on. The French were, as Napoleon himself relates, divided into eleven columns, four of which were meant for the first line of battle, four for the second, and three for the third line or reserve. The infantry divisions were drawn up in two lines, separated by 120 yards from each other, with the artillery partly in front and partly in the intervals of the brigades, and the light cavalry on the wings. The whole battle array thus formed six lines, forming six V's, the line of the reserve being most contracted. Like to what happened at Wa-

gram, and from identical reasons, Napoleon determined to direct the principal attack on the English left. It was from that side that the Prussians were expected. Knowing that Blucher was approaching, Wellington's task naturally was to keep strictly on the defensive—a *rôle* particularly suitable to his character; and as natural was it, on the part of Napoleon, to assume the offensive. The two generals were thus, by the nature of things, driven to opposite tactics. If Grouchy should remain away, and, at the same time, keep off Blucher, that would have perfectly satisfied Napoleon in his combinations of the offensive.

Within two hours the French columns deployed, advanced to their proper places, and the action commenced, principally on Hougoumont, the English right. It was intended to mask the real attack on the English left. Wellington had at first only placed some 2000 men in Hougoumont, which, however, were speedily re-enforced. Generals Cook and Clinton commanded the English right; Alten and the Belgian general Chas   were in the centre; Picton and Lambert held the left wing. As it often happens, the demonstration on the English right, guided by Prince Jerome Bonaparte, soon became a most bloody combat. The wood in front of Hougoumont was finally carried, but the chateau itself was obstinately defended. A few howitzers set the

out-buildings on fire, which caught some parts of the chateau itself; but the defenders were not to be dislodged.

While things thus looked on the English right, Napoleon was about completing his dispositions for the principal attack, when something like a dark mass was perceived in the direction of St. Lambert, facing the extreme left of the English and the French right. A pause ensued. All the glasses of the staff were then applied in that direction. But as the weather was rather foggy, some asserted that there were no troops, but merely trees; while others maintained that columns were in position there. That state of uncertainty was terminated by an order for three thousand light cavalry to effect a junction, should they belong to Marshal Grouchy, or to hold them in check if they proved to be enemies. In a quarter of an hour a Prussian black hussar was brought in, being the bearer of a letter, who proved very intelligent, and gave all the information required. It then appeared that the column at St. Lambert was the advanced guard of the Prussian General Bulow, who was coming up with 30,000 men.

Shortly after, Napoleon dispatched ten thousand men, under Lobau, in the direction of St. Lambert, to check the thirty thousand Prussians who, as was supposed, must be soon taken in the rear by Grou-

chy. Napoleon now thought that of the ninety chances he had yet sixty left, and Ney thus received orders to initiate the principal attack.

It was about noon. Ney advanced, with one infantry division and eighty guns, straight on La Haye Sainte. The English battalions, overwhelmed by this fire, were dislodged and thrown into confusion. Now Wellington let loose his cavalry. The charging horse broke through the French columns, dispersed and trampled down every thing before them, dismounted several pieces, and triumphantly carried off two eagles. Napoleon then ordered forward from the second line the cuirassiers under Milhaud, and a new and still fiercer carnage commenced between cavalry and cavalry, in which the infantry on both parts, having gained rallying time, soon again participated. At last, after three hours' strife, the English were overborne, and La Haye Sainte was occupied by the French.

In the mean time, and while Mont St. Jean, the corner-stone of the English position, remained as yet intact, a separate battle raged on the extreme right of the French, between the thirteen thousand French under Lobau, and the Prussians under Bulow, the former beginning visibly to fall back. The New Guard was sent forward to the support of Lobau; but even this did not suffice to arrest the Prussians. Anon, four battalions of the Old Guard hast-

ened to that point, and Bulow was arrested and even thrown back. It was then, says Napoleon, seven o'clock. The French had also, at the same time, gained ground toward the village of La Haye, the pivot of the English left; but Mont St. Jean had yet to be taken; and, what was more, Blucher was soon to be in sight, advancing on the road of Ohain, and no traces of Grouchy! The cuirassiers of Kellerman were, at this moment, destined to support the final attack on Mont St. Jean; they were followed (and probably instinctively) by the cavalry of the Guard, forming part of the reserve. These heavy, iron-breasted horsemen galloped down the narrow valley and then up the slopes of the height, deploying within fifty yards of the English batteries, flanked by squares. Here, on the narrow crest of Mont St. Jean, heavy cavalry squadrons and infantry squares engaged in close combat, such as was probably never before witnessed, both dying by the hundred, and both alike determined not to yield.

Napoleon now advanced with eight infantry battalions of the Old Guard, which was all he had at hand. These veterans advanced into the fray shouting "*Vive l'Empereur.*" They appeared to make head irresistibly, and to turn the scale; but it was too late; already were the heads of Blucher's columns seen approaching La Haye. Grouchy, who

had heard the cannonade of Waterloo, allowed himself to be arrested at Wavre by Blucher's rear. Bulow, too, had by this time worked his way into the French rear, toward Planchenoit. All was now over; the panic-stricken French fled from the field in wild confusion. Like Frederick the Great at Kunnersdorf, Napoleon, too, in vain courted death at Waterloo; he, too, had to fly, losing at once the day and the empire.

Dispassionate critics find fault with Napoleon for having, contrary to his usual conduct, neglected the *ensemble* of the manœuvres on the field of Waterloo, while they censure Ney for having deployed, with his heavy squadrons, so near the English batteries—a manœuvre which exposed his own men, while it saved the enemy from the shock. These reasonings, it must be admitted, are not without foundation; though few will agree with those who think that, instead of making the last attempt, Napoleon ought to have prepared his retreat. Whether Grouchy be culpable or not, the fact is, that his non-arrival was the main cause of the issue of the battle. And if it be true, as related in the "Stories of Waterloo," that in the most doubtful moments Wellington prayed for Blucher or night, it may easily be imagined that, till the last moment, Napoleon expected to see Grouchy. That both armies performed feats of extraordinary valor is a fact ver-

ified by thousands of testimonies; but it must, at the same time, be admitted that the English had, upon the whole, the more difficult task to perform. Theirs was the steady, unruffled defensive. They had, as it were, to "feed death, inactive and unmoved;" to listen coolly to the constant command "close up," marking the quick succession of the slaughter. It is a fact worth bearing in mind that the 92d had only 200 men left, and yet returned to the charge. The French cuirassiers, on the other hand, stood, at fifty yards' distance, five rounds of grape-shot without stirring, and retreated only after the twenty-ninth round!

CHAPTER XII.

CONCLUSION.

General Remarks.—Retreats.—Forced and Voluntary Retreats.—Bugeaud's Dictum.—Modes of Retreating.—Advantages and Disadvantages of a retreating Army.—Examples.

AFTER this survey of a few of the most renowned campaigns and battles, little remains to add in this place. A hundred circumstances will contribute toward fixing and modifying the manœuvres of the battle-field. Nor would there be any use in entering into such abstract discussions as the respective value of the infantry fire and the bayonet charge, or the solidity of squares with regard to cavalry charges. Good infantry will know how to employ with efficacy both its fire and the bayonet; and efficient cavalry will make itself felt under almost every circumstance. It is for the tact and knowledge of the commanding generals to distribute the *rôles* to the different arms, and to predetermine and remodel the battle array. What ought not to be forgotten is, that the actual number of the wounded and slain is not always the test of victory. An army attacking another army occupying strong

intrenched positions may incur greater losses in driving the enemy from its positions, and yet justly claim victory. Victory is not so much gained by the numbers of the slain as by the fear and disorder of those who survive.

Great captains have sometimes lost battles by over-confidence and proud stubbornness. At the battle of Kunnersdorf, 1759, Frederick the Great engaged, immediately after a fatiguing march, the Russo-Austrian army, which was greatly superior in numbers to his own, and in strong positions. By the dint of extraordinary exertions, the Prussians succeeded in routing the enemy's left, in breaking his centre, and capturing scores of guns. A deep ravine led to the enemy's right; the generals implored the king to stop, and to remain contented with the great successes already obtained. Frederick, actuated by a fatal obstinacy, and bent on victory complete, gave orders to advance. The result of this order was dire defeat. Had the enemy followed up his unexpected victory, then the annihilation of the great king would have been consummated that very evening. Yet it would be idle to try to lay down rules as to how far an army may push on its attack, and when and at what point it ought to slacken or recede. However, a certain combination, a degree of preconcerted dispositions, though liable to failure, ought to mark all kinds of

operations, whether on the battle-field, preparatory marches, or retreats.

Without at all intending here to enter into a methodic description of the different kinds of retreats, it may yet be necessary to observe that there are voluntary and forced retreats. Voluntary retreats naturally present no difficulty whatever. In such cases, retreats partake of the character of manœuvring marches. But quite different is it when you are forced to retreat, and especially immediately after a battle lost. In the latter event, fear and disorder take the initiative, and the giving and execution of orders will, in many instances, become a sheer impossibility in the first moments of the panic. However, with disciplined troops properly led, such general confusion will rarely occur, and last but a few moments; and, unless totally broken, a steady army will have in itself the means necessary to bring order into its retrograding march, and to save it from utter dissolution. An acquired ascendancy of an army or its leaders will sometimes suffice to rescue a retreating army after the heaviest of defeats. The retreat of Frederick the Great from Kunnersdorf and that of Napoleon from La Rothière offer, perhaps, the most striking examples to this effect. This sufficiently proves the influence of the morale of an army, but the morale has to be sustained by tactic rules and forms.

It is a verified fact that, to retreat well, an army must, from time to time, advance; forced to turn its back on the enemy, it must endeavor now and then to show him its face. If the front is broken and receding, some parts of it ought to try to halt, while the others retire, then the others make a stand and allow these to retreat. This is what is called to retreat *en échiquier*. A retreating army, in short, must show the enemy that it has got some spirit left in it, and disguise its fear. However, it is perhaps in retreats, more than any where else, when pedantic adherence to form and rules ought to be avoided. Bugeaud, who expresses his opinion without reserve on that point, says, "The slow retreat *en échiquier* has compromised or destroyed many a corps which might have been saved by a more prompt retreat. This method, which is in many instances called methodic, allows the enemy to come near, and forces the retreating army to re-engage, and that with considerable losses. The best method is to apply the manœuvres to the circumstances; sometimes it is best to run *à toutes jambes*; rout has often preserved vanquished armies from destruction, and that is the reason why, in certain cases, rout should be ordered and organized." It must not, of course, be understood that this intrepid general is giving *carte blanche* to certain armies to fly as far as they choose. What he means

is, that a retreating army should the soonest get out of its flight in order to rally the soonest where it can make a new stand.

A beaten army must try to get out of the reach of the enemy, and night will often favor its retrograding march. While the principal column retreats undisturbed, the rear guard will avail itself of every advantage of ground to arrest the pursuing enemy. In an open country cavalry is indispensable to cover the retreat; while in mountainous, broken ground, the principal work is done by infantry; much can naturally be achieved, in certain cases, by the artillery alone. In every case, it is the rear guard that plays the principal *rôle*, and it forms generally from one third to one fifth of the total army. The rear guard must always march in columns, and sometimes even in squares, as the French did in Egypt, where the vast plains so much exposed them to the attacks of the Mamelukes. The rear guard itself has its small rear guard, as well as its flankers. Defiles must be passed rapidly.

A large army, it is hardly necessary to say, can not retreat by one road; and, while thus dividing its forces, the enemy will probably do the same. The different roads, supposed to be parallel, ought not to be so distant as to entirely isolate the columns from each other; however, in many instances, there is no great choice. The general commanding

keeps usually with the central column. "In order that the march be executed regularly, it is necessary," says Dufour, "that the commander of each column be summarily informed of the object in view of the commander-in-chief; that each commander know who are his neighbors—who are before and who behind him; by whom he will be assisted if attacked, and where to fall back if forced to yield to superior numbers." It is necessary, he adds, "that there be continuous communication between the general head-quarters and those of the different corps d'armée."

A retreating army, amid all its calamities, has one, we might add, involuntary advantage, viz., capacity of marching; we mean, of course, immediate retreat. Fear doubles, quintuples its pace; it becomes, as it were, insensible to fatigue; and a great advantage that is. Marshal Saxe, that famous general of a former century, for example, enjoins vigorous, unrelenting pursuit. "An enemy," he says, "ought to be vigorously pushed, harassed night and day, and pursued through every winding he can make. By a conduct of this sort, the advancing army will drive him from all his holds and fastnesses, and his retreat will ultimately turn out a complete overthrow. Ten thousand well-trained and disciplined troops, sent forward from the main army to hang upon the rear of a retiring enemy, will be

able to destroy an army of 100,000 men, when that army has once been forced to make retrograde movements. A want of confidence in their generals, added to many other disheartening circumstances, will naturally possess the minds of the latter, while implicit confidence and warm affection must influence the former. A first defeat, well followed up, almost always terminates in a total rout, and finishes the contest." An enemy once retreating in earnest, the marshal thinks, "can be driven before you by the mere noise of empty bladders."

These lessons, however, must be taken with certain qualifications. The actual loss sustained, the moral effects produced by the loss, as well as the degree of fatigue of both armies, all modify the nature and results of the pursuit. If you have no fresh corps at hand, you can, at most, only send your cavalry in immediate pursuit of the enemy; and night will arrest them also. The Prussians, who launched themselves, in the dark night, in pursuit of the French at Waterloo, were, as we have seen, fresh troops. The Hungarian army in 1849, consisting chiefly of raw recruits, and mostly in summer jackets, retreated, for a period of two months, before the Austrians through mountains covered with ice. The enemy was in its rear, in front, and on its flanks; and the former finally effected their junction with the other corps, to begin an irresistible offensive.

In many instances, the pursuing army, with the best will and the best possible dispositions, is physically incapable of doing more than follow the retreating enemy, as was exemplified in the pursuit of the English, under Sir John Moore, by the French in 1809. Despite all the efforts of Soult, during a pursuit of ten days, the English, having at times halted in favorable positions, finally gained the port of Corunna, and, with it, the protection of the fleet.

The miseries and calamities of retreat were probably never exhibited in such a measure, and such variety, as in that of Napoleon from Moscow; but the extraordinary circumstances under which it was effected justly place it among the greatest of exceptions. This disastrous retreat can no more serve as an example than the successful retreat of Xenophon, begun, as history relates, under the favorable auspices of two dreams and a sneeze—auspices of not much value nowadays.



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
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
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